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INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected
state and federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither comprehensive in
breadth, as several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues within individual cases are
omitted. Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an authoritative guide; rather, they are
intended to alert the Alaska legal community to judicial decisions from the previous year. The
summaries are grouped by subject matter.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
top
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Disability Law Center of Alaska v. Anchorage School District
In Disability Law Center of Alaska v. Anchorage School District,1 the Ninth Circuit held that the removal
of an employee allegedly responsible for abuse does not defeat probable cause that the abuse occurred under the
Development Disabilities Act (“DDA”).2 Following six separate complaints of mistreatment of disabled students,
the Disability Law Center of Alaska requested information regarding the students.3 The district provided most of the
information but refused to provide guardian contact information for the students.4 The district court held that the
Law Center had no probable cause of continuing neglect because the alleged offenders were no longer employed by
the school, and dismissed the case.5 The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, reasoning that because the DDA
contemplates abuse that has occurred and that which may occur, the removal of the alleged offender from the school
did not defeat the Law Center’s showing of probable cause.6 Further, it held that the Federal Educational Rights and
Privacy Act did not prevent the disclosure of guardian contact information under the DDA.7 The Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court decision holding that the removal of an employee allegedly responsible for abuse does not
defeat probable cause that the abuse occurred under the DDA.8

Alaska Supreme Court
Alaska Exchange Carriers Ass’n, Inc. v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska
In Alaska Exchange Carriers Ass’n, Inc. v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska,9 the supreme court held that
the Alaska Exchange Carriers Association (“AECA”) had no statutory right to intervene in a regulatory proceeding
and that the Regulatory Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention to the AECA.10
After a local telephone company proposed moving its first point of switching for routing telephone traffic, AECA,
an association of local telephone companies, sought to intervene in the ensuing regulatory proceeding.11 The
Regulatory Commission denied intervention and the superior court affirmed.12 AECA appealed to the supreme
court, arguing that it had an implied statutory right to intervene and a right to permissive intervention under 3 Alaska
Adminstrative Code 48.110(a).13 The court reasoned that AECA had no implicit statutory right to intervene because
of its narrow administrative role.14 Further, AECA failed to carry its burden in satisfying three of the permissive
intervention factors under the statute.15 The Regulatory Commission’s findings with regard to these factors was
subject to an abuse of discretion standard and the court was not persuaded to overturn the agency’s findings that: (1)
AECA’s interest in the proceeding was insufficient, (2) AECA’s institutional knowledge would not assist the
proceeding, and (3) AECA’s intervention may delay the proceeding.16 Affirming the lower court’s denial of
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intervention, the supreme court held that AECA had no statutory right to intervene and the Regulatory Commission
did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention to the AECA.17
Alaska Public Offices Commission v. Stevens
In Alaska Public Offices Commission v. Stevens,18 the supreme court held that the Alaska Public Offices
Commission (“APOC”) could not impose a civil penalty on a legislator for failure to report because the reporting
requirements for the Legislative Financial Disclosure Statement (“LFD”) were ambiguous.19 Alaska State Senator
Stevens was elected to serve on the board of directors for SEMCO Energy, Inc.20 Stevens’ contract provided that his
compensation would be paid after his term expired in 2007 so that payment of his federal income tax could be
deferred.21 As a legislator, Stevens was required to report sources of income over $5000 on a LFD.22 On his LFD for
2005, Stevens failed to disclose the deferred income.23 APOC ordered a fine of $630 for this failure to report,24 and
Stevens sought judicial review.25 The court reversed the order, and APOC appealed to the supreme court.26 While
concluding that APOC’s interpretation of reporting requirements was not necessarily incorrect, the supreme court
noted that APOC’s LFD instruction manual did not discuss deferred compensation but spoke only in terms of
income received.27 Accordingly, the court determined that it was reasonable for Stevens to believe that he did not
need to report money that he did not yet have in hand.28 The court also reasoned that the 2007 amendments to the
reporting-requirement statutes that specifically addressed deferred compensation demonstrated that the previous
requirements were ambiguous.29 Affirming the superior court’s reversal of the APOC fine, the supreme court held
that the APOC could not impose a civil penalty on a legislator for failure to report because the reporting
requirements for the LFD were ambiguous.30
Allen v. State
In Allen v. State,31 the supreme court held that the Department of Health and Social Services (“HSS”) was
entitled to reduce an individual’s future monthly food stamp allotments in order to recoup overpaid benefits even
when HSS’s errors caused the overpayments.32 Allen received an excess of food stamps for several months due to an
error at the HSS.33 When HSS discovered its error, it gave written notice to Allen that her future monthly food
stamps would be reduced to make up for the overpayments.34 Allen argued that the doctrine of equitable estoppel
should prevent the HSS from reducing her food stamps because she reasonably relied on the assertion that she was
entitled to the benefits.35 HSS argued that the federal Food Stamp Act preempted equitable estoppel because it states
that households are liable for overpayments.36 Additionally, Allen claimed that HSS’s notice to her was inadequate
because it failed to provide three pieces of information that were required by statute.37 On appeal, the supreme court
affirmed the issue of equitable estoppel but reversed the finding of adequate notice.38 The court reasoned that it
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could not find for Allen on the equitable estoppel issue without being in direct conflict with federal law.39 However,
the court held that HSS did not provide adequate notice since it did not comply with statutory requirements and this
error violated Allen’s due process right to notice.40 Affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the lower
court, the supreme court held that HSS is entitled to reduce an individual’s future monthly food stamp allotments in
order to recoup overpaid benefits even when HSS’s errors caused the overpayments.41
Bohlman v. Alaska Construction & Engineering, Inc.
In Bohlman v. Alaska Construction & Engineering, Inc.,42 the supreme court held that the Alaska Workers’
Compensation Board should have either corrected misinformation given by the employer or told the employee how
to obtain the correct information.43 Bohlman filed a claim for adjustment of his compensation and his employer,
filed a notice controverting the claim on August 6, 2003.44 Bohlman was told that he needed to file an affidavit of
readiness for hearing within two years of his claim being controverted.45 On July 20, 2005, Bohlman tried to amend
his claim, but Alaska Construction & Engineering argued that the claims were barred and the deadline for amending
the claim had passed.46 The board did not inform Bohlman that the deadline was not until August 6, 2005.47
Bohlman filed on August 31, 2005, and the claim was denied because it was submitted past the deadline.48 The
supreme court held that the board should have either corrected the claim that the deadline had already passed, or told
Bolhman how to figure out the correct deadline.49 The court reasoned that the board has this responsibility since it is
an adjudicative body and this requirement is similar to the duty that a court owes to a pro se party.50 The supreme
court reversed the decision of the appeals commission, holding that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board
should have either corrected misinformation given by the employer or told the employee how to obtain the correct
information.51
Boyd v. State
In Boyd v. State,52 the court of appeals held that a road grader operating on the state highway system is a
vehicle subject to permitting regulations.53 Boyd was cited for operating an oversized vehicle without a permit.54 On
appeal, Boyd argued that the road grader he was driving was special mobile equipment rather than a commercial
vehicle, and that the regulations applied only to commercial vehicles.55 The court of appeals determined that the
Department of Transportation and Public Facilities had broad authority to regulate vehicle operations on state
highways.56 Based on the plain language of the regulations, the court further determined that a road grader qualifies
as a vehicle, and that the permitting regulations apply to all vehicles rather than the subset of commercial vehicles.57
The court also noted that if the regulations applied only to commercial vehicles, a large number of vehicles would be
left unregulated, defeating the point of the regulations.58 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of
the district court and held that a road grader is a vehicle subject to permitting regulations.59
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Button v. Haines Borough
In Button v. Haines Borough,60 the supreme court held that a borough manager was justified in denying an
application for renewal of a commercial tour operator’s license when the operator had been twice convicted of
offenses stemming from his tours and had been the subject of several complaints from customers and competitors.61
The plaintiff, Button, had been operating tours in Haines for five years when he submitted his annual application to
renew his tour operator permit.62 The reviewing clerk rejected his application because: (1) he had been recently
convicted of two misdemeanors related to his business, (2) several complaints had been filed about his unsafe use of
his catamaran, (3) he had pressured other boat captains for favors, and (4) he had impeded waterway traffic in using
his boat.63 The supreme court held that the admission of the prior convictions was not inadmissible hearsay because
administrative officers are not bound by the Alaska Rules of Evidence and are instead required to consider only
factual circumstances.64 Button did not deny that he had in fact been convicted of the crimes.65 While some of the
other factual findings of the administrator were not supported by substantial evidence, the court reasoned that a
statute allowing for the non-renewal of permits for violations of “applicable law” was broad enough to encompass
non-renewal for violations that occurred outside of Haines Borough.66 The court then held that the administrative
process was procedurally sound and did not deny him due process, and that although the borough manager had
advance knowledge of Button’s convictions, there was no evidence that his having this knowledge biased the
hearing.67 The court further held that because of the great value that the state places on public safety, denying the
permit removal of a tour boat operator who frequently violated safety rules was not an overly severe sanction.68
Hence, the supreme court held that a borough manager was justified in denying an application for renewal of a
commercial tour operator’s license when the operator had twice been convicted of offenses stemming from his tours
and been the subject of several complaints from customers and competitors.69
Copeland v. Ballard
In Copeland v. Ballard,70 the supreme court held that a governmental agency may not dismiss litigants for
failure to meet the deadline for payment of record costs in advance of the trial when the agency failed to provide
clear and accurate explanations of the costs, the delay did not prejudice the agency, and the agency failed to explore
alternatives to dismissal.71 Copeland and Ott moved to intervene in an administrative action filed with the
Department of Environment Conservation (“DEC”).72 The parties negotiated the preparation and certification of the
administrative record which culminated in an order in January 2004 that Copeland and Ott must pay two-thirds of
the record costs by February 13, 2004, or face dismissal.73 Both Copeland and Ott were dismissed on March 2, 2004,
for non-payment. They promptly requested reconsideration of dismissal and submitted a check for their two-thirds
portion, but their check was returned and their dismissal approved.74 Copeland and Ott appealed to the superior court
and argued that their due process rights had been violated, but the superior court affirmed the dismissal.75 On appeal,
the supreme court reversed in part the superior court’s decision and held that Title 18, Section 15.237(b) of the
Alaska Administrative Code violated the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution because it restricted access to
the record prior to certification, and DEC had failed to show a valid governmental interest for the restriction.76
Although the statute did not violate the due process clause on its face, the court held that DEC nonetheless erred in
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its failure to explain how it applied the pro rata cost-sharing method to the three consolidated appeals.77 Finally, the
court held that the agency abused its discretion in dismissing Copeland and Ott because it failed to explore
alternatives to dismissal and could easily have reinstated them after their payment was received.78 The supreme
court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the lower court by holding that a governmental agency
may not dismiss litigants for failure to meet a deadline for payment of record costs in advance of the trial when the
agency failed to provide clear and accurate explanations of the costs, the delay does not prejudice the agency, and
the agency failed to explore alternatives to dismissal.79
Kuzmin v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
In Kuzmin v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,80 the supreme court held that the Commercial Fisheries
Entry Commission (“CFEC”) did not abuse its discretion in denying a person’s limited entry crab permit application
when the person did not demonstrate that he was in joint control of his fishing operation.81 Kuzmin, a crab fisher,
applied for an entry permit to the Kodiak bairdi Tanner crab pot fishery, claiming that he qualified because he had
nineteen points for consistent participation based on the pounds of crab that he had harvested in past years.82 The
CFEC denied his application, reasoning that Kuzmin had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he was
in joint control of the fishing operation; thus, he had not earned the partnership participation points that he had
claimed and had instead acquired only thirteen points.83 Kuzmin appealed, claiming that the CFEC’s decision was
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not supported by evidence.84 The superior court found for the CFEC
because substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Kuzmin was participating in the crab fishing as a
crewmember and not a partner.85 On appeal, the supreme court found that Kuzmin failed to show by substantial
evidence that he was in joint control of the operation because neither Kuzmin nor the owner of the fishing boat
testified that Kuzmin was in joint control of the operation, the owner referred to Kuzmin as a deckhand, and Kuzmin
did not do the majority of the work on board.86 The court further found that the trial court did not err in using joint
control as the standard for determining partnership status.87 Affirming the decision of the lower court, the supreme
court held that the CFEC did not abuse its discretion in denying a person’s limited entry crab permit application
when the person did not demonstrate that he was in joint control of his fishing operation.88
Municipality of Anchorage v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska,89 the supreme court held that a
regulatory commission must have a reasonable basis for denying a municipality’s request to increase rates.90 In
response to a new ordinance, the Municipality attempted to raise rates to erase a deficit.91 The Regulatory
Commission of Alaska (“RCA”) denied the request to increase rates and the superior court affirmed the denial.92
Reversing the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that there was no reasonable basis for RCA’s
ruling.93 The court, applying a deferential reasonable basis standard to RCA’s conclusions of law, found that RCA
unreasonably believed itself to be bound by precedent, failed to consider applicable law, and denied the request
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without sufficient factual findings.94 Reversing the decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that a
regulatory commission must have a reasonable basis for denying a municipality’s request to increase rates.95
Rubey v. Alaska Commission on Postsecondary Education
In Rubey v. Alaska Commission on Postsecondary Education,96 the supreme court held that a student loan
borrower did not have a statutory or regulatory right to medical cancellation of student loans, and the Alaska
Commission on Postsecondary Education (“ACPE”) has a discretionary right to eliminate eligibility for medical
cancellation of student loans.97 ACPE denied Rubey’s request, based on a permanent disability, for cancellation of
loans.98 Rubey appealed, arguing that he had an implied statutory right to medical cancellation, that applicable
regulations provided a right to cancellation, and that ACPE’s exclusion of medical cancellation provisions in
promissory notes was outside the scope of its authority.99 The supreme court reasoned that no implied statutory right
exists because such cancellation rights are explicitly given in other contexts.100 Further, no regulation governed
because there was no term in the promissory note granting a cancellation right.101 The ACPE did not act outside the
scope of its authority because it has broad discretion to exercise business judgment and no statutory directive existed
providing for medical cancellations.102 The supreme court thus affirmed the superior court, and held that a student
loan borrower did not have a statutory or regulatory right to medical cancellation of student loans and the ACPE has
a discretionary right to eliminate eligibility for medical cancellation of student loans.103
Squires v. Alaska Board of Architects, Engineers, & Land Surveyors
In Squires v. Alaska Board of Architects, Engineers, & Land Surveyors,104 the supreme court held that an
agency may impose experience verification requirements when determining an applicant’s eligibility for a waiver of
a required examination to become an engineer.105 Squires, who had never been a registered engineer in any
jurisdiction, applied for a fundamental exam waiver in December 2003.106 The Board denied his waiver application,
reasoning that he was unable to demonstrate the requisite twenty years of professional experience.107 Squires
appealed to the superior court, which upheld the Board’s decision.108 On appeal, Squires argued that the experience
verification requirements were invalid because they violated the Administrator Procedure Act (“APA”).109 He also
argued that imposing the experience verification requirements denied him due process and equal protection under
the law.110 The supreme court affirmed the superior court decision, reasoning that the agency’s experience
verification requirement was not a regulation and so did not have to be promulgated in accordance with the APA.111
This was because it: (1) was not unforeseeable, (2) was in effect for at least six years before Squires’ waiver
application, and (3) was a reasonable interpretation of the phrase “satisfactory evidence” found in the statute.112 The
court held that the significant interest of the Board and the government in ensuring that all registered engineers are
duly qualified was not outweighed by Squires’ due process claims.113 Finally, the court denied the equal protection
claim because Squires was not similarly situated to licensed Canadian engineers seeking registration by comity,
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since they had already been registered for at least five years in their own country.114 Therefore, the supreme court
affirmed the decision of the court of appeals that an agency may impose experience verification requirements when
determining an applicant’s eligibility for a waiver of a required examination to become an engineer.115

BUSINESS LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Askinuk Corp. v. Lower Yukon School District
In Askinuk Corp. v. Lower Yukon School District,116 the supreme court held that a lease providing land to a
school district for one dollar per year was valid and enforceable.117 Askinuk Corp. leased twenty acres to the Lower
Yukon School District to build a school at the rate of one dollar per year for the first ten years.118 This rate would
remain in effect after ten years if the parties were unable to reach mutual agreement on a different rate.119 Roughly
fifteen months later, Askinuk sued for the lease to be invalidated or reformed.120 The superior court granted
summary judgment to the school district, and Askinuk appealed.121 On appeal, the supreme court determined that the
Askinuk chairman’s signature did in fact bind the corporation because it held the chairman out as having “apparent
authority” to do so and because it was reasonable for the school district to believe that the chairman had the
authority to bind Askinuk.122 The court next found that Askinuk’s failure to follow its own internal requirements and
present the lease to its shareholders for their assent could not serve as the basis for avoiding a contract with a third
party.123 The court then held that the implied construction of a school was sufficient to provide the bargained-for
consideration in leasing the land and that the renegotiation provision was not illusory because it was made in good
faith.124 The court then went on to reason that the lease was not unconscionable because bargaining power was equal
and because the terms were not coerced or supremely one-sided.125 Finally, the court reasoned that the lease should
not be reformed on grounds of mistake when Askinuk had not shown that the school district knew that the
corporation’s shareholders were mistaken about the terms of the lease.126 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s decision and held that a lease which provided land to a school district for one dollar per year was
both valid and enforceable.127
Egner v. Talbot’s, Inc.
In Egner v. Talbots, Inc.,128 the supreme court held that when an alleged shareholder was told she had no
claim to a corporation’s stock, she was put on inquiry notice that her status as a shareholder was disputed, triggering
the statute of limitations.129 Egner alleged that she owned shares in Talbot’s, Inc., but the corporation claimed Egner
never owned stock.130 Egner admitted that by 1986 she knew that two others were claiming sole ownership of the
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company and had excluded Egner from the business.131 The statute of limitations for contract causes of action was
six years.132 Egner initiated suit in 2006.133 Under the discovery rule, a cause of action begins when a person has
enough information to alert them to begin an inquiry into her rights for a potential cause of action.134 Because Egner
was on inquiry notice by 1986, Talbot’s was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because of the statute of
limitations.135 Furthermore, denial of an alleged shareholder’s claim to stock ownership establishes a permanent
violation, which prohibits the shareholder from recovering on the continuing violations doctrine.136 Affirming the
decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that when an alleged shareholder was told she had no claim to a
corporation’s stock, she was put on inquiry notice that her status as a shareholder was disputed, triggering the statute
of limitations for her claim.137
Frost v. Spencer
In Frost v. Spencer,138 the supreme court held that due process was violated when a trial court decided it
would apply domestic relations law rather than partnership law—as agreed by the parties—to a dissolution of a
business’s assets.139 After a business relationship failed between Spencer and Frost, who were sporadically
romantically involved, Spencer sued for division of partnership property under the law of domestic relations.140
After trial, the court decided that it would use partnership law instead of domestic relations law and split the assets
equally.141 Frost appealed, arguing that deciding the case based on partnership law despite the expectation that it
would be decided on domestic relations law was a violation of her due process rights.142 The supreme court decided
the case on abuse of discretion rather than due process grounds because of a preference for constitutional
avoidance.143 Since procedural fairness required sufficient notice and an opportunity to present appropriate evidence,
it violated due process for the court to unexpectedly change the legal framework from that which was agreed
upon.144 Because different facts would be relevant in the termination of a partnership rather than a domestic
relationship, Frost should have been given an opportunity to make an appropriate evidentiary presentation.145 In
vacating the ruling of the trial court,146 the supreme court held that due process was violated when a trial court
decided it would apply domestic relations law rather than partnership law—as agreed by the parties—to a
dissolution of a business’s assets.147
Kazan v. Dough Boys, Inc.
In Kazan v. Dough Boys, Inc.,148 the supreme court held that it was an error to rescind a settlement
agreement with respect to one party and not the other.149 Kazan had a lien on the property of Dough Boys, Inc.150
When Dough Boys tried to sell the property to Sagaya Corporation, the lien inhibited closing.151 The sale agreement
thus provided that Sagaya would pay Kazan $60,000 in return for certain releases of claims by Kazan.152 At trial in
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2006, Dough Boys sought and received damages for the $60,000 paid to Kazan.153 On appeal, the supreme court
found that the trial court erred by only rescinding part of the settlement agreement.154 A number of policy reasons
support the enforcement of settlement agreements, and in absence of evidence that an agreement is unconscionable
or has another basis for invalidation, settlement agreements will be upheld.155 Reversing the decision of the lower
court, the supreme court held that it was error to rescind a settlement agreement with respect to one party and not the
other.156
Mat-Su Valley Medical Center, LLC v. Advanced Pain Centers of Alaska, Inc.
In Mat-Su Valley Medical Center, LLC v. Advanced Pain Centers of Alaska, Inc.,157 the supreme court held
that a health care provider had standing to enjoin the construction of a competitor’s facility and that the provider’s
appeal of the State’s certificate of need determination was not untimely.158 Advanced Pain Centers of Alaska, Inc.
applied to the State for a determination of whether a certificate of need (“CON”) was necessary to construct an
ambulatory surgery center.159 Alaska law requires a CON if construction exceeds a certain threshold.160 The State
determined that no CON would be needed.161 Mat-Su Valley Medical Center, LLC (“Mat-Su”), a competitor of
Advanced Pain Centers, then sued Advanced Pain Centers and the State alleging Advanced Pain Centers
misrepresented the construction.162 The superior court granted summary judgment for Advanced Pain Centers and
the State because Mat-Su lacked standing and failed to make a timely appeal of the State’s decision to approve the
CON.163 On appeal, Mat-Su argued that it had standing because the CON statute ought to be interpreted as providing
standing for the public to sue for violations of the statute itself—not only for violations of pre-existing CONs—and
that the State’s CON determination was invalid because Advanced Pain’s estimate lacked the required supporting
information.164 The supreme court adopted Mat-Su’s reading of the standing provision because it was more
consistent with precedent, because it was more textually accurate, and because an interpretation in which only the
State had standing to challenge its own failure to require a CON would create a hole in enforcement.165 Next, the
court observed that the thirty-day administrative appeal period begins to run only after the state agency has issued a
decision that clearly asserts that it is a final decision and that affected parties have thirty days to challenge.166 The
court determined that here the State never provided that clear assertion, and therefore the thirty-day period never
started to run.167 The court thus reversed and remanded the case, holding that a health care provider had standing to
enjoin the construction of a competitor’s facility and that the provider’s appeal of the State’s certificate of need
determination was not untimely.168
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
top
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Exxon Valdez v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
In Exxon Valdez v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,169 the Ninth Circuit held that, in the suit arising from the Exxon
Valdez wreck: (1) the post-judgment interest award ran from the date of the original judgment,170 and (2) each party
had to bear its own appellate costs.171 The case appeared before the Ninth Circuit on remand, following a Supreme
Court decision that, under maritime law, set the maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory damages at one to
one.172 Issues related to interest and appellate costs were left to the discretion of the court of appeals.173 The court
held that interest is ordinarily computed from the date of an original judgment’s initial entry when both the
evidentiary and legal bases for an award are sound.174 The court concluded that plaintiffs’ entitlement to punitive
damages was meaningfully ascertained on the date the original district court judgment was entered.175 With respect
to appellate costs, the court reasoned that neither side was a clear winner, because although the award was
substantially reduced by ninety percent, it was still the fourth largest punitive damages award ever granted.176 The
court exercised its discretion by requiring each party to bear its own appellate costs, noting that it had consistently
ordered the same outcome on appeals where punitive awards were upheld but reduced.177 Remanding the case to the
district court for entry of final judgment, the Ninth Circuit held that, in the suit arising from the Exxon Valdez
wreck: (1) the post-judgment interest award ran from the date of the original judgment,178 and (2) each party had to
bear its own appellate costs.179

Alaska Supreme Court
Adkins v. Stansel
In Adkins v. Stansel,180 the supreme court held that a prisoner who filed a pro se complaint alleging that a
warden intentionally violated the prisoner’s constitutional right to rehabilitation should be given the opportunity to
proceed past the pleading stage.181 Adkins, a prisoner in Arizona, felt that his constitutional right to rehabilitation
had been violated because the warden refused to let his cousin visit him in prison.182 The trial court granted the
prison’s motion to dismiss at the pleading stage.183 On appeal, the supreme court held that it was error to dismiss
Adkins’s claim at the pleading stage, particularly because he was a pro se litigant who should be held to a lower
standard than attorneys.184 The court reasoned that since Adkins’s complaint alleged that the denial of visitation was
intentional and that it was part of a pattern of conduct, it was error for the superior court to conclude at the pleading
stage that the denial of visitation was a mere mistake.185 The court further reasoned that the superior court may reach
the same conclusion upon a summary judgment motion after hearing evidence from the warden that proves he made
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a mere mistake.186 Reversing the decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that a prisoner who filed a pro
se complaint alleging that a warden intentionally violated the prisoner’s constitutional right to rehabilitation should
be given the opportunity to proceed past the pleading stage.187
Alexander v. State, Department of Corrections
In Alexander v. State, Department of Corrections,188 the supreme court held that a former federal prisoner
was properly denied economic damages when the prisoner failed to provide a basis for such damages, but that the
prisoner was entitled to prejudgment interest and reimbursement of litigation costs.189 Alexander, a formal federal
prisoner, filed seven requests with the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) for medical attention.190 After the
requests, the DOC examined Alexander’s hand, applied a splint, and ordered x-rays that later showed a fracture.191
Alexander received no additional medical care, and he filed suit alleging that the State negligently failed to provide
him with proper medical attention for his hand.192 The district court granted a directed verdict for the State,
disallowed Alexander’s economic loss claims, and denied him reimbursement of prejudgment interest and litigation
costs.193 The supreme court held that the law does not permit a plaintiff to recover for losses that are purely
speculative, and that the plaintiff bears the burden of providing some reasonable basis upon which the jury could
determine the extent of a loss.194 Because Alexander presented no evidence of his previous medical expenses or
wages before the loss, the district court was correct in disallowing claims of economic loss.195 In respect to the
prejudgment interest claim, the court explained that prejudgment interest is only to be denied in order to prevent an
injustice and remanded the issue of prejudgment interest.196 The supreme court reasoned that the district court has a
requirement to instruct pro se litigants how to proceed, and the district court’s failure to do so was an abuse of
discretion.197 Affirming in part and remanding for a determination of interest and costs, the supreme court held that a
former federal prisoner was properly denied economic damages when the prisoner failed to provide a basis for such
damages, but that the prisoner was entitled to prejudgment interest and reimbursement of litigation costs.198
Beal v. Beal
In Beal v. Beal,199 the supreme court held that when a case that has already been decided by the supreme
court is appealed again, the “law of the case” doctrine controls so that no issues are reconsidered unless there are
exceptional circumstances presenting clear error.200 In 1999, Annette and David Beal divorced and the superior court
made several judgments.201 In 2004, the Beals both appealed numerous issues to the supreme court, who affirmed,
reversed, and remanded various parts of the judgment (case hereinafter “Beal I”).202 The remanded issues returned to
the superior court, which issued several findings of fact and final judgments.203 The supreme court held that there
was no error in any judgment which was consistent with Beal I.204 Conversely, the superior court exceeded its
authority on remand by using an appreciation value for David’s pre-marital artwork because this issue was rejected
in Beal I.205 The superior court also exceeded its authority when it recalculated the interim support judgment because
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the judgment was affirmed in Beal I.206 Lastly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by deducting David’s
post-separation mortgage payments from the interim support judgment or by awarding David further mortgage
reduction credit because these issues had been remanded in Beal I.207 All of these judgments were consistent with
the rulings from Beal I.208 Using the “law of the case” doctrine, the supreme court held that when a case that has
already been decided by the supreme court is appealed again, no issues are reconsidered unless there are exceptional
circumstances presenting clear error.209
Douglas v. Alaska
In Douglas v. Alaska,210 the supreme court held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by: (1)
excluding a disruptive defendant from the courtroom,211 (2) refusing to allow a defendant to reclaim the right to be
present at trial to testify in person whenever he promises to behave,212 or (3) requiring a disruptive defendant to
testify via speakerphone.213 The trail court excluded Douglas from the courtroom because he repeatedly and
egregiously disrupted pretrial hearings from the first day of trial, though the court did allow Douglas to participate
via speakerphone.214 The trial court then denied his request to testify in person, finding that his promise to behave
was not credible.215 On appeal, he argued that the trial court was required to allow him to be present at trial after he
stated he would behave appropriately.216 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the
right to be present at trial was not absolute.217 The court reasoned that Douglas’s behavior was egregious enough to
justify excluding him from trial.218 The court further reasoned that a defendant reclaims the right to be present at trial
by proving his willingness to behave appropriately and that past behavior, rather than a naked promise to behave,
should be used to determine a defendant’s credibility.219 The court found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow Douglas to return to the courtroom because Douglas had repeatedly demonstrated an
unwillingness to behave while in the courtroom.220 The supreme court also reasoned that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by requiring Douglas to testify via speakerphone because this option still protected his constitutional
rights.221 Affirming the decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding a disruptive defendant from the courtroom,222 by refusing to allow him to reclaim the right
to be present at trial to testify in person merely because he promised to behave,223 or by requiring him to testify via
speakerphone.224
E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute
In E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute,225 the supreme court held that when a mentally ill individual is
considered a threat to himself or others, a court does not need to find that treatment will improve his condition
before ordering involuntarily confinement.226 E.P. suffered damage to the frontal lobe of his brain due to substance
abuse, which damaged his judgment and insight abilities.227 E.P. voluntarily committed himself at the Alaska
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Psychiatric Institute in March 2007, continuing his voluntary stay until August 2007.228 In August 2007, E.P.
indicated his desire to leave and resume his drug abuse.229 The superior court ordered him to be involuntarily
committed because it found E.P. to be mentally ill from the brain damage and a danger to himself and others.230 On
appeal, the supreme court affirmed the decision, reasoning that while the statutory requirement that involuntary
treatment of the gravely disabled is only allowed when treatment would improve the patient’s condition, E.P. had
not been confined based on grave disability, but instead on the grounds that he posed a danger to himself.231 This
was supported by his stated intent to resume drug use.232 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that
when a patient’s mental illness is a threat to himself or others, the State need not demonstrate that treatment will
improve a patient’s condition before seeking involuntary confinement.233
Haeg v. Cole
In Haeg v. Cole,234 the supreme court held that before an arbitrator can grant an award, the party must
submit a claim for that award.235 Haeg filed a fee arbitration proceeding, arguing that Cole, his lawyer, gave him
defective services.236 Haeg sought reimbursement for the fees that he had paid, though he had not paid Cole in full
for the services.237 Though Cole made no claim for the outstanding payments, the arbitration panel awarded him the
fees.238 The supreme court remanded the case to the superior court to delete the affirmative award for Cole.239 The
court reasoned that Cole did not present a claim for those fees, and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act requires a
court to correct an award on a claim that was not submitted.240 The supreme court modified the arbitration, holding
that before an arbitrator can grant an award, there must be a claim for that award.241
Hidden Heights Assisted Living, Inc. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services
In Hidden Heights Assisted Living, Inc. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,242 the supreme
court held that it is an abuse of discretion to prevent the presentation of documentary evidence when an evidentiary
hearing is granted.243 Following the second appeal of an audit, which found that Hidden Heights had received excess
Medicaid payments of more than $50,000, the Department of Health and Social Services (“DHSS”) offered Hidden
Heights either a reduced settlement or an evidentiary hearing in superior court.244 A hearing examiner did not admit
some of Hidden Heights’ exhibits into evidence, and Hidden Heights contested the ruling.245 The superior court
found that even though some of the evidence should have been admitted, it would not have changed the verdict.246
The supreme court held that because DHSS offered the evidentiary hearing, it was required to hear Hidden Heights’
evidence.247 This included all of the evidence presented, even exhibits not admitted into evidence by the hearing
examiner.248 Thus, the supreme court remanded the case to the lower court, holding that if an evidentiary hearing is
held, all documentary evidence may be presented, not only evidence submitted by the hearing examiner.249
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Keller v. French
In Keller v. French,250 the supreme court held that plaintiffs did not have standing to file suit under the fair
and just treatment clause of the Alaska Constitution when there were other potential litigants who were more
directly affected by the case and when the plaintiffs did not have a sufficient personal stake in the outcome.251 The
Alaska Legislative Council initiated an investigation into Governor Palin’s dismissal of the Public Safety
Commissioner in order to examine potential abuses of power or improper actions of the executive branch.252 Five
state legislators filed suit asking for declaratory and injunctive relief.253 The plaintiffs claimed that the investigation
violated the fair and just treatment clause, which protects individuals’ rights in the course of legislative and
executive investigations.254 The superior court dismissed the claim, finding that the plaintiffs raised nonjusticiable
political questions.255 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the plaintiffs
lacked both citizen-taxpayer and interest-injury standing.256 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs lacked citizentaxpayer standing because other parties, such as the governor and the people who were subpoenaed for the
investigation, were more directly affected by the investigation and were therefore more appropriately situated to
bring suit.257 The court further reasoned the plaintiffs lacked interest-injury standing because they did not
demonstrate that they had a sufficient personal stake in the outcome or an interest that was adversely affected by the
investigation.258 Affirming the decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that plaintiffs did not have
standing to file suit under the fair and just treatment clause of the Alaska Constitution when there were other
potential litigants who were more directly affected by the case and the plaintiffs did not have a sufficient personal
stake in the outcome.259
Krone v. State
In Krone v. State,260 the supreme court held that a pro-bono litigant who prevailed on the merits in a classaction civil suit regarding constitutional rights was entitled to an award of full reasonable attorneys’ fees under
Section 9.60.010(c)(1) of the Alaska Statutes, the calculation of which is not limited to the simple mathematical
formula mandated by Section 9.60.010(c)(1).261 The Northern Justice Program represented, pro bono, a putative
class of disabled low income individuals terminated from Alaska’s Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services
Waiver Program (the “Program”), which provided long-term health care services to individuals.262 The superior
court held that federal and state constitutional due process rights had been violated when care was terminated
without showing that the patient’s medical conditions had materially improved.263 The class was awarded attorneys’
fees.264 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s finding that the class was entitled to an award of
full reasonable attorneys’ fees, but vacated the court’s award amount and remanded for further consideration of that
amount.265 The supreme court reasoned that the fee-shifting provisions of Section 9.60.010(c)–(e) do not require
strict adherence to the formula used by the superior court in calculating full reasonable attorney’s fees.266 The
supreme court reasoned further that it was unclear from the record whether the superior court felt constrained to use
the simple mathematical formula and thus may have overlooked many important factors that should have been taken
into account.267 Affirming in part and vacating in part, the supreme court thus held that a pro-bono litigant who
prevailed on the merits in a class-action civil suit regarding constitutional rights was entitled to an award of full
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reasonable attorney’s fees under Section 9.60.010(c)(1), the calculation of which is not limited to the simple
mathematical formula mandated by Section 9.60.010(c)(1).268
Lockhart v. Draper
In Lockhart v. Draper,269 the supreme court held that punitive damages were proper when the reward was
not based solely on unanswered requests for admissions and when the lower court had held a two-day hearing on
punitive damages.270 The court also held that prejudgment interest could not be imposed on punitive damages.271
The Drapers filed suit to recover a retainer they had paid Lockhart, when Lockhart refused to return the money after
they discovered he was not an attorney.272 Lockhart transferred his only property of value, a duplex, to his brother
for what the trial court found to be inadequate consideration.273 The trial court correctly found that Lockhart acted in
total disregard for the Drapers’ rights, and his actions were sufficiently egregious to justify an award of punitive
damages.274 Upholding the trial court, the supreme court held that the trial court did not rely solely on unanswered
requests for admissions when finding punitive damages liability, as the court held a two-day hearing on punitive
damages.275 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that punitive damages were proper when the reward
was not based solely on unanswered requests for admissions and when the lower court had held a two-day hearing
on punitive damages.276
McLaughlin v. Okumura
In McLaughlin v. Okumura,277 the supreme court held that a creditor can renew efforts to execute a fraud
judgment against another person even though more than five years of inactivity had passed if the creditor had just
and sufficient reasons for doing so.278 In 1993, Okumura obtained a judgment of over one million dollars against the
McLaughlins for fraud.279 Okumura attempted to locate the McLaughlins but failed because he had lost track of their
physical address.280 In 2006, Okumura was notified that the McLaughlins received a settlement in a malpractice
case, so he renewed his efforts to collect on the judgment from 1993.281 The McLaughlins argued that Okumura had
failed to show good cause for delaying the execution of his judgment against them by more than five years.282 The
superior court found for Okumura on all issues and the McLaughlins appealed.283 On appeal, the supreme court held
that the superior court did not err when it granted Okumura a new writ of execution to collect on his 1993 judgment
against the McLaughlins because Okumura’s reasons for his delay in executing the judgment were “just and
sufficient.”284 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a creditor can renew efforts to execute a
fraud judgment against another person even though more than five years of inactivity had passed if the creditor has
just and sufficient reasons for doing so.285
Neese v. Lithia Chrysler Jeep of Anchorage, Inc.
In Neese v. Lithia Chrysler Jeep of Anchorage, Inc.,286 the supreme court held that consumers bringing a
class action lawsuit against auto dealerships lacked standing where class representatives had not made purchases at
those dealerships, but that the superior court erred in entering final judgment without a showing of hardship or good
268
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cause.287 The consumers alleged that four auto dealerships failed to disclose important information about vehicles in
accordance with statute.288 The superior court dismissed the suit against two of the auto dealerships based on lack of
standing and then entered final judgment.289 The consumers appealed, arguing that they had standing against all the
dealerships because of their common ownership and that final judgment should not have been entered before the
consumers had a chance to amend their complaint to add new class representatives.290 The supreme court held that
common ownership did not confer standing.291 In a class action lawsuit, each representative plaintiff must have
individual standing, and because no plaintiff had bought a vehicle from two of the dealerships, no claim had
properly been stated against those dealerships.292 However, because granting final judgment was inappropriate
where neither party would suffer hardship if the consumers were allowed to amend their complaint, the superior
court erred in entering final judgment.293 Reversing and remanding to allow the consumers to amend their complaint,
the supreme court held that the consumers bringing a class action lawsuit against auto dealerships lacked standing to
sue the dealerships where class representatives had not made purchases, but that the superior court erred in entering
final judgment without a showing of hardship or good cause.294
Neese v. State
In Neese v. State,295 the supreme court held that: (1) plaintiffs could not intervene as a matter of right when
they did not satisfy the test required by Alaska Civil Rule 24(a), and (2) the superior court did not abuse its
discretion by denying permissive intervention where it would unnecessarily delay other parties’ actions.296 Neese
was the named plaintiff in a class action that alleged Lithia auto dealers were violating statutes governing the sale of
used cars.297 During this time, the State, which also was investigating Lithia’s violation of various business statutes,
reached a consent judgment with Lithia.298 Neese then filed a second class action and moved to intervene in the
consent judgment.299 The superior court denied Neese’s motion to intervene but mandated that the State amend the
consent judgment to include an opt-out provision, which Neese accepted.300 Neese appealed the denial of his motion
to intervene, claiming that intervention should have been granted as a matter of right or at least permissive
intervention should have been allowed.301 In order to have an absolute right to intervene, Neese had to demonstrate
that: (1) his motion was timely, (2) he had an interest in the subject matter of the State’s case, (3) his interest was
hindered due to the State’s action, and (4) his interest was not sufficiently embodied by an existing party.302 The
supreme court held that Neese failed to meet the second prong because outside parties’ rights to intervene are
extinguished when the government exercises its sovereign power to enforce the law.303 Further, Neese did not meet
the third prong because the opt-out provision was adequately explained, Neese elected to opt-out, and Neese could
still make any desired argument.304 Lastly, the supreme court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion
by denying permissive intervention because it correctly decided that all remaining parties to the consent judgment
would suffer from unnecessary delay if Neese was allowed to intervene.305 Affirming the decision of the lower
court, the supreme court held: (1) that plaintiffs could not intervene as a matter of right when they did not satisfy the
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test required by Alaska Civil Rule 24(a), and (2) the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying
permissive intervention when it would unnecessarily delay other parties’ actions.306
Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc.
In Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc.,307 the supreme court held that: (1) the State’s interest in
half of any punitive damage award attached when the jury returned its verdict;308 (2) a supreme court’s order to
recalculate punitive damages did not destroy the State’s interest;309 and (3) the State’s share should reflect the
interest rate in effect at the time of the first judgment and a reduction for a pro rata share of a plaintiff’s costs.310
When a jury awarded Reust a punitive damage verdict, the State intervened to protect its fifty percent interest in any
punitive damage award.311 After an appeal, the supreme court remanded the case for a recalculation of the damage
award.312 Reust then settled and moved to dismiss the case.313 The State objected to the dismissal because it had not
received its one-half share of punitive damages.314 The superior court refused to dismiss the case and entered a final
judgment awarding the State its share.315 On this appeal, Reust argued that the State’s interest in the award did not
attach until final judgment and that the supreme court’s reversal of the judgment destroyed the State’s interest in the
settlement proceeds.316 First, the court determined that the State’s interest in a punitive damage award arose as soon
as the jury returned a verdict because the statute in question generally used the word “award” to refer to verdicts and
because a contrary interpretation would defeat the purpose of the statute by allowing parties to deny the State’s
interest by settling.317 Since the interest attached at the jury’s verdict, the court reasoned that its previous adjustment
did not affect the State’s interest because a new trial was never required and the original verdict was never upset.318
Finally, the court observed that appellate rules and principles of unjust enrichment required that post-judgment
interest accrue at the rate prevailing at the time of the first judgment, and that a pro rata share of Reust’s costs and
attorney’s fees be deducted from the State’s share.319 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the superior court,
holding that: (1) the State’s interest in a punitive damage award attached as soon as a jury returned its verdict,320 (2)
the recalculation did not destroy the State’s interest,321 and (3) the State’s share should be modified to reflect the
interest rate prevailing at the time of a judgment, as well as a reduction for a plaintiff’s costs.322
Sayer v. Bashaw
In Sayer v. Bashaw,323 the supreme court held that an offer of immediate dismissal with prejudice was not a
valid form of judgment in Alaska and thus did not entitle the offering party to an award of full attorneys’ fees under
Alaska Civil Rule 68.324 Before trial, in an effort to settle, Sayer had offered Bashaw $10,111 to file an immediate
dismissal with prejudice.325 Bashaw rejected the offer and went to trial, where Sayer was held not liable.326 Sayer
filed a motion for full attorneys’ fees under Rule 68, but his motion was denied because his offer for dismissal with
prejudice did not allow for an entry of judgment.327 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the lower court’s
306
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decision, reasoning that an offer of immediate dismissal with prejudice is not a valid offer of judgment under Rule
68.328 Although Alaska Civil Rule 68(a) allows a party who makes an offer to allow judgment to be entered to
recover full attorneys’ fees if the offeree declines the offer and eventually loses at trial,329 Sayer’s offer was invalid
because it did not allow for judgment to be entered.330 The supreme court affirmed the decision below, holding that
an offer of immediate dismissal with prejudice was not a valid form of judgment in Alaska and thus did not entitle
the offering party to an award of full attorneys’ fees under Alaska Civil Rule 68.331
Shea v. State of Alaska, Department of Administration
In Shea v. State of Alaska, Department of Administration,332 the supreme court held that Appellate Rule
502(b), which permits an extension of time to file an appeal for good cause, required only a showing of good cause,
not excusable neglect, for an application to receive a time extension for filing.333 Shea, a state employee, appealed a
Public Employees’ Retirement System decision denying her occupational disability claim.334 On May 21, 2007, the
Office of Administrative Hearings issued an order denying her appeal and stated that judicial review could be sought
by filing an appeal in the Alaska Superior Court in accordance with Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 602(a)(2)
within thirty days.335 Shea’s attorneys first attempted to file her appeal on June 20, thirty days after the
administrative opinion and order were mailed, but the court clerk erroneously informed them that the appeal had to
be taken to another agency for filing.336 Another attempt was made on June 21, but was again refused by the court
clerk.337 After the notice of appeal was filed on June 26, 2007, the superior court denied the motion for late filing
without prejudice and denied Shea’s ensuing motion of reconsideration.338 The supreme court reversed the superior
court’s order, finding that Shea demonstrated good cause under Appellate Rule 502(b)(2) for a six-day extension to
file her appeal and that there was no plausible indication that the delay prejudiced the State or the court.339 The court
held that Shea’s representative demonstrated good faith by trying to file timely appeals on both June 20 and June
21.340 The supreme court reversed the decision of the lower court, holding that an untimely appeal can receive an
extension upon a showing of good cause for the delay.341
Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. State
In Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. State,342 the supreme court held that a conservation group that
had successfully challenged a transfer of land by the State was entitled to full prevailing party attorneys’ fees.343 The
Southeast Alaska Conservation Council (“SEAC”) had successfully argued on appeal before the supreme court that
a legislative action that transferred land from the State to the University of Alaska was in violation of Article IX,
Section 7 of the Alaska Constitution (the “dedicated funds” clause).344 SEAC then filed suit under Section
09.60.010(c)(1) of the Alaska Statutes, which provides for an award of full attorneys’ fees for all appeals concerning
the establishment, protection, or enforcement of a right under the Alaska Constitution.345 The court rejected the
State’s attempt to distinguish between cases that sought to establish or protect constitutional rights and those that
merely sought to have constitutional interpretations rendered.346 It also held that the statute did not distinguish
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between constitutional provisions that created individual rights and those that protected important public rights.347
Finally, the court held that the University of Alaska, a co-defendant, was required to pay its share of the attorneys’
fees, even though it had merely offered a different interpretation in the litigation.348 The supreme court thus held that
a conservation group that had successfully challenged a transfer of land by the State was entitled to full prevailing
party attorneys’ fees.349
State, Department of Health & Social Services v. Okuley
In State, Department of Health & Social Services v. Okuley,350 the supreme court held that it was not an
abuse of discretion to award a common fund fee of 9.25% to a class’s attorneys in a class action lawsuit against the
State.351 In 2005, a class of members filed suit against the State seeking Interim Assistance benefits that were
wrongly denied to them.352 The superior court awarded the class $990,010, including $91,575 in interest, as well as
$91,575 to the class counsel from the common fund.353 On appeal, the State argued that the latter amount should not
have been awarded to the class’s counsel from the common fund because the amount was unreasonable and the
common fund doctrine should not apply to public benefits cases.354 Using an abuse of discretion standard of review,
the supreme court reasoned that the award amount was not unreasonable because the lower court accepted this
award amount after taking into account the relevant common fund doctrine factors.355 The supreme court further
reasoned that the superior court had sufficiently scrutinized the plaintiff’s counsel’s award request and fulfilled its
fiduciary duty by comparing the award amount under the lodestar and percentage methods, either of which was an
appropriate standard.356 Specifically, the lower court had considered the number of hours reasonably spent working
on the case, the reasonable hourly rate of an attorney working on a similar case, and the amount the attorneys would
have been awarded if their award were set at a flat twenty-five percent of the total award.357 Furthermore, the
supreme court reasoned that the appellant’s argument that the common fund doctrine concerning attorney awards
should not apply to public benefits cases also failed because of the decreased likelihood of prevailing against the
State in litigation.358 Affirming the decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that it was not an abuse of
discretion to award a common fund fee of 9.25% to a class’s attorneys in a class action lawsuit against the State.359
Valdez Fisheries Development Ass’n, Inc. v. Froines
In Valdez Fisheries Development Ass’n, Inc. v. Froines,360 the supreme court held that the task of
determining the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees requires an objective assessment.361 In assessing attorneys’
fees on remand, the superior court concluded that the supreme court’s reversal of its initial decision forbade it from
considering objective factors when determining whether the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees were required.362 Instead of
using an objective evaluation, the superior court accepted the amount of time that the attorney chose to spend on the
case.363 The supreme court held that it was error for the superior court to avoid using an objective evaluation.364
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the task of determining the amount of reasonable
attorneys’ fees requires an objective assessment.365
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Williams v. State of Alaska
In Williams v. State of Alaska,366 the supreme court held that a defendant who withdrew his request for jury
instructions could not later challenge the superior court judge’s ruling that the State could introduce evidence of the
defendant’s prior convictions if the jury instructions were given.367 Williams was charged with driving under the
influence.368 His trial was bifurcated so that the jury would not know of his prior convictions for driving under the
influence.369 After testifying, Williams asked the superior court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of
reckless and negligent driving.370 The superior court agreed to give these instructions but ruled that the State could
then introduce evidence of Williams’s past convictions to demonstrate his knowledge and establish recklessness.371
Williams withdrew his request for jury instructions,372 but then appealed to the supreme court, claiming that the
superior court judge erred in ruling that the State could introduce his prior convictions if the court instructed the jury
on the lesser included offenses.373 On appeal, the supreme court ruled that Williams had not preserved the issue for
appeal because he had withdrawn his request for jury instructions.374 The court reasoned that ruling on the
substantive issue would require too much speculation about whether Williams was prejudiced by the superior court’s
ruling.375 The court further reasoned that: (1) Williams could have withdrawn his request for reasons other than the
superior court’s ruling, (2) the State could have decided not to introduce the prior convictions, and (3) there was no
evidence to show whether the superior court’s ruling was a harmless error.376 Affirming the decision of the lower
court, the supreme court held that a defendant who withdrew his request for jury instructions could not later
challenge the superior court judge’s ruling that the State could introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior
convictions if the jury instructions were given.377

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
top
United States Supreme Court
Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez
In Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez,378 the Supreme Court held that a city ordinance violated the
Tonnage Clause because it imposed a tax on vessels based on their carrying capacity and usage of the port, rather
than for services provided to the vessel.379 In 1999, the city of Valdez passed an ordinance that taxed ships based on
their time spent in Valdez and their overall size.380 In 2000, Polar Tankers, Inc. owned ships that were subject to this
tax and brought suit claiming that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it violated the Tonnage Clause and
Due Process Clause of the Constitution.381 The Alaska Superior Court found the ordinance unconstitutional under
the Due Process Clause, but the Alaska Supreme Court overruled this decision, asserting that the ordinance was
constitutional.382 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and declared the ordinance unconstitutional,
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reasoning that the purpose of the Tonnage Clause was to prevent states from unfairly benefiting from their ports at
the expense of other states.383 The Court held that Valdez’s ordinance violated the Tonnage Clause because it
imposed a tax based on a factor related to a vessel’s tonnage and the usage of Valdez’s ports.384 Furthermore, the
Tonnage Clause has usually been applied to ordinances that raise revenue and the Valdez ordinance produces funds
for municipal services.385 Lastly, the ordinance was unconstitutional because it did not operate as an ordinary
property tax.386 Unlike other Alaskan property taxes, Valdez’s ordinance applied only to ships rather than to all
similar business property.387 Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Alaska Supreme Court, holding
that Valdez’s ordinance was unconstitutional under the Tonnage Clause because it imposed a tax on vessels based
on their carrying capacity and usage of the port, rather than for services provided to the vessel.388

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
State v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
In State v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,389 the Ninth Circuit held that states do not have
Eleventh Amendment immunity from claims under the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 (“GERA”).390
Two former employees of the Governor’s office filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) under GERA, in which they alleged sexual harassment, pay discrimination on the basis of
race, and retaliatory discharge.391 Before an administrative law judge, the State argued that the claims were barred
by the Eleventh Amendment.392 The judge rejected that argument, as did the EEOC on interlocutory appeal.393 The
State appealed to the Ninth Circuit on the same grounds.394 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Eleventh
Amendment’s guarantee of sovereign immunity to the states was abrogable by Congress if Congress was acting
pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.395 Here, the grant of authority was provided by Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.396 Since all three claims being brought under GERA were alleged constitutional violations
pursuant to the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, GERA was a valid
abrogation of sovereign immunity.397 The Ninth Circuit thus held that states do not have Eleventh Amendment
immunity from claims under GERA.398
United States v. Jefferson
In United States v. Jefferson,399 the Ninth Circuit held that law enforcement can detain and search a
package before a guaranteed delivery time without conflicting with the recipient’s Fourth Amendment possessory
interest rights.400 On April 6, a package addressed to John Jefferson arrived in Juneau, with a guaranteed delivery
time of 3:00 p.m. on April 7.401 The recipient’s address on the package had previously been flagged by the postal
inspector.402 The inspector examined the package and used a canine to positively detect the presence of narcotics.403
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After obtaining a warrant, law enforcement opened the package at 11:55 a.m. and discovered 253 grams of
methamphetamine.404 Around 5:00 p.m., law enforcement made a controlled delivery of the package to Jefferson's
address and arrested Jefferson.405 On appeal, Jefferson argued that his package was unlawfully detained in violation
of his Fourth Amendment possessory interest rights.406 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and held that a
possessory interest in a package with a guaranteed delivery time does not prohibit law enforcement from detaining
such packages for inspection until the contractual delivery time has passed.407 The court reasoned that Jefferson’s
Fourth Amendment possessory interest was not implicated before the police inspection because the inspection
occurred at 11:55 a.m. on April 6, and the package’s delivery was not guaranteed until 3:00 p.m. that day.408
Affirming the lower court, the Ninth Circuit held that law enforcement can detain and search a package before a
guaranteed delivery time without conflicting with the recipient’s Fourth Amendment possessory interest rights.409

Alaska Supreme Court
Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute
In Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute,410 the supreme court held that a patient’s due process rights were
violated when he did not receive adequate notice of the State’s petition for the involuntary administration of
psychotropic drugs and he was denied access to his medical chart.411 After ordering Bigley to be committed to the
Alaska Psychiatric Institute (“API”), the trial court notified the parties on a Friday that it would hold an expedited
hearing on the medication petition on the following Monday.412 Bigley’s attorney had not received notice of the
court’s earlier commitment order, and he had not received access to Bigley’s complete medical chart.413
Additionally, the petition used by API merely stated its intent to administer psychotropic medication, without
information about proposed treatment or its justification.414 The court held that the petition was insufficient to allow
Bigley a reasonable opportunity to prepare his case and that the State must provide a plain, concise, and definite
written statement of the facts, as well as the nature and reasons for the proposed treatment.415 Furthermore, to satisfy
due process, a patient must have access to his medical records once a petition to involuntarily medicate him has been
filed.416 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that a patient’s due process rights were violated when he
did not receive adequate notice of the State’s petition for the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs and
he was denied access to his medical chart.417
Hertz v. Beach
In Hertz v. Beach,418 the supreme court held that: (1) mere knowledge of a medical condition was not
sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to sustain an Eighth Amendment cause of action,419 and (2) the
question of whether a defendant’s dental practitioner committed malpractice by failing to treat a prison patient was
one of fact that may not require expert medical evidence.420 Hertz received dental care from Dr. Anderson while
incarcerated.421 After having two teeth extracted, Hertz filed a medical request for a new partial denture because his
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existing denture no longer fit properly.422 Hertz waited over five months without being seen by Dr. Anderson,423 and
then filed suit alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights by the nurses at the prison and malpractice on the
part of Anderson, who had contracted with the prison to give dental care to patients.424 The supreme court held that
the prison did not violate the Eighth Amendment because the “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs”
standard had not been met.425 In particular, while the record was replete with evidence of knowledge of the nurses
and Anderson that he had requested a new partial denture, the record did not demonstrate that the nurses or
Anderson had been deliberate in failing to treat Hertz, because they did not have actual knowledge of his dental
pain.426 Examining the question of malpractice, the court reasoned that granting summary judgment in favor of
Anderson had been erroneous because it was not clear from the record whether expert evidence was necessary to
evaluate Dr. Anderson’s actions in failing to treat Hertz for five months, and thus, a genuine issue of material fact
remained unresolved.427 Affirming in part and reversing in part the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held
that: (1) mere knowledge of a medical condition was not sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to sustain an
Eighth Amendment cause of action,428 and (2) the question of whether a defendant’s dental practitioner committed
malpractice by failing to treat a prison patient was one of fact that may not require expert medical evidence.429
Huffman v. State
In Huffman v. State,430 the supreme court held that an individual had the right to control medical treatment
for his children, which is a fundamental liberty and privacy right protected by the Alaska Constitution and cannot be
infringed upon absent a showing of a compelling state interest and no less restrictive means to accomplish that
interest.431 For religious reasons, the Huffmans refused to subject their children to a tuberculosis PPD skin test as
required by statute.432 The school refused to allow the children to attend school as result.433 The Huffmans filed suit
alleging that the State’s regulation requiring tuberculosis testing interfered with their liberty and privacy interests
under the Alaska Constitution.434 The supreme court held that a fundamental liberty interest and privacy right exists
with respect to decisions made about medical treatments for oneself or one’s children based on valid analogous
privacy protections under the Constitution.435 The court held that further inquiry was required to examine whether
the State’s tuberculosis test requirement did not allow for a less restrictive means with which the State could further
its compelling interest of ensuring student safety.436 Reversing the lower court’s decision and remanding the case,
the supreme court held that an individual had a right to control medical treatment for his children, which is a
fundamental liberty and privacy right protected by the Alaska Constitution and cannot be infringed upon absent a
showing of a compelling state interest and no less restrictive means to accomplish that interest.437
Lot 04B & 5C, Block 83 Townsite v. Fairbanks North Star Borough
In Lot 04B & 5C, Block 83 Townsite v. Fairbanks North Star Borough,438 the supreme court held that a
partial property tax exemption neither violated the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution,439 nor acted as
a penalty within the meaning of Alaska statutory law.440 Fairbanks North Star Borough applied a partial tax
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exemption to residential property that had no back taxes owed.441 Falke challenged the constitutionality and legality
of the partial tax exemption, claiming that it violated the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution by
discriminating against the poor and that it amounted to a penalty for payment of taxes in excess of statutory law.442
The supreme court noted that purely economic interests are at the low end of the continuum of interests for equal
protection purposes, and thus they are given a more lenient scrutiny.443 The court held that the statute served a
legitimate public purpose,444 and had classifications that bore a fair relationship to that purpose.445 With respect to
the statutory claim, the court held that the drafters of the statute did not intend on treating the denial of the
exemption as a penalty.446 The supreme court held that a partial property tax exemption neither violated the equal
protection clause of the Alaska Constitution,447 nor acted as a penalty within the meaning of Alaska statutory law.448
Pepper v. Crabtree
In Pepper v. Crabtree,449 the supreme court held that defendants are not entitled to immunity under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine if the plaintiff’s claim will not unconstitutionally burden the defendants’ petitioning
activity.450 Pepper sued Crabtree for violations of Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act
(“UTPA”).451 The superior court found that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine required the court to strictly construe the
UTPA to avoid burdening conduct protected by the petition clauses of the United States and Alaska Constitutions.452
On appeal, the supreme court held that requiring the defendants to litigate the claims in a fair manner would not
unconstitutionally burden the defendants’ petitioning activities.453 The court utilized the Sosa three-step analysis to
determine whether Noerr-Pennington immunity applies.454 First, the Sosa analysis required the court to identify
what burden the threat of adverse adjudication would impose on the defendants’ petitioning rights.455 The court
determined that a successful claim by Pepper might burden Crabtree’s ability to obtain favorable judgments.456
Second, the Sosa analysis required the court to determine whether the potential burden could be imposed
consistently with the constitution.457 The supreme court found that subjecting Crabtree to UTPA liability for the
alleged conduct would not chill the First Amendment right to petition.458 The supreme court held that defendants are
not entitled to immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because the plaintiff’s claim will not
unconstitutionally burden the defendants’ petitioning activity.459
Schiel v. Union Oil Co. of California
In Schiel v. Union Oil Co. of California,460 the supreme court held that amendments to Sections
23.30.045(a) and 23.30.055 of the Alaska Statutes do not violate a worker’s rights to equal protection under the
Alaska Constitution.461 Schiel sued the Union Oil Company of California (“UNOCAL”) for injuries he sustained
while working on one of the company’s drilling platforms.462 UNOCAL filed for summary judgment, arguing that
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the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Statute barred the claim.463 Schiel responded with a cross-motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the 2004 amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Statute violated the equal protection
clause of the Alaska Constitution.464 The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Statute (specifically Sections 23.30.045
and 23.30.055) was amended in 2004 to extend liability for workers’ compensation coverage to project owners and
to provide immunity from tort liability to both general contractors and project owners.465 Schiel argued that the
amendments violated his right to equal protection because they classify injured workers into two classes—those who
can sue in tort and those who must recover through the workers’ compensation system.466 The court found that
because the amendments deal with an economic interest and bear a substantial relationship to legitimate state goals,
they do not violate Schiel’s right to equal protection.467 Answering a certified question from the lower court, the
supreme court held that amendments to Sections 23.30.045(a) and 23.30.055 do not violate a worker’s rights to
equal protection and due process under the Alaska Constitution.468
State v. ACLU of Alaska
In State v. ACLU of Alaska,469 the supreme court held that the bar on abstract adjudication precluded it from
ruling on the constitutionality of a statute when the risk of offending the coequal branches of government
outweighed the need for a decision.470 The ACLU of Alaska challenged a statute based on constitutional right of
privacy that criminalized the possession and use of less than one ounce of marijuana.471 The supreme court found
little need for a decision since: (1) even absent the state statute, private possession of marijuana was still prohibited
by federal law;472 (2) statements of anonymous marijuana users submitted by the ACLU suggested that they were
not altering their drug usage in response to the new statute at issue;473 and (3) there was little evidence that law
enforcement officials were pursuing those who possessed and used only small amounts of marijuana in their own
homes.474 The court did, however, find significant risks in issuing a decision including: (1) the risk that there might
be a set of facts to which the statute would apply constitutionally;475 and (2) the risk of insulting the coequal
branches of government by invalidating a statute when there was no pressing judicial need to do so.476 Reversing the
decision of the superior court, the supreme court held that the bar on abstract adjudication precluded it from ruling
on the constitutionality of a statute when the risk of offending the coequal branches of government outweighed the
need for a decision.477
Valentine v. State
In Valentine v. State,478 the supreme court held that the amendment to DUI statute, Section 28.35.030(s) of
the Alaska Statutes, which excluded delayed-absorption evidence to challenge prosecutions under the “under-theinfluence” DUI theory subsection in the statute, violated due process.479 Valentine appealed his conviction under the
recently amended DUI law and challenged the constitutional validity of the DUI law that excluded delayedabsorption evidence.480 The supreme court agreed with Valentine as to the unconstitutionality of the amendment,
noting that a defendant’s due process rights are violated when legislation significantly affects his or her ability to
present a defense.481 The court held that Valentine’s due process rights were violated because the old statute required
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the prosecution to demonstrate that a defendant was impaired while driving, where the new amendment denied the
defendant the opportunity to show that they were not impaired while driving (even though a later chemical test may
say otherwise).482 Therefore, the supreme court reversed and remanded, finding that the amendment to the DUI
statute, Section 28.35.030(s), was unconstitutional.483

CONTRACT LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
AAA Valley Gravel, Inc. v. Totaro
In AAA Valley Gravel, Inc. v. Totaro,484 the supreme court held that a gratuitous assignment of an interest
in royalties from gravel mining was irrevocable and that one assignee would be entitled to one hundred percent of
any royalties recovered.485 It also held that the trial court’s failure to consider whether a lease was exclusive and
whether a warranty against encumbrances was waived prevented a final judgment.486 Ramirez leased gravel mining
rights to Cosmos Development, which then subleased to AAA Valley Gravel, which paid royalties to Ramirez and
Cosmos.487 Cosmos assigned its right to overriding royalties to Totaro.488 Years later, AAA purchased the property
being mined from Ramirez and stopped paying royalties.489 Totaro sued AAA for breach of contract, and AAA filed
a third-party complaint against Ramirez for breach of contract and warranty.490 The trial court determined that AAA
was still required to pay Totaro any overriding royalties under the sublease, and that Ramirez was not liable for
misrepresentation because both parties to the property sale knew about the lease and sublease.491 On appeal, the
supreme court reasoned that Cosmos’s gratuitous assignment to Totaro was made irrevocable when Cosmos notified
AAA of the assignment in a signed and sealed the letter, which did not reveal any intention to make the assignment
revocable.492 The court also determined that because there was conflicting evidence about the exclusivity of the
lease between Cosmos and Ramirez,493 Ramirez could be liable for breach of the title unless he could prove that the
deed did not express the parties’ actual intent.494 Thus, the supreme court held that Cosmos’s assignment to Totaro
was irrevocable and that Totaro was entitled to one hundred percent of the overriding royalties if she ultimately
prevailed.495 It then held that the trial court had failed determine whether the original lease was exclusive.496
Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case, holding that a gratuitous
assignment of an interest in royalties from gravel mining was irrevocable and that one assignee would be entitled to
one hundred percent of any royalties recovered.497

482

Id. at 326–27.
Id. at 327.
484
219 P.3d 153 (Alaska 2009).
485
Id. at 155.
486
Id. at 154.
487
Id. at 156.
488
Id. at 157.
489
Id. at 158.
490
Id.
491
Id.
492
Id. at 159–60.
493
Id. at 160–61.
494
Id. at 164–65.
495
Id.
496
Id. at 154.
497
Id. at 155.
483

27

Beal v. McGuire
In Beal v. McGuire,498 the supreme court held that summary judgment was not appropriate when there were
genuine issues regarding the scope of joint venture members’ fiduciary duties and whether those duties were
breached.499 Nine members of a joint venture owned a medical condominium, which they rented out to an
ambulatory surgical center.500 Two of the members were responsible for relocating the surgical center from the
location owned by the venture to an alternate location.501 Six of the members filed suit for breach of fiduciary duty
against the members initiating the move because the move was not consistent with the purpose of producing income
and profit.502 The trial court granted summary judgment for McGuire because Beal had not demonstrated how
moving rather than extending the lease had breached any duty. The supreme court reversed, reasoning that while a
provision existed that allowed members to deal at arm’s length with competitors, it did not eliminate all fiduciary
duties owed between members.503 Instead, a duty continued to exist to prevent members from gravely harming the
economic interests of the venture since the venture had been created with the sole purpose of producing income and
profit, as noted in its explicit terms.504 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that summary judgment
was not appropriate when there were genuine issues regarding the scope of joint venture members’ fiduciary duties
and whether those duties were breached.505
Wagner v. Wagner
In Wagner v. Wagner,506 the supreme court held that the awarding of specific performance for the payment
of past damages was permissible if consistent with a written agreement.507 In exchange for co-signing a loan,
Gregory and his father, Richard, signed a written agreement that royalties from oil and gas leases Richard possessed
would be used to pay this loan, with additional income being divided between Gregory and Richard.508 Richard
defaulted on payments and Gregory filed a complaint.509 The trial court found that Richard had breached the
agreement, and the court awarded Gregory past damages.510 The superior court ordered specific performance,
holding that the jury must have used the terms of the written agreement to calculate its award of past damages.511 On
appeal, the supreme court affirmed this decision, holding that the order of specific performance for contract damages
did not constitute an abuse of discretion.512 Therefore, affirming the decision of the lower court, the supreme court
held that the awarding of specific performance for the payment of past damages was permissible if consistent with a
written agreement.513
Weiner v. Burr, Pease & Kurtz, P.C.
In Weiner v. Burr, Pease & Kurtz, P.C.,514 the supreme court held that the phrase “further substantial
litigation” should be construed broadly to include preparation done for trial.515 Weiner and Garrison retained the
firm Burr, Pease & Kurtz, P.C. to represent them in a lawsuit.516 Under a contingency agreement, the firm would get
thirty-three percent of damages if the matter were resolved before the filing of an appeal;517 otherwise, it would
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receive $250,000 if no work was done to “further substantial litigation.”518 The claim was settled after filing but
before trial.519 The firm claimed thirty-three percent of funds per the contingency agreement, claiming that it had
done work to “further substantial litigation.”520 The firm argued that the term “further substantial litigation” should
be viewed broadly to include preparation for trial and settlement negotiations.521 The trial court held that the “further
substantial litigation” meant additional considerable efforts in carrying on the legal contest and that the firm had met
that standard.522 On appeal, the clients argued that the trial court had misinterpreted the term and erred in finding
that the firm’s work met that standard.523 The supreme court held that the trial court’s interpretation of the term was
correct and that the firm had met the standard because it had engaged in substantial preparation for trial.524
Moreover, the court found that the term “further substantial litigation” was not ambiguous and included more than
in-court filings and proceedings.525 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the phrase “further
substantial litigation” should be construed broadly to include preparation done for trial.526

CRIMINAL LAW
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
United States v. Anchrum
In United States v. Anchrum,527 the Ninth Circuit held that: (1) substituting “motor vehicle” for “weapon”
in the jury instructions for assault with a dangerous weapon was harmless error, (2) permitting a Drug Enforcement
Agent (“DEA”) to testify as first a lay witness and then an expert witness was not an abuse of discretion, (3) the
DEA did not inappropriately opine on defendant’s mental state, and (4) applying a six-level sentencing enhancement
was warranted.528 Anchrum received a package containing drugs and was pursued by the police shortly after.529 In
attempt to escape, he struck an officer, Agent Solek, with his vehicle.530 A jury convicted him, and the district court
applied a six-level enhancement to his sentence because the victim was an official.531 Anchrum appealed, claiming
that the district court erred by instructing the jury to find that he had used a “motor vehicle” instead of a “weapon,”
by allowing Solek to testify as a lay witness and an expert witness, by allowing Solek to testify about Anchrum’s
mental state, and by applying the sentence enhancement.532 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court
on all counts.533 The court reasoned that even though the district court erred in its jury instruction, it was harmless
error because it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found Anchrum guilty of using
the motor vehicle as a deadly weapon.534 The court then reasoned that it was not an abuse of discretion to allow
Agent Solek to testify as both a lay and expert witness because his testimony was separated into two phases so the
jury would not confuse his two distinct roles.535 The court next reasoned that Solek did not improperly opine on
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Anchrum’s mental state because he only referenced the modus operandi of drug dealers in general, and not
Anchrum’s mental state specifically.536 Also, because Anchrum intentionally drove his vehicle at Agent Solek and
struck him after Solek exited a police car clad in a vest obviously marked “Police,” the official victim six-level
sentencing enhancement was correctly applied.537 Affirming the decision of the lower court, the Ninth Circuit held:
(1) that substituting “motor vehicle” for “weapon” in the jury instructions for assault with a dangerous weapon was
harmless error, (2) that permitting a DEA to testify as first a lay witness and then an expert witness was not an abuse
of discretion, (3) that the DEA did not inappropriately opine on defendant’s mental state, and (4) that applying a sixlevel sentencing enhancement was warranted.538

Alaska Court of Appeals
Ambrose v. State
In Ambrose v. State,539 the court of appeals held that a police officer did not conduct an illegal search when
he removed and opened an object from a suspect’s pocket during an arrest, reasonably believing the object could
have been a weapon, and then recognized that it was a container for illegal drugs.540 When Ambrose was arrested
after a traffic stop, the arresting officer felt a small object in Ambrose’s pocket while conducting a pat-down
search.541 The officer then removed and opened the object, a folded piece of newspaper, and found that it contained
illegal drugs.542 Ambrose was convicted of a drug offense and appealed, arguing that the officer’s warrantless search
was illegal.543 The court of appeals pointed out that during investigative stops, an officer may remove an object
found during the search if he reasonably believes the object might be used as a weapon.544 Here, the officer
reasonably believed the object contained a razor blade.545 In addition, an officer may open an object in plain view if
it is apparent that the object is a single-purpose container used to carry illegal drugs.546 After removing the
newspaper from Ambrose’s pocket, it was apparent to the officer that the package was being used to carry drugs.547
Therefore, the court of appeals held that the policeman did not conduct an illegal search when he removed and
opened an object from a suspect’s pocket during an arrest, reasonably believing the object could have been a
weapon, and then recognized that it was a container for illegal drugs.548
Boles v. State
In Boles v. State,549 the court of appeals held that: (1) it was improper for a sentencing court to require
warrantless searches for weapons as a condition of probation for the charge of attempted second-degree sexual abuse
of a minor when no weapon was involved,550 and (2) the sentencing court had no authority to impose registration or
reporting requirements under the Sex Offender Registration Act.551 At trial, Boles pled guilty to two counts of
attempted second-degree sexual abuse of a minor.552 As a condition of probation, the superior court ordered him to
submit to warrantless searches for weapons and required him to register as a sex offender.553 On appeal, the court of
appeals reversed the decision of the superior court that required warrantless firearm searches and held that the lower
court’s statement that Boles would have to register as a sex offender for life was not a ruling, but rather a
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prediction.554 The court of appeals also struck down the condition of probation because it was not reasonably related
to the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the public,555 and the court of appeals held that the lower
court did not have the authority to determine the period of time required to register under the Sex Offender
Registration Act because the registration and reporting requirements are not part of a defendant’s sentence.556
Vacating the warrantless weapon searches condition of Boles’s probation, the court of appeals held that requiring
warrantless searches for weapons was an inappropriate condition of probation when no weapon was involved in the
commission of the crimes,557 and that the sentencing court had no authority to rule on registration or reporting
requirements under the Sex Offender Registration Act.558
Brown v. State
In Brown v. State,559 the court of appeals vacated a defendant’s conviction because his right to a speedy
trial under Alaska Criminal Rule 45 was violated.560 Brown was charged with two misdemeanors, and his trial was
set in Sand Point, a rural community where misdemeanor trials are conducted once every two months.561 Brown’s
first trial was scheduled for April, but he requested a continuance, and the court set his trial for October.562 A
different trial, however, had already been set for October, so Brown’s trial was delayed until December.563 In
December, the court again had another trial scheduled that precluded Brown’s case from being heard, so his trial
was rescheduled to February.564 In February, Brown’s case was finally heard and he was convicted after the judge
denied his motion to dismiss under Alaska Criminal Rule 45.565 The court of appeals held that Brown’s request for a
continuance only excluded the days between his original April trial date and the October date set by the court.566 The
period from October through February, however, should have been viewed as non-excludable days under Rule 45
because Brown was not the legal cause of those delays.567 Thus, Brown’s motion to dismiss should have been
granted because his trial was set for a date more than 120 non-excludable days after the time he was charged.568
Vacating the conviction in the lower court, the court of appeals held that defendant’s right to speedy trial under
Alaska Criminal Rule 45 was violated.569
Cronce v. State
In Cronce v. State,570 the court of appeals held that two separate assault convictions arising from a single
incident merged into a single punishable offense where the record was ambiguous.571 Cronce and Wims were
involved in an argument.572 When Wims attempted to escape, Cronce caught him and proceeded to beat him until
police arrived.573 Cronce was convicted of second- and third-degree assault.574 On appeal, Cronce argued that these
separate convictions should be barred by the double jeopardy rule.575 The court of appeals held that a defendant
should receive only one conviction if the record is ambiguous as to whether there was one offense or two.576 The
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court first examined whether the two statutory offenses as applied to the facts involved any differences in intent or
conduct and then considered those differences in light of the basic public interests that the statutes sought to
protect.577 Here, the court determined that the record was ambiguous because there was nothing in the indictment,
the jury instructions, or the prosecution’s arguments that clearly differentiated the conduct that was second-degree
assault from the conduct that was third-degree assault.578 Indeed, it was likely that the jury convicted Cronce of
third-degree assault based on the same intent and conduct for which it convicted him of second-degree assault.579
The court further reasoned that second- and third-degree assault statutes both serve the identical goal of protecting
the safety of individual citizens.580 Reversing the decision of the lower court, the court of appeals held that two
separate assault convictions arising from a single incident should merge into a single punishable offense where the
record is ambiguous.581
Dale v. State
In Dale v. State,582 the court of appeals held that exigent circumstances existed as a matter of law and
police were therefore justified in conducting a blood test without a warrant when: (1) a motor vehicle accident had
caused death or serious physical injury, and (2) police had probable cause to believe the driver was intoxicated.583
Dale drove his truck off the road, and his two passengers were severely injured.584 A blood test showed Dale to have
been intoxicated, but Dale moved to suppress the results because the test was obtained without a warrant.585 The
superior court ruled that there were exigent circumstances as a matter of law and denied the motion; the court of
appeals agreed.586 The court of appeals reasoned that the speed with which alcohol dissipates in the blood supports a
conclusion that exigent circumstances exist as a matter of law when a blood test is required.587 Furthermore,
requiring police to assess whether exigent circumstances exist on a case-by-case basis would place an unreasonable
burden on law enforcement, as the officer would be required to make his determination based on speculation about
factors such as how much the suspect had to drink, how recently the suspect stopped drinking, how quickly the
suspect would metabolize the alcohol, and how quickly the test could be administered.588 Accordingly, the court of
appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, and held that exigent circumstances existed as a matter of law
and police were therefore justified in conducting a blood test without a warrant when: (1) a motor vehicle accident
had caused death or serious physical injury, and (2) police had probable cause to believe the driver was
intoxicated.589
Douglas v. State
In Douglas v. State,590 the court of appeals held: (1) that constitutionally flawed sentencing procedures
could be amended to conform to the requirements of Blakely, and thus include jury trials of aggravating factors,591
and (2) that an aggravating factor of the crime involving a particularly vulnerable victim would be satisfied if there
had been an abusive relationship between the victim and a defendant.592 Douglas appealed from the sentencing
decision of the superior court, arguing that: (1) he did not receive a jury trial on the aggravating factors; (2) the jury
should have been allowed to reevaluate his guilt in his previous convictions; (3) one aggravator, that of the crime
involving a particular vulnerable victim, was not factually supported; and (4) his composite sentence was
excessive.593 In response, the court of appeals first found that Alaskan precedent established that when confronted
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with pre-Blakely, constitutionally deficient sentencing laws, the previous procedure could be replaced by a jury
trial.594 The court, in finding that the aggravator of a “particularly vulnerable victim” was supported, pointed to
Douglas’s history of violent, manipulative, and controlling behavior towards the victim during their relationship, and
concluded that a jury would be justified in finding that the victim suffered emotional or psychological vulnerability
because of the pattern of abuse.595 Finally, the court pointed out that a twenty-four-year sentence was less excessive
than the original sentence of thirty years, which the court had previously upheld, and so the current sentence could
not be excessive.596 Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the finding of the superior court, holding: (1) that
constitutionally flawed sentencing procedures could be amended to conform to the requirements of Blakely, and thus
include jury trials of the aggravating factors,597 and (2) that an aggravating factor of the crime involving a
particularly vulnerable victim would be satisfied if there had been an abusive relationship between the victim and a
defendant.598
Espinal v. State
In Espinal v. State,599 the court of appeals held that it was not required to conduct an interlocutory review of a
superior court ruling merely because the ruling was based on the double jeopardy clause.600 Espinal was charged
with sexually assaulting J.L., M.T., K.T., and P.M., but the jury acquitted him of assaulting M.T. and could not
reach a decision regarding the other charges.601 The State decided to retry him and the superior court granted the
State’s request to introduce evidence that Espinal assaulted M.T., even though he had been acquitted of that
crime.602 Espinal petitioned the court of appeals to review the ruling.603 He argued that introducing the evidence
violated the Alaska and United States Constitutions’ double jeopardy clause and violated Alaska Rule of Evidence
404(b).604 Additionally, Espinal claimed that Tritt v. State required the court of appeals to hear his interlocutory
petition for review because it was based on the double jeopardy clause.605 However, the court of appeals decided that
Tritt only requires review of motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds, not evidentiary rulings.606
Therefore, the court of appeals denied Espinal’s petition for review, holding that it was not required to conduct an
interlocutory review of a superior court ruling merely because the ruling was based on the double jeopardy clause.607
Ferrick v. State
In Ferrick v. State,608 the court of appeals held that Alaska’s child pornography statute was not
unconstitutionally overbroad.609 Ferrick was convicted of possession of child pornography and, on appeal, argued
that the child pornography statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalized protected speech by
prohibiting explicit images of virtual children rather than real children and by allowing conviction of people who
thought they had pornography of real children but in fact had only virtual pornography.610 The court of appeals
reasoned that the child pornography statute had to be read in light of the crime defined in Alaska’s sexual
exploitation of a minor statute.611 Thus, the child pornography statute at issue only criminalized material that
depicted real, exploited minors, and thus it was not overly broad for criminalizing protected speech.612 Similarly, the
statute did not provide for the conviction of people who thought they possessed real child pornography but in fact
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possessed only virtual pornography.613 Affirming the lower court, the court held that Alaska’s child pornography
statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad.614
Hanson v. State
In Hanson v. State,615 the court of appeals held that when a defendant did not fulfill the obligations of his
probation, the probations should not be set-aside under Section 12.55.085(e) of the Alaska Statutes, even when the
Department of Corrections failed to properly supervise the defendant.616 In 1997, Hanson was convicted of two
felony counts of controlled substance misconduct, and in 2007, he was convicted of felony assault.617 Under
Alaska’s sentencing statute, his possible prison term hinged on whether he was a first- or a second-time felony
offender.618 The court had discretion under 12.55.085(e) to award Hanson a set-aside of his previous conviction if he
had successfully completed probation.619 Typically, if a defendant completes probation, there is a presumption in
favor of setting aside the previous sentence.620 Here, however, the court determined that Hanson did not successfully
complete probation because he never reported to the Department of Corrections, he failed to do his required
community service, and he did not submit an alcohol and drug assessment during his probation.621 These facts
provided sufficient cause to overcome the presumption favoring set-asides.622 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the
lower court in denying the set-aside of Hanson’s conviction, holding that probations should not be set-aside under
12.55.085(e) even when the Department of Corrections failed to supervise the defendant.623
Khan v. State
In Khan v. State,624 the court of appeals held that evidence of prior falsifications was relevant and
admissible to show intent in a perjury case, and that the jury need not agree unanimously on which statement was
false.625 Khan was indicted for perjury for making false statements on an application for court-appointed counsel.626
Kahn was convicted after the court instructed the jury that it could convict if it found any of Kahn’s statements to be
false, even if it could not agree about which statement was false.627 Khan argued on appeal that evidence of his prior
fraudulent conduct was inadmissible, and that the jurors needed to unanimously agree upon which particular
statements were false.628 The court held that evidence of Khan’s prior fraudulent conduct was relevant because it
made it less likely that Khan acted mistakenly or innocently, and the court held that the jury instructions were thus
appropriate.629 Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the superior court and held that evidence of prior
falsifications was relevant and admissible to show intent in a perjury case, and that the jury need not unanimously
agree upon which statement was false.630
Lapp v. State
In Lapp v. State,631 the court of appeals held that a defendant who had been ordered to pay restitution as
part of a criminal sentence for manslaughter did not have his constitutional rights violated when the superior court
judge later entered a civil judgment for the balance of the restitution.632 Lapp was ordered to pay over $86,000 in
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restitution after being convicted of manslaughter and assault, but after Lapp stopped making payments, the superior
court judge converted the restitution order to a civil judgment for the remainder of the sum.633 Lapp appealed the
civil judgment, arguing that the judgment violated double jeopardy and his substantive due process rights, and was
an unconstitutional application of an ex post facto law because a 2001 statute was relied on to increase punishment
for his conviction, which occurred in 1995.634 The appeals court reasoned that double jeopardy did not attach
because restitution was an independent condition of Lapp’s sentence rather than a condition of his parole,635 and
because the civil judgment did not increase Lapp’s punishment.636 Similarly, the court of appeals rejected Lapp’s
substantive due process and ex post facto arguments because application of the 2001 law resulted in a procedural
change rather than a substantive change to the amount of the restitution.637 The court of appeals held that a defendant
ordered to pay restitution as part of a criminal sentence for manslaughter did not have his constitutional rights
violated when the superior court judge later entered civil judgment for the balance of the restitution.638
Moffitt v. State
In Moffitt v. State,639 the court of appeals held that a defendant knowingly fails to appear when he makes a
conscious and deliberate choice not to attend court at the scheduled time.640 Moffitt was convicted of felony failure
to appear under Section 12.30.060 of the Alaska Statutes.641 He filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the
prosecutor’s rebuttal argument and the jury instructions misled the jury about the mens rea of the crime of failure to
appear.642 The prosecutor argued that “knowingly” meant that Moffitt knew at some point that he had a court
appearance and then did not show up.643 The jury instructions defined “knowingly” as awareness of the nature of the
defendant’s conduct and awareness of a substantial probability that a particular circumstance existed.644 The court of
appeals held that the prosecutor’s comments misstated the law and that the jury instructions were misleading,
although technically correct.645 It first reasoned that “knowingly,” in this context, implied a conscious choice to not
come to court.646 It further reasoned that the jury instructions misled by defining “knowingly” in regards to both
conduct and surrounding circumstances, but only the conduct prong was relevant to Moffitt’s case.647 Moffitt did not
contest that he knew he had a court date; rather, he argued that on the day of his hearing he forgot the time.648 This
could have misled the jury into believing that “knowingly” meant awareness of the court date rather than a
conscious and deliberate decision not to attend court.649 Therefore, because there was a substantial probability that
the jury convicted Moffitt under an incorrect legal theory, the court of appeals reversed his conviction and ordered a
new trial, holding that the defendant knowingly fails to appear when he makes a conscious and deliberate choice to
not come to court at the scheduled time.650
Moore v. State
In Moore v. State,651 the court of appeals held that a defendant who committed armed robbery: (1) was not
eligible to argue that the mitigating doctrine of least serious offense applied to him, and (2) was eligible to have his
assault and armed robbery convictions merged.652 Moore committed armed robbery using a knife.653 He was charged
633

Id. at 536.
Id.
635
Id. at 537.
636
Id. at 539.
637
Id. at 541.
638
Id. at 542–43.
639
207 P.3d 593 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).
640
Id. at 595.
641
Id. at 594.
642
Id.
643
Id. at 598.
644
Id. at 599.
645
Id.
646
Id. at 595 (citing Hutchison v. State, 27 P.3d 744, 780 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001)).
647
Id. at 600.
648
Id.
649
Id.
650
Id. at 595, 603.
651
218 P.3d 303 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).
652
Id. at 306.
634

35

with first-degree robbery and third-degree assault.654 He was convicted and appealed on two grounds: first, that his
first-degree robbery offense should have been mitigated because it was conduct among the least serious covered by
the definition of the offense; and second, that the separate convictions should have merged into a single conviction
for the more serious offense.655 On the first point, the court held that the mitigating factor was not present because
the use of a knife could be as dangerous as the use of a firearm.656 On the second point, the court held that the double
jeopardy clause requires that both charges be merged when a single threat is the basis of both charges.657 Affirming
in part and reversing in part the decision of the lower court, the court of appeals held that a defendant who
committed armed robbery: (1) was not eligible to argue that the mitigating doctrine of least serious offense applied
to him, and (2) was eligible to have his assault and armed robbery convictions merged.658
Morrell v. State
In Morrell v. State,659 the court of appeals held that: (1) a self-defense argument against a second-degree
murder charge was not allowed when the defendant was the initial aggressor and (2) a lengthy prison sentence is
appropriate when the defendant used a deadly weapon in an unprovoked attack in response to a minor social
disagreement.660 Morrell and Kalenka got into a minor car accident which escalated into a physical confrontation.661
Morrell produced a knife and eventually stabbed Kalenka to death.662 Morrell was convicted of second degree
murder, and the judge sentenced him to sixty years imprisonment with ten years suspended.663 On appeal, Morrell
argued that the prosecution produced insufficient evidence that he did not act in self-defense,664 and he further
contented that his sentence was excessive.665 The court of appeals rejected the former claim, reasoning that
testimony from a bystander that Morrell was winning the fight at the time he stabbed Kalenka and evidence that
Morrell had to be shoved off Kalenka after Morrell had been stabbed sufficiently demonstrated that a reasonable
juror could have found Morrell to be acting as an aggressor rather than in self-defense.666 Further, the court reasoned
that a jury could reasonably find that Morrell’s testimony was insufficient to show that Kalenka was a deadly
threat.667 The court also rejected Morrell’s argument that his sentence was excessive because his crime was atypical:
he had used a deadly weapon in an unprovoked attack in a minor car accident.668 Affirming the jury’s verdict and the
defendant’s sentence, the court of appeals held: (1) a self-defense argument against a second degree murder charge
was not allowed when the defendant was the initial aggressor, and (2) a lengthy prison sentence was appropriate
when the defendant used a deadly weapon in an unprovoked attack in response to a minor social disagreement.669
Phillips v. State
In Phillips v. State,670 the court of appeals held that: (1) bouncing a forged check was insufficient evidence
of harm to financial reputation to sustain a charge of criminal impersonation in the first degree,671 and (2) a
condition of probation requiring submission to drug and alcohol testing was reasonable when the defendant was
involved in several alcohol-related criminal offenses in the past and nitrous oxide was found in his vehicle at the
time of the arrest.672 During a consensual search of Phillips’s vehicle, a police officer found a false identification
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card, checks issued in someone else’s name, and nitrous oxide, which Phillips admitted to using to get high.673 At
trial, a jury convicted Phillips of multiple offenses, including criminal impersonation, as Phillips had bounced
checks after one of his victims had closed his checking account.674 The trial judge assigned a probation condition
requiring Phillips to submit to drug and alcohol testing.675 On appeal, the court of appeals reasoned that the
applicable statutory requirements for criminal impersonation in the first degree were not met when the victim had
two of his checks bounced, as the statute required damage to a victim’s financial reputation vis-à-vis a victim’s
creditworthiness or his ability to obtain a loan, open an account, obtain credit, or obtain an access device.676 The
court also reasoned that the nitrous oxide found in Phillips’s car, coupled with his prior record of underage alcohol
possession, supported a “case-specific” basis to condition his probation on alcohol and drug testing.677 The court of
appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that: (1) bouncing a forged check was insufficient evidence of
harm to financial reputation to sustain a charge of criminal impersonation in the first degree,678 and (2) a condition
of probation requiring submission to drug and alcohol testing was reasonable when the defendant was involved in
several alcohol-related criminal offenses in the past and nitrous oxide was found in his vehicle at the time of the
arrest.679
Rantala v. State
In Rantala v. State,680 the court of appeals held that advice to a witness to give “yes” or “no” answers
whenever reasonably possible, and not to volunteer information or elaborate on her answers, did not violate Alaska’s
witness tampering statute.681 While in jail, Rantala phoned Mischler and urged her not to cooperate with the
authorities in the burglary case because she had not been issued a subpoena, and Rantala advised that Mischler
should answer “yes” or “no” whenever possible.682 Rantala was charged with three separate counts of witness
tampering, and was found guilty.683 The court of appeals held that Rantala’s conversations with Mischler did not
support any of the charges of witness tampering because urging a witness not to volunteer information—if the
information is not solicited by the examiner’s questions—is permissible.684 Specifically, the court of appeals rejected
the notion that advising Mischler to answer “no” when possible was an attempt to offer misleading testimony
because it is up to the prosecution to obtain the truth from a witness in direct or cross-examination.685 Affirming the
superior court’s allowance of a second trial, the court of appeals held that advice to a witness to give “yes” or “no”
answers whenever reasonably possible, and not to volunteer information or elaborate on their answers, did not
violate Alaska’s witness tampering statute.686
Rockwell v. State
In Rockwell v. State,687 the court of appeals held that admitting as evidence a defendant’s inculpatory
statements was harmless error if the government could demonstrate that the statements did not contribute to the
verdict obtained.688 Rockwell was involved in a two-car accident.689 The arresting officer asked Rockwell to sit in
the back seat of the patrol car with the understanding that he was not under arrest.690 The officer proceeded to
question him in the car and took him to the station for a field sobriety test.691 Upon a positive result, he was read his
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rights and arrested.692 Rockwell was then convicted of felony driving while under the influence and driving while his
license was revoked.693 On appeal, the court of appeals found that Rockwell’s right to counsel was violated after he
was advised of his rights but the police continued interrogation after he demanded an attorney, and the court
remanded for additional findings to determine: (1) when the interview became custodial, and (2) whether the
admission of statements from the interrogation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.694 The superior court
determined that Rockwell’s interrogation became custodial as soon as he was seated in the patrol car for questioning
and that he was entitled to reversal of his convictions because he might have advanced a different defense if he had
not been forced to contend at trial with all of the conflicting statements he made to the police.695 The court of
appeals the held that Rockwell was not actually prejudiced by the evidence gathered in violation of Miranda because
the jury did not rest its verdict on the evidence gathered during the detention.696 The court further reasoned that there
was no evidence that Rockwell would have argued a different defense had the evidence been excluded.697 Reversing
the ruling in the lower court and affirming the conviction, the court of appeals held that admitting as evidence a
defendant’s inculpatory statement was harmless error if the government could demonstrate that the statements did
not contribute to the verdict obtained.698
Skjervem v. State
In Skjervem v. State,699 the court of appeals held that law enforcement must have a separate, legally
sufficient reason to continue to detain a defendant after suspicions that led to an initial investigative stop have been
resolved.700 After police observed a small canister in Skjervem’s car during a burglary investigation, and after
Skjervem admitted that the canister contained marijuana, police obtained his consent to search the car and found
drug paraphernalia inside.701 A subsequent search of Skjervem’s person revealed a lump of crack cocaine.702 The
district court found that the police reasonably believed that a burglary was in progress when they began the search
and that the defendant was connected to the burglary.703 The trial court thus concluded that the police were initially
justified in taking Skjervem into custody.704 On appeal, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to
resolve two factual issues: (1) whether the burglary investigation had been resolved when the defendant consented to
search of his car and was brought in for questioning, and (2) whether drug paraphernalia was in plain view on seat of
the car.705 The court reasoned that the observation of a canister on the seat of Skjervem’s car did not justify his
continued detention because a reasonable suspicion that a person has small amount of illegal drugs for personal use
is not sufficient to justify an investigative stop.706 The court also reasoned that if the defendant’s continued detention
was unlawful, then that detention would have tainted his consent to search his car.707 Moreover, the court stated that
if the defendant was detained after the burglary investigation had been resolved and if the drug paraphernalia was
not in plain view, then the cocaine found on defendant should have been suppressed.708 Remanding to the lower
court to determine: (1) whether police observed drug paraphernalia in plain view, and (2) whether police learned that
there was no burglary before or after beginning custodial interrogation of defendant,709 the court of appeals held that
law enforcement must have a separate, legally sufficient reason to continue to detain a defendant after suspicions
that led to an initial investigative stop have been resolved.710
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State v. Hamilton
In State v. Hamilton,711 the court of appeals held that a Juneau tire-spinning ordinance did not violate
Section 28.01.010(a) of the Alaska Statutes.712 In 1971, the City of Juneau enacted a traffic code which made it
unlawful for a driver to accelerate a vehicle so rapidly as to cause the tires to spin or squeal.713 At the time the
provision was enacted, the Alaska Administrative Code contained an identical regulation, but it was repealed in
1979.714 Section 28.01.010(a) prohibits municipalities from enacting traffic ordinances that are inconsistent with the
Alaska Code.715 The trial court found that the policy behind 28.02.010(a) was to maintain consistency in Alaska
traffic laws and thus declared the ordinance to be invalid.716 The court of appeals explained that when a question of
consistency is raised, the issue is whether the discrepancy frustrates state policy.717 Here, the court of appeals found
nothing to suggest that the tire-spinning provision frustrated state policy.718 Reversing the decision of the lower
court, the court of appeals held that a Juneau tire-spinning ordinance did not violate Section 28.01.010(a).719
Wall v. State
In Wall v. State,720 the court of appeals held that one can be convicted of driving under the influence when
the driver is merely sitting in a stalled car in an intersection when the car is operable or reasonably capable of being
rendered operable.721 Wall was found sitting in a stopped car on the side of a road, with the keys in his left hand and
an open beer in his right.722 He was convicted by a jury of felony driving under the influence.723 On appeal, he
argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish either that he was operating the car or that the car was
operable.724 The court of appeals affirmed the jury’s decision, reasoning that Wall had actual physical control of the
vehicle, as he was the sole occupant of the car and had just removed the keys from the ignition.725 The court further
found that the car was reasonably capable of being rendered operable, comparing it to a car that has run out of gas
(as opposed to a car with a cracked block, which would be inoperable).726 The court of appeals thus affirmed the
decision below and held that one can be convicted of driving under the influence when the driver is merely sitting in
a stalled car at an intersection when the car is operable or reasonably capable of being rendered operable.727
Wilson v. State
In Wilson v. State,728 the court of appeals held that Section 11.61.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes, which
punishes possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, did not violate the Alaska Constitution.729 Wilson was pulled
over during a traffic stop and police found him in possession of a firearm.730 He was charged with being a convicted
felon in possession of a firearm, but appealed, arguing that the statute violated his right to bear arms under Article I,
Section 19 of the Alaska Constitution, because the Constitution does not distinguish violent from non-violent
felons.731 The court of appeals cited federal precedent to support the position that the right to bear arms can be
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abridged when applied to convicted felons.732 The court relied on Gibson v. State to demonstrate that the 1994
amendment to Article I, Section 19 of the Alaska Constitution was not intended to mandate strict scrutiny for
firearm regulations.733 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that Section 11.61.200(a)(1), punishing
the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, did not violate the Alaska Constitution, which provides an
individual with the right to bear arms.734
Wooley v. State
In Wooley v. State,735 the court of appeals held that theft, which is normally a third-degree misdemeanor,
cannot be enhanced to a second-degree misdemeanor under Section 11.46.130(a)(6) of the Alaska Statutes if the
defendant had been convicted of two thefts but sentenced for both on the same day.736 On February 12, 2002,
Wooley was charged with theft.737 Because he had been sentenced previously for two separate thefts on March 28,
1997, he pled guilty to second-degree theft based on the enhancement provision of 11.46.130(a)(6).738 He later filed
a motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that his past convictions were too old to support the enhancement
because his guilty plea to the previous thefts fell outside the five-year range.739 The supreme court held that the
operative date was the date of sentencing, but the court remanded for determination as to whether being sentenced
for two thefts on the same day constituted the two separate offenses required for enhancement.740 On remand, the
court of appeals reasoned that the statute was designed to target the “habitual criminal” and that one only becomes a
habitual criminal if he has failed after two separate opportunities to reform.741 Since the defendant had only been
sentenced once before, he had only one opportunity for reformation.742 Thus, the court of appeals held that theft,
which is normally a third-degree misdemeanor, cannot be enhanced to a second-degree misdemeanor under
11.46.130(a)(6) if the defendant had been convicted of two thefts but sentenced for both on the same day.743
Worden v. State
In Worden v. State,744 the court of appeals held that a defendant cannot be convicted of knowing possession
of child pornography simply for having images stored in his computer’s cache.745 Law enforcement found images of
child pornography in Worden’s computer cache files.746 The court of appeals held that Worden did not have the
requisite intent to sustain the charge of knowing possession because the State offered no evidence that he knew the
images he viewed on websites would be stored on his computer’s cache.747 Reversing the lower court, the court of
appeals held that a defendant cannot be convicted of knowing possession of child pornography simply for having
images stored in his computer’s cache.748
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
top
United States Supreme Court
District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne
In District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne,749 the Supreme Court held that a
defendant had no constitutional right to access the State’s evidence for the purpose of DNA testing.750 In 1993,
Osborne was arrested for sexually assaulting and murdering a prostitute.751 Osborne denied the charge, but “DQ
Alpha” DNA testing showed that he was within a sixteen percent segment of the population that could have
committed the offense.752 Osborne requested a more specific form of DNA testing, but his lawyer strategically
refused, fearing that further testing would only prove guilt and diminish a mistaken identity defense.753 Osborne was
nonetheless convicted.754 On appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that the Due Process Clause entitled him to
access the State’s evidence in order to perform the most specific form of DNA testing available.755 The Court held
that Osborne did not have the same rights to access the State’s information post-conviction as he did before he was
found guilty in a fair trial.756 Therefore, Osborne’s claim under the Due Process Clause could only succeed if
Alaska’s post-conviction relief procedures were fundamentally flawed.757 Since Alaska had guidelines for allowing
convicts to seek post-conviction DNA testing, there was no fundamental injustice violating Osborne’s due process
right.758 The Supreme Court held that a defendant had no constitutional right to access the State’s evidence for the
purpose of DNA testing.759

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
United States v. Johnson
In United States v. Johnson,760 the Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly denied a defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence and his request for a Section 3E1.1(b) one level downward adjustment in his
Sentencing Guidelines sentence.761 Police noticed three men acting suspiciously around a bank.762 When one of the
men, Johnson, entered the bank, the police followed; Johnson then immediately left and got into a car waiting
outside.763 After pulling over the car, the officers searched the men and found a handgun inside Johnson’s coat.764
Johnson had a prior conviction in Florida and the federal government later indicted him for being a felon in
possession of a firearm.765 Johnson appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the handgun found
in the pat-down and the denial of his one level decrease pursuant to Section 3E1.1(b) of the Sentencing
Guidelines.766 The Ninth Circuit held that the search was proper because the Fourth Amendment allows officers to
conduct stop-and-frisk searches when they have reasonable suspicion to believe criminal behavior is happening.767
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The court also held that Johnson was not entitled to a one level sentencing guidelines decrease.768 The Guidelines
allow a one-level decrease on motion by the government when the defendant pleads guilty and accepts responsibility
so the court and government can use their resources efficiently by avoiding trial.769 The government has broad
discretion about whether to file this motion, but it is not unlimited, and courts can grant the one-level decrease if the
government has abused its discretion.770 Here, the government did not file a motion for a one-level reduction
because although Johnson pled guilty, he still retained the right to appeal and thus forced the government to defend
the appeal.771 The Ninth Circuit held that this use of discretion was proper because Section 3E1.1(b) is designed to
conserve resources and encourage guilty pleas.772 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly denied
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and a request for a Section 3E1.1(b) one level downward adjustment in the
Sentencing Guidelines.773
United States v. Leniear
In United States v. Leniear,774 the Ninth Circuit held that a motion for a sentence reduction based on
Amendment 706 would not be granted when the Amendment did not lower the applicable sentencing guideline
range and the sentence reduction was not consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.775 Leniear filed a motion seeking a
sentence reduction based on Amendment 706, which reduced the base level assigned to each threshold quantity of
crack cocaine by two points.776 Leniear had previously pled guilty to four counts, one of which involved crack
cocaine.777 The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction to reduce Leniear’s sentence because Amendment 706
did not lower the applicable guideline range in light of the grouping rules under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4.778 Although
courts are generally not permitted to alter a sentence once it has been imposed, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) permits a
change if: (1) the sentence is based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission, and (2) such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.779 Leniear’s motion did not satisfy the two elements.780 First, the sentencing range applicable to
Leniear remained the same, as the combined offense level did not change.781 Second, a sentence reduction would not
be consistent with the Sentencing Commissions policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, which forbids a reduction in
a sentence if it does not lower the defendant’s applicable guideline.782 Affirming the decision of the district court,
the Ninth Circuit held that a motion for a sentence reduction based on Amendment 706 would not be granted when
the Amendment did not lower the applicable sentencing guideline and the sentence reduction was not consistent
with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.783
United States v. Maness
In United States v. Maness,784 the Ninth Circuit held that a district court’s denial of a defendant’s request to
represent himself at sentencing was subject to harmless error analysis, and because the denial did not cause any
error, the sentence was upheld.785 The court also held that while the Sentencing Guidelines borrow the definition of a
semiautomatic assault weapon from 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30), the statute’s effective date is not incorporated into the
Guidelines.786 Maness appealed a conviction of two counts of firearm possession.787 On remand, the district court
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denied his motion to proceed pro se and sentenced him to 120 months.788 However, the district court did allow
Maness to file briefs and motions pro se, although it did not allow him to proceed without an attorney.789 The Ninth
Circuit held that while an improper request to proceed pro se at trial cannot be subject to harmless error analysis,
such analysis may be used if the violation occurred only at the sentencing.790 The court also held that while the
Sentencing Guidelines borrow the definition of a semiautomatic assault weapon from 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30), the
statute’s effective date is not incorporated into the Guidelines.791 Affirming the decision of the district court, the
Ninth Circuit held that a district court’s denial of a defendant’s request to represent himself at sentencing was
subject to harmless error analysis, and because the denial did not cause any error, the sentence was upheld.792

Alaska Supreme Court
Beltz v. State
In Beltz v. State,793 the supreme court held that the police’s reasonable suspicion of methamphetamine
production was sufficient to justify the warrantless search of the suspect’s garbage even though there was some
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage set out for collection.794 Without a warrant, police collected garbage
bags that Beltz placed on public property at the end of his driveway.795 The bags contained evidence of
methamphetamine manufacturing.796 Beltz moved to suppress the evidence resulting from collection of his
garbage.797 The superior court granted the motion, but the court of appeals reversed.798 On appeal, Beltz argued that
the police violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.799 The court found no violation of
the U.S. Constitution because a subjective expectation of privacy in garbage left for collection is unreasonable under
U.S. Supreme Court precedent.800 Under the Alaska Constitution, however, the court held that highly personal
information can be gleaned from a garbage search, but that leaving garbage out necessarily contemplates a risk of
intrusion by human or natural forces.801 The court therefore concluded that under the Alaska Constitution there is a
reasonable but diminished expectation of privacy in garbage left out for collection.802 Nonetheless, the court
determined that a reasonable suspicion of evidence of a crime causing serious harm to people or property is
sufficient to justify a warrantless search of garbage because the expectation of privacy is diminished and because the
search is minimally invasive.803 Here, evidence that Beltz purchased the necessary materials for methamphetamine
production was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that he was manufacturing methamphetamine.804
Affirming the appellate court, the supreme court held that the police’s reasonable suspicion of methamphetamine
production was sufficient to justify the warrantless search of the suspect’s garbage even though there is some
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage set out for collection.805
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State v. Smart
In State v. Smart,806 the supreme court held that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely,
which grants the right to a jury trial to determine every fact in a case—including aggravating factors in a
presumptive sentencing scheme—would not apply retroactively in Alaska.807 Smart was convicted by a jury of
second-degree assault, and the sentencing judge found an aggravating factor that extended his sentence.808 The court
of appeals overturned Smart’s sentence, holding that the Blakely doctrine was retroactive and required that
aggravating facts must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.809 The supreme court identified three criteria
to guide whether a new ruling should be retroactive: the purpose of the new standards, the extent of reliance on the
old standards, and the administrative effect of retroactive application of the new standards.810 The court reasoned
that the purpose of the new standard was not contravened because no serious questions were raised about the
fairness of prior criminal trials;811 the reliance on the old standard was heavy and consistent;812 and making the new
rule retroactive would create a large administrative problem because many cases would need to be retried.813 As all
three factors gravitated against retroactivity, the supreme court reversed the decision of the lower court and held that
the Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely, which grants the right to a jury trial to determine every fact in a case,
including aggravating factors in a presumptive sentencing scheme, would not apply retroactively in Alaska.814
State v. Miller
In State v. Miller,815 the supreme court held that a police officer’s reasonable suspicion was sufficient to
conduct an investigative stop of a car when the factors of a balancing test were met.816 An anonymous 911 call
alerted the police that a man and woman were engaged in a nonphysical fight in a bar parking lot and an officer was
dispatched to the scene.817 Upon arriving, the officer saw the man and woman beginning to drive off.818 The officer
pulled the car over at the parking lot exit to investigate and determined that the driver, Miller, was intoxicated.819 At
trial, Miller argued that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion necessary to stop his car, and Miller moved to
suppress the results of the investigation.820 The district court found the officer’s suspicion sufficient and denied the
motion.821 On appeal, the supreme court held that to determine whether an investigative stop is appropriate, a
balancing test that considers: (1) the seriousness of the suspected crime; (2) the immediacy of the investigation; (3)
the strength of the officer’s reasonable suspicion; and (4) the intrusiveness of the stop should be applied.822 Here, the
court held that domestic violence was a serious crime,823 and that it was reasonable for the officer to believe that
domestic violence had been or would be committed.824 Moreover, the investigation through a car window was
minimally invasive and occurred in the immediate area of the suspected crime.825 Accordingly, the supreme court
reversed the court of appeals, holding that an investigative stop was appropriate when a balancing test indicated that
an officer’s reasonable suspicion supported the stop.826
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Alaska Court of Appeals
Alex v. State
In Alex v. State,827 the court of appeals held that: (1) federal post-conviction relief law does not affect the
interpretation of Section 12.72.020(a)(3)(A) of the Alaska Statutes, which governs the time limit to file a petition for
post-conviction relief for state convictions; and (2) a defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief is not untimely
for purposes of Section 18.85.100(c)(1) until that claim is resolved against the defendant.828 Alex filed a petition for
post-conviction relief in the superior court thirteen months after the supreme court denied his petition for hearing.829
However, according to 12.72.020(a)(3)(A), the deadline was twelve months, so the superior court dismissed the
petition.830 On appeal, Alex argued that under federal law, he still had time to file the petition because the United
States Supreme Court rules allow the defendant ninety days to file a petition for certiorari.831 Alex also argued that
he was denied effective assistance of counsel, which should have equitably tolled the statute of limitations.832 On the
former issue, the court of appeals reasoned that the federal statutory and case law cited by Alex only applied to
federal convictions.833 On the latter issue, the court reasoned that because defendants have a constitutional right to
representation when challenging a statute their conviction, the defendant's petition for post-conviction relief is not
untimely for purposes of 18.85.100(c)(1) until that claim is resolved against the defendant.834 Thus, the court of
appeals held that: (1) federal post-conviction relief law does not affect the interpretation of 12.72.020(a)(3)(A),
which governs the time limit to file a petition for post-conviction relief for state convictions; and (2) a defendant’s
petition for post-conviction relief was not untimely for purposes of 18.85.100(c)(1) until his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim had been resolved.835
Bennett v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Bennett v. Municipality of Anchorage,836 the court of appeals held that in a domestic violence
proceeding, a trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting evidence of a defendant’s other crime of domestic
violence or by failing to explain the basis for admitting the evidence on the record.837 Bennett was arrested and
charged with assault, family violence, and malicious destruction of property.838 The trial court admitted evidence
that Steven had struck his wife once before, in 2005.839 On appeal, Bennett claimed that evidence about the 2005
incident was improperly admitted because there was insufficient proof that that incident was domestic violence,840
and that the trial judge erred in not explaining on the record why the 2005 incident was relevant to the present
case.841 The court noted that the relevancy of evidence depends upon whether a reasonable juror could find that the
prior incident had been established as domestic violence.842 The court further reasoned that this standard had been
met, given the victim’s testimony that in 2005 Steven struck her in the face multiple times.843 The court also
determined that a trial judge is not required to explain on the record the analysis of each and every factor in his or
her decision to admit evidence.844 Therefore, the court of appeals held that in a domestic violence proceeding, a trial
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judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting evidence of a defendant’s other crime of domestic violence or by
failing to explain the basis for admitting the evidence on the record.845
Brand v. Alaska
In Brand v. Alaska,846 the court of appeals held that a police officer could not conduct a protective sweep of
a residence unless he has a reasonable belief that there were other individuals inside the home who might put him in
danger.847 Brand consented to a search of his residence after police had already conducted a protective sweep of his
home and discovered a marijuana-growing operation inside.848 Brand was convicted of two counts of fourth-degree
misconduct involving a controlled substance and was sentenced to four years of imprisonment.849 On appeal, the
court of appeals found that the trial court should have suppressed the State’s evidence because the police lacked
reasonable cause to perform a protective sweep of the Brand residence.850 The court reasoned that there was no
reasonable cause to believe that a dangerous person was inside the house because the officers who arrested Brand
and performed the sweep of his residence testified that they did not have any actual belief that another individual
was in the home and posed a threat, and Brand and the other suspects were all secured outside of the home.851
Reversing the decision of the lower court, the court of appeals held that police may not conduct a protective sweep
of a residence unless they have reason to believe that there are other individuals inside the home who might put
them in danger.852
Clark v. State
In Clark v. State,853 the court of appeals held that a victim’s prior testimony at an evidentiary hearing could
be used at trial without violating the confrontation clause, even though the victim refused to testify at trial and
refused to be cross examined.854 Amouak, the victim of Clark’s assault, arrived at the hospital and informed medical
personnel that she was assaulted by Clark.855 During trial, Amouak refused to testify, and the State relied on the
hospital conversation to detail the cause of Amouak’s injury.856 Clark was convicted, but on appeal argued that the
conversation should not have been admitted because it was hearsay.857 The court of appeals then remanded the case
for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conversation should have been excluded under the confrontation
clause of the Sixth Amendment.858 At the evidentiary hearing, Amouak testified about the conversation, but refused
to answer cross-examination questions.859 Clark claimed that Amouak’s entire testimony should have been stricken
because she elected not to subject herself to cross-examination.860 The court of appeals affirmed the decision to
admit the testimony because Clark’s attorney was still able to substantially make his argument without questioning
Amouak.861 The court of appeals also affirmed that the conversation with medical personnel was an exception to the
hearsay rule under Alaska Rule of Evidence 803(4) because it was intended to facilitate medical treatment.862
Furthermore, the court stated that the conversation was not testimonial because Amouak’s primary purpose for
disclosing information was to obtain treatment.863 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that a victim’s
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prior testimony at an evidentiary hearing could be used at trial without violating the confrontation clause, even
though the victim refused to testify at trial or be cross examined.864
Dayton v. State
In Dayton v. State,865 the court of appeals held that tardy filing was not grounds for a dismissal when the
brief was actually filed and the opposing party did not demonstrate any hardship brought by the filing’s lateness.866
Dayton was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and first-degree burglary.867 After being convicted, Dayton filed
a petition for post-conviction relief, but did so a full sixty days after the deadline set by the trial court judge.868 The
judge then granted the State’s motion to strike the petition and dismissed the action, orally citing the tardiness of the
petition.869 On appeal, the court of appeals held that late filing was not grounds for dismissal when: (1) the brief was
actually filed; and (2) the opposing party had not demonstrated any hardship brought by the tardy filing.870 Since
these factors were both present here, the court held dismissal of the appeal was inappropriate and remanded the case
to the trial court, where the State could pursue other avenues for dismissal.871 Reversing the lower court, the court of
appeals held that a tardy filing was not grounds for a dismissal when the brief was actually filed and the opposing
party did not demonstrate any hardship brought by the filing’s lateness.872
Gibson v. State
In Gibson v. State,873 the court of appeals held that the State could not use evidence procured under the
emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement when the circumstances surrounding the search would not have
led a reasonable officer to perceive an immediate need to take action in order to prevent death or to protect against
serious injury.874 The police responded to a 911 call, in which a woman reported that a man was threatening to stab
her in the back of the head.875 Moments after their arrival, the police saw Bevin tumble out the door with a cut on the
back of her head and a swollen eye.876 When ordered to come out of the trailer, Gibson offered no resistance and
was placed in the back of a patrol car.877 Although the officers had seen nothing to indicate that there were other
people in the trailer, an officer entered the trailer to make sure no one else was inside and injured.878 Upon entering
the trailer, an officer discovered a methamphetamine laboratory.879 The police then obtained a warrant and returned
to gather evidence.880 Gibson filed a motion to suppress arguing that the police illegally entered his trailer without a
warrant.881 The State argued that the officers were justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant
requirement.882 On appeal, the court of appeals held that warrantless entries are deemed per se unreasonable and are
only tolerated if they fall within a well-established and specifically defined exception, such as the emergency aid
exception. For that exception to apply: (1) the police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an
immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property; (2) the search must not be primarily
motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence; and (3) there must be some reasonable basis to associate the
emergency with the area or place to be searched.883 The court held that the exception did not apply here because the
State had failed to show that there was an immediate need for the officers’ assistance, thus leaving no reasonable
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basis for them to enter the trailer.884 The supreme court reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the State
may not use evidence procured under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement when the
circumstances surrounding the search would not have led a prudent and reasonable officer to perceive an immediate
need to take action in order to prevent death or to protect against serious injury to persons or property.885
Kalmakoff v. State
In Kalmakoff v. State,886 the court of appeals held that when a defendant’s Miranda rights are violated but
there is a sufficient break in the stream of events between the violation and a subsequent statement, then the
subsequent statement is admissible.887 During an initial interview, Kalmakoff made statements that caused police to
suspect his involvement in the crime, but he was not given Miranda warnings.888 In a second interview, Kalmakoff
was warned of his right to silence, but troopers prodded him for information after he expressed a desire to stop
talking.889 Three hours after the conclusion of this interview, troopers came to his home to speak with him again; he
was again warned, after which he confessed to the crime without invoking a right to silence.890 The trial judge
admitted statements from the first interview, but excluded the entire second interview due to the Miranda
violation.891 The court of appeals declined to rule on whether the first interview was improperly admitted, but held
that the statements from the third interview were sufficient to convict Kalmakoff regardless of whether the first
interview’s statements were heard by a jury or not.892 It held that the third interview was properly admitted because,
under the Halberg rule, there was a sufficient break in the stream of events between the second and third interviews
(time had elapsed, Kalmakoff had gone to school and his home and had time to speak with family and friends), and
that the third interview was not tainted by the prior Miranda violation.893 Affirming the decision of the lower court,
the court of appeals held that when a defendant’s Miranda rights are violated but there is a sufficient break in the
stream of events between the violation and a subsequent statement, then the subsequent statement is admissible.894
Malutin v. State
In Malutin v. State,895 the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant’s negotiated plea bargain was
constitutionally valid when the defendant’s attorney stipulated to two aggravating factors without the defendant’s
express permission.896 Malutin pled no contest to attempted first-degree sexual abuse of a minor as part of a plea
bargain.897 The plea bargain had a negotiated sentence of twelve years imprisonment with seven years suspension.898
However, because attempted sexual abuse of a minor is a class A felony, the superior court could not lawfully
impose the twelve year sentence unless it found at least one aggravating factor.899 Thus, the defense stipulated to two
aggravating factors.900 On appeal, Malutin challenged his plea agreement,901 arguing that the court was in error when
it allowed his defense attorney to make a stipulation for him without his express permission.902 The court of appeals
held that it is not plain error for the superior court to allow the defense attorney to concede aggravating factors for
the client.903 Although the court decided that there was no factual basis for the second aggravating factor, it held that
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only one aggravating factor was needed to sustain the plea bargain.904 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals
held that a criminal defendant’s negotiated plea bargain was constitutionally valid where the defendant stipulated to
two aggravating factors through his attorney without the defendant’s express permission.905
McKinley v. State
In McKinley v. State,906 the court of appeals held that placement at a residential treatment facility, even if
court ordered, does not approximate incarceration if the program does not require residency and twenty-four hour
custody.907 After completing a residential treatment program, McKinley entered an aftercare program.908 He filed a
motion requesting credit for the time he resided at the aftercare program.909 The court of appeals held that McKinley
was not entitled to credit for the time he resided at the aftercare program.910 The court used three of the Nygren
criteria to determine whether McKinley was considered in custody during the aftercare program: first, whether the
program required residency; second, whether the facility required twenty-four hour supervision; and third, whether a
court order required the person to reside at the facility.911 The court of appeals held that McKinley was not subjected
to incarceration during the aftercare program because, even though it was court ordered, the aftercare program did
not require residency and he was not under twenty-four hour supervision.912 Affirming the decision of the superior
court, the court of appeals held that placement at a residential treatment facility, even if court ordered, does not
approximate incarceration if the program does not require residency and twenty-four hour custody.913
McLaughlin v. State
In McLaughlin v. State,914 the court of appeals held that a person convicted of a criminal offense could not
circumvent the statute of limitations on a petition for post-conviction relief by appealing to civil rules that allow
relief under certain circumstances.915 McLaughlin pled no contest and was convicted of driving under the
influence.916 Nearly three years later, he applied to the superior court for post-conviction relief, but the application
was denied because it was untimely.917 On appeal, McLaughlin admitted that the statute of limitations on his
application had run but argued that his application should be allowed because Alaska’s criminal rules explicitly
applied civil rules to post-conviction relief, and because under the civil rules there was no time limit on an
application for relief from a void judgment.918 The court of appeals determined that the grounds and procedure—
including the statute of limitations—for seeking relief from a criminal conviction are provided under Alaska’s
Criminal Rules.919 The court reasoned that although the Alaska Criminal Rules provide that civil rules will typically
be used in post-conviction relief actions, the provision at issue was intended to promote administrative efficiency,
rather than to create an alternative procedure for seeking relief.920 To create an alternative procedure would
undermine the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.921 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the
superior court decision and held that a person convicted of a criminal offense could not circumvent the statute of
limitations on a petition for post-conviction relief by appealing to civil rules that allow relief under certain
circumstances.922
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Newsom v. State
In Newsom v. State,923 the court of appeals held that the police may stop a suspect even in the absence of
public danger or a serious crime.924 When Officer Busey attempted to pull over Newsom for driving at night without
lights, Newsom accelerated and began weaving through traffic but was eventually caught as he fled into a
Walmart.925 Newsom was convicted of first-degree failing to stop at the direction of a police officer; the crime was a
felony because it was accompanied by reckless driving.926 On appeal, he argued that the police were not authorized
to conduct this investigative stop because he presented no immediate public danger and because the crime being
investigated did not involve serious harm to person or property.927 The court held that an investigative stop was
appropriate even in the absence of public danger, and was a serious crime when, as here, the stop was minimally
intrusive and was based on solid information suggesting the existence of a crime.928 The court also found support in
two guiding principles for close cases like this one: (1) a stop may not be used a pretext to a search for evidence and
(2) practical necessity sometimes requires a stop.929 Here, the court believed that the stop was conducted not to
search for evidence but to prevent the suspect from leaving.930 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the superior court and held that the police may stop a suspect even in the absence of public danger or a
serious crime.931
State v. Avery
In State v. Avery,932 the court of appeals held that an inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
phone calls made from jail, and the contents of such phone calls are admissible as evidence.933 In February and
March 2005, Avery was in jail awaiting trial and was under an order prohibiting him from contacting his wife.934
When police became aware that Avery violated the order several times, they obtained a warrant giving them access
to the phone calls, which had been recorded by the Department of Corrections as part of a routine process.935 The
calls became the basis for additional charges.936 Avery moved to suppress the telephone recordings, arguing that his
rights under the United States and Alaska Constitutions were violated when the recordings were made without a
warrant.937 The motion was granted by the superior court and the State appealed.938 The court of appeals held that
under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, Avery did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when
making the phone calls, reasoning that the privacy rights of Avery were outweighed by the security interest of the
jail.939 The court further reasoned that under the Alaska Constitution, prison security is a compelling government
interest and conversations could be recorded if they furthered that interest.940 The court of appeals reversed the
motion, holding that an inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone calls made from jail, and the
contents of such phone calls are admissible as evidence.941
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State v. Galbraith
In State v. Galbraith,942 the court of appeals held that a judge who was preempted in a dismissed indictment
remained preempted when an identical indictment is filed anew, but that a judge who was not preempted during
original proceedings could not be preempted in a later proceeding on an identical indictment.943 After a judge
dismissed murder charges against Galbraith, the State obtained a new indictment on identical charges.944 When the
original judge was assigned to the newly filed case, the State attempted to remove the judge through a peremptory
challenge.945 This challenge was denied, and the State appealed.946 The court reviewed previous Alaska criminal
cases and concluded that, at least in the criminal context, the decision to use or forego a peremptory challenge in an
earlier proceeding should remain binding in a newly filed identical proceeding.947 Therefore, the court of appeals
affirmed the denial of the State’s peremptory challenge holding that a judge who was preempted in a dismissed
indictment remains preempted when an identical indictment is filed anew but that a judge who was not preempted
during original proceedings cannot be preempted in a later proceeding on an identical indictment.948
State v. Jones
In State v. Jones,949 the court of appeals held that a criminal complaint from a prior prosecution, in which
the defendant pled no contest, was inadmissible hearsay when offered to prove the facts of the prior assault.950
During Jones’ trial for second-degree assault, the prosecution introduced evidence of prior similar violent behavior
through the judgment and complaint from a former case in which Jones had pled no contest.951 The prosecution
argued that by pleading no contest, the defendant admitted the acts alleged in the complaint.952 The superior court
accepted this argument, admitted the evidence, and Jones was convicted.953 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed
the conviction, reasoning that the evidence was inadmissible and that its admission may have appreciably affected
the jury’s verdict.954 Under Alaska law, a judge is only required to ascertain the factual basis of a plea when a
defendant enters a guilty plea, but not when a defendant enters a no contest plea.955 Further, the evidence admitted in
error may have appreciably affected the jury’s verdict, because without it the State had little evidence to demonstrate
the assault occurred as alleged.956 Reversing the superior court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a criminal
complaint from a prior prosecution, in which the defendant pled no contest, was inadmissiable hearsay when offered
to prove the facts of the prior assault.957
Tegoseak v. State
In Tegoseak v. State,958 the court of appeals held that potential problems with a photo lineup procedure
were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the witness had followed the defendant until his arrest.959 When
Maestas witnessed a car swerving as though the driver was intoxicated, he called the police and followed the car
until officers arrived.960 One week later, Maestas identified Tegoseak from a photo array, but the officer
administering the photo lineup may have conducted the photo lineup in a suggestive way.961 After he was convicted,
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Tegoseak appealed the superior court’s denial of his motion to suppress the results of the photo lineup.962 The court
of appeals reasoned that even if the identification procedure had been unnecessarily suggestive, the identity of the
perpetrator was not in doubt here because Maestas had followed Tegoseak until he was arrested.963 Affirming the
decision of the lower court, the court of appeals held that potential problems with a photo lineup procedure were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the witness had followed the defendant until his arrest.964

ELECTION LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Carmony v. McKechnie
In Carmony v. McKechnie,965 the supreme court held that a land use ballot initiative was unenforceable as a
matter of law because it circumvented the planning commission’s statutory duty to create a consistent and
comprehensive land use plan.966 Carmony submitted an initiative that imposed expiration dates on all land use
ordinances enacted after July 1, 2007 unless they were approved by voters.967 The borough clerk rejected the
initiative application because: (1) the initiative was unenforceable as a matter of law; (2) it was related to
administrative rather than legislative matters; and (3) it was more similar to a referendum than an initiative.968 The
superior court affirmed.969 Carmony then appealed to the supreme court.970 In order to be valid, an initiative must be
enforceable as a matter of law.971 Carmony’s proposed initiative was not enforceable because it would set automatic
expiration dates for land use ordinances without allowing the planning commission to have any say in the matter.972
Because state law assigns the planning commission the duty of establishing a comprehensive land use plan, a voter
initiative cannot strip them of their power and avoid the legislative intent.973 Affirming the decision of the superior
court, the supreme court held that the land use ballot initiative was unenforceable as a matter of law because it
circumvented the planning commission’s statutory duty to create a consistent and comprehensive land use plan.974
Swetzof v. Philemonoff
In Swetzof v. Philemonoff,975 the supreme court held that a proposed ballot initiative should have been
subject to approval by the city clerk because the initiative was enforceable as a matter of law and was legislative in
nature.976 Philemonoff included language in his proposed ballot initiative which required the City of St. Paul to take
express action toward receiving regulatory approval to end the retail sale of electric power.977 The supreme court
held that because the initiative clearly stated that the city would be required to take action, it became enforceable as
a matter of law.978 The court noted that legislative matters tend to involve new rules of a permanent nature, whereas
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administrative matters regulate existing rules in a temporary manner.979 The supreme court held that an initiative is
legislative when it: (1) makes new law; (2) declares a public policy with a way to achieve it; and (3) does not require
specific training or knowledge.980 Philemonoff’s proposed initiative met the first two prongs.981 However, the court
held that the third prong was subordinate to the first two, due to the state’s standing policy of liberally construing
voter initiatives so as to maintain their validity.982 The supreme court therefore affirmed the lower court, holding that
the proposed initiative should have been approved by the city clerk because the initiative was enforceable as a
matter of law and was legislative in nature.983

EMPLOYMENT LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Classified Employees Ass’n v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District
In Classified Employees Ass’n v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District,984 the supreme court held
that a school district’s decision to outsource its custodial services was not subject to arbitration with a union when
the collective bargaining agreement did not prohibit or limit outsourcing.985 Both parties agreed to a collective
bargaining agreement that did not prohibit or limit outsourcing.986 In December 2005, the Matanuska-Susitna
Borough School District began outsourcing custodial work, replacing union workers with contract employees.987
The union filed a grievance and the school district sought a declaratory judgment that outsourcing was not
arbitrable.988 In response, the union filed suit to compel the arbitration.989 The superior court found in favor of the
school district, concluding that the question of whether an issue is arbitrable is not a question of law and that there
was no statutory prohibition to prevent the school board from outsourcing.990 The supreme court affirmed the
decision,991 holding that the school district’s decision to outsource its custodial services was not subject to
arbitration with a union when the collective bargaining agreement did not prohibit or limit outsourcing.992
Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc.
In Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc.,993 the supreme court held that an employment arbitration clause that
placed restrictions on an employee’s right to appeal an arbitration award and required a claimant to pay half the
arbitration costs was unconscionable and unenforceable.994 Larry Gibson filed suit against Nye Frontier Ford, Inc. to
receive unpaid overtime compensation.995 Nye answered that Gibson’s claim was subject to an arbitration
agreement,996 but Gibson argued that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it precluded appeals on
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awards less than $50,000 and the clause required him to pay one half of the arbitration costs.997 The superior court
entered an order staying proceedings pending arbitration and Gibson appealed.998 The supreme court reasoned that a
$50,000 threshold to bring an appeal was unconscionable because a losing claimant would be unable to appeal an
arbitrator’s award.999 Further, the party imposing the award threshold anticipated being the defendant; therefore, it
was one-sided and unconscionable.1000 The supreme court held that requiring a claimant to pay half of the costs
associated with arbitrating his claim would run afoul of AWHA’s purpose.1001 Specifically, the court reasoned that
the deterrent effect of requiring a claimant to pay arbitration costs would be a de facto forfeiture of an employee’s
statutory right to bring suit.1002 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that an employment arbitration
clause that placed restrictions on an employee’s right to appeal an arbitration award and required a claimant to pay
half the arbitration costs was unconscionable and unenforceable.1003
Hageland Aviation Services, Inc. v. Harms
In Hageland Aviation Services, Inc. v. Harms, the supreme court held that Chapter 19 of the Alaska Wage
and Hour Act violated the takings and contract clauses of the Alaska Constitution.1004 In 2002, pilots of Hageland
Aviation Services filed a class action lawsuit for unpaid overtime wages under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act.1005 A
2003 amendment to the Act exempted pilots from the Act’s overtime compensation provision, and a 2005
amendment made that exemption retroactive to 2000.1006 Hageland moved for summary judgment based on the 2005
amendment, arguing that the amendment’s retroactive exemption violated several provisions of both the state and
federal constitutions.1007 The superior court found that the 2005 amendment violated the takings and contracts
clauses of the Alaska Constitution.1008 On appeal, the supreme court agreed.1009 The court reasoned that Chapter 19
stripped pilots of the vested property interests that were lawfully owed to them at the end of each pay period and
protected by the Alaska Constitution’s takings clause.1010 Additionally, the Chapter 19 provisions failed the
multifactor test for takings violations.1011 The court further stated that Chapter 19 was an unconstitutional
impairment of contracts because it impaired the parties’ contractual relationship by eliminating the pilots’ claims to
unpaid overtime wages and was not reasonable and necessary to serve a significant public purpose.1012 Affirming the
decision of the superior court, the supreme court held that Chapter 19 of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act violated the
takings and contract clauses of the Alaska Constitution.1013
Kelly v. State, Department of Corrections
In Kelly v. State, Department of Corrections,1014 the supreme court held that an employee who suffered
from a mental disorder caused by extraordinary and unusual stress from his employment was entitled to benefits.1015
Kelly, a prison guard, was responsible for overseeing an individual unit in Cook Inlet Pretrial Facility.1016 One of the
inmates, who had been previously convicted of murder, approached him with a sharpened pencil and threatened to
stab him to death.1017 Kelly later reported angina and increased blood pressure.1018 Kelly filed a claim and began to
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receive disability benefits in 1995, which continued until 2004 when the State filed a controversion notice for all
benefits.1019 The Workers’ Compensation Board (the “Board”) held that Kelly’s claim was not compensable because
his injury was not unusual and extraordinary when compared to the experiences of fellow prison guards.1020 Kelly
appealed, claiming that the Board gave inappropriate weight to a correctional officer’s testimony.1021 The supreme
court held that any time a person is faced with a verifiable and credible death threat, it qualifies as an unusual and
extraordinary experience1022 and as a work-related injury.1023 Because Kelly was threatened in an open space by a
convicted murderer with a sharpened pencil, he suffered a work-related injury.1024 In reversing the decision of the
Commission, the supreme court held that an employee who suffered from a mental disorder caused by extraordinary
and unusual stress from his employment was entitled to benefits1025
Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc.
In Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc.,1026 the supreme court held that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (the
“Board”) improperly approved a settlement agreement where a worker was not medically stable at the time of the
agreement and the Board made no finding that the settlement was in his best interests.1027 Smith injured his back
during work at CSK Auto.1028 Smith’s doctor eventually decided that he was medically stable,1029 meaning that
additional medical treatment would not improve his condition.1030 Smith and CSK Auto reached a settlement in
which Smith accepted $10,000 as full payment of any permanent total disability and reemployment benefits, and
CSK Auto would continue to pay medical benefits.1031 Smith signed the agreement and the Board approved it at a
hearing where Smith was not present.1032 Later, Smith petitioned the Board to set aside the settlement agreement, but
it refused.1033 On appeal, the supreme court held that the Board must determine that a settlement agreement is in an
employee’s best interests before approving it.1034 When a settlement waives future permanent disability benefits
before the employee is medically stable, there is a presumption that the settlement is not in the employee’s best
interests.1035 The court concluded that Smith was not medically stable because he underwent more medical treatment
after his first doctor initially classified him as stable.1036 The supreme court held that the Board improperly approved
a settlement agreement where the worker was not medically stable at the time of the agreement and the Board made
no finding that the settlement was in his best interests.1037
Thurston v. Guys With Tools, Ltd.
In Thurston v. Guys With Tools, Ltd.,1038 the supreme court held that to be eligible for temporary total
disability (“TTD”) or permanent total disability (“PTD”) benefits, it must be shown that a work-related disability is
a substantial factor of the total disability, without regard to whether any unrelated subsequent diseases or injuries
could independently have caused the total disability.1039 Thurston, while working for Guys With Tools (“GWT”),
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suffered a knee injury in 2003 for which GWT paid her TTD and medical benefits.1040 In October 2003, Thurston
began treatment for lung cancer.1041 In 2006, Thurston filed a new workers’ compensation claim purporting to still
be unable to perform her job functions.1042 GWT attributed her disability to the cancer and claimed that her knee
injury was medically stable.1043 The Workers’ Compensation Board (the “Board”) found that Thurston was eligible
for PTD benefits relating to the 2002 knee injury and that the combination of the knee injury and cancer rendered
her totally disabled.1044 On review, the supreme court held that the Board must first determine if the knee injury was
a substantial factor in her disability, independent of the cancer.1045 However, the court noted that the test for total
disability when there is a subsequent condition is not a but-for test.1046 Remanding to the Board, the supreme court
held that to be eligible for TTD or PTD benefits, it must be shown that the work-related disability was a substantial
factor in her total disability, without regard to whether any subsequent diseases or injuries could independently have
caused the total disability.1047

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
top
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne
In Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne,1048 the Ninth Circuit held that five-year permits for nonlethal “takes” of polar bears and walrus by oil and gas activities were allowed under both the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (“MMPA”) and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).1049 The Center for Biological
Diversity (the “Center”) alleged that allowing a five-year period of “takes” of polar bears and walrus violated both
the MMPA and the NEPA.1050 A “take” is harassment, hunting, capture, or killing of a marine animal.1051 The Ninth
Circuit held that allowing the takes violated neither MMPA nor NEPA.1052 Under the MMPA, incidental takes of
marine species are allowed for specified activities in specified regions.1053 The court held that oil and gas
exploration, development, and production activities were not too broad to qualify as specified activities.1054 The
court also reasoned that the threat to polar bears of reduced fitness was negligible and that further harm as a result of
climate change could not be reasonably expected to be caused by gas and oil exploration.1055 Further, the court noted
that NEPA requires an environmental impact statement to be produced for federal actions that would significantly
affect the quality of human environment, but the court found that the environmental organizations could not
sufficiently show that non-lethal takes in a specific industry and during the specific time period would have the
requisite significant impact.1056 Similarly, no environmental impact statement was necessary because the effect of
the takes had only normal uncertainty, not high uncertainty.1057 Thus, the court affirmed the decision of the district
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court, holding that five-year permits for non-lethal “takes” of polar bears and walrus were allowed under both the
MMPA and NEPA.1058

ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
top
Alaska Supreme Court
DeNardo v. Maasen
In DeNardo v. Maasen,1059 the supreme court held that as long as a judge reasonably believes he or she can
be fair and impartial, that judge does not have to recuse himself simply because one of the parties is separately suing
the judge.1060 DeNardo sued a judge based on his actions in prior cases, and then the same judge was assigned
another of DeNardo’s cases.1061 After a pre-litigation screening order was filed against DeNardo, he appealed,
claiming that the judge should have recused himself because DeNardo was suing the judge in another suit.1062 The
supreme court held that a judge need not recuse himself just because one of the litigants is suing him in his official
capacity or based on his performance of official duties, as long as the judge believes that he can be fair and
impartial.1063 The pre-litigation screening order was found to be tailored to the circumstances of this case.1064 The
supreme court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that so long as a judge reasonably believes he or
she can be fair and impartial, that judge does not have to recuse himself simply because a party is separately suing
the judge.1065
In re Disciplinary Matter Involving Brion
In In re Disciplinary Matter Involving Brion,1066 the supreme court held that a three-year suspension from
the practice of law issued by the Disciplinary Board of the Alaska Bar Association (the “Board”) was
appropriate.1067 After being suspended by the Board for violating the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct (the
“Rules”) in dealings with at least six different clients, Brion challenged his suspension on two grounds: (1) that it
was disproportionate with sentences for similar offenses; and (2) that the sentencing hearing was procedurally
flawed.1068 The court held that although the Board used a standard that was ad hoc and not rooted in precedent, the
suspension was equal to the length of time that Brion was violating the Rules and consistent with ABA Standards,
which are judged by three factors: (1) the duty violated, the lawyer’s mental state, and the extent of injury; (2) what
the appropriate ABA Standard is for the type of offense; and (3) what the aggravating and mitigating factors are.1069
In considering Brion’s offenses in light of these factors, the sentence was appropriate.1070 Procedurally, the court
held that the disciplinary hearing comported with due process because Brion was provided with adequate notice of
the pending hearing via a mailed letter, he was given adequate opportunity to rebut the statements of the Bar
Counsel, the panel was adequately informed of Alaska precedent, and Brion was not subject to character
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assassination.1071 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the decision of the Board, holding that a three-year
suspension from the practice of law was appropriate.1072
In re Cummings
In In re Cummings,1073 the supreme court affirmed the Judicial Conduct Commission’s suspension of a trial
judge who made ex parte communications with a witness in a criminal trial and—after stating an intent to recuse
himself—continued to preside over the hearing.1074 During a recess from a domestic violence trial, Judge Cummings
passed a note to a state trooper testifying for the prosecution that referred the trooper to material useful in his
testimony.1075 As he handed the state trooper the note, the judge stated, “Just in case you want to go fishing.”1076 The
prosecutor informed defense counsel about the note, and the judge was then prompted to give a similar note to the
defense.1077 At this time, he stated that he intended to recuse himself, but he did not do so and instead presided over
the trial until granting the defendant’s motion for a mistrial.1078 The court upheld the commission’s findings: the
passing of the note was an ex parte communication that created an “appearance of impropriety,” and the judge acted
knowingly in passing the note and negligently in continuing to preside over the case.1079 The court then held that
Section 22.30.070(c) of the Alaska Statutes implicitly grants the court the power to suspend a judge for willful
misconduct in office.1080 Finally, the court upheld the suspension’s length of three months and held that the
commission had appropriately reduced the standard six-month suspension for legal misconduct because no harm
was actually caused and the judge previously had a stellar record.1081 The supreme court affirmed the Judicial
Conduct Commission’s suspension of a trial judge who made ex parte communications with a witness in a criminal
trial and continued to preside over the hearing after stating an intent to recuse himself.1082

FAMILY LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Barlow v. Thompson
In Barlow v. Thompson,1083 the supreme court held that the superior courts have jurisdiction in custody
disputes and that monthly child support should be calculated with respect to income.1084 Thompson, the mother, was
given sole custody of her child by the superior court.1085 On appeal, Barlow disputed the superior court’s jurisdiction
and argued that the court erred in calculating the amount of child support he owed.1086 The supreme court held that
the superior court had jurisdiction and that Barlow’s consent was not needed in order to satisfy the requirements of
personal jurisdiction.1087 It reasoned that while a party may raise a question about jurisdiction, the court does not
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have to dismiss a case based merely on that suggestion.1088 With respect to child support, the court was unable to
determine whether the implied imputation of income was erroneous and remanded for further factual
determinations.1089 Thus, the supreme court held that the superior courts have jurisdiction in custody disputes and
that monthly child support should be calculated with respect to income.1090
Bilbao v. Bilbao
In Bilbao v. Bilbao,1091 the supreme court held that in a divorce proceeding, the party seeking to establish a
mixed secondary asset as separate property bore the burden of proof and that certificates of deposit were marital
property.1092 Annette filed for divorce from her husband Pedro in November 2005.1093 On December 2, 2005, Pedro
cashed out two certificates of deposit worth $50,500 from an account where marital funds had also been
deposited.1094 In July 2006, the superior court decided that the marital property should be divided equally.1095 The
court rejected Pedro’s argument that the $50,500 was his separate property and included that amount in its
calculation of the marital property.1096 On appeal, the supreme court noted that where there is a commingling of
separate and marital assets in one account, a mixed secondary asset is created.1097 The party seeking to establish such
a secondary asset as separate property bears the burden of proof.1098 The court thus reasoned that the lower court was
correct in finding that Pedro bore the burden of showing that the $50,500 was separate property.1099 The court
determined that Pedro’s testimony and account statements were insufficient to demonstrate that the certificates of
deposit funds worth $50,500 originated from his separate property.1100 Affirming the decision of the lower court, the
supreme court held that in a divorce proceeding the party seeking to establish a mixed secondary asset as separate
property bore the burden of proof and that certificates of deposit were marital property.1101
Brotherton v. State ex rel Brotherton
In Brotherton v. State ex rel Brotherton,1102 the supreme court held that: (1) the superior court should have
made more factual findings before modifying a child support obligation; (2) marital property awards did not count as
income for child support purposes; and (3) post-judgment interest on a marital property settlements was income for
child support purposes.1103 Douglas and Tahni Brotherton had two children and divorced in 1995.1104 Douglas
received complete custody of the children in 2004 and the superior court ordered Tahni to pay child support.1105
Later, Tahni asked Child Support Services Division (“CSSD”) to reduce her child support due to her reduced
income.1106 She originally estimated her 2006 income at $20,000 but changed it to $16,000 in September.1107 CSSD
decided that Tahni’s child support obligation should be lowered.1108 Douglas appealed, and the supreme court held
that the superior court did not make sufficient factual findings concerning Tahni’s 2006 income.1109 Tahni did not
clearly explain why her income would only be $16,000 in 2006 given that she made about $20,000 in 2005 and that
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even when making minimum wage she would earn $20,000 in 2006 as well.1110 Second, the court rejected Douglas’s
argument that Tahni’s marital property award was income because property awards are not considered income under
Rule 90.3.1111 However, the court did hold that post-judgment interest was income for the purposes of calculating
child support under Rule 90.3.1112 Thus, the post-judgment interest Tahni received in 2006 was part of her 2006
income for calculating child support.1113 Remanding to the superior court, the supreme court held that: (1) the
superior court should have made more factual findings before modifying a child support obligation; (2) marital
property awards did not count as income for child support purposes; and (3) post-judgment interest on a marital
property settlements was income for child support purposes.1114
Cusack v. Cusack
In Cusack v. Cusack,1115 the supreme court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by
awarding a divorced father the sole legal and primary physical custody of his daughter,1116 by refusing the mother’s
request for court-ordered family therapy,1117 or by authorizing the father to send his daughter to boarding school.1118
The superior court gave John Cusack sole legal and primary physical custody of his daughter, including the
authority to send her to boarding school.1119 Gretchen Cusack appealed the court’s decision to give John custody.1120
The supreme court concluded that in light of the parents’ inability to communicate or act civilly with one another or
others involved in the care of their daughter, the trial court did not err in awarding sole legal custody to John.1121 It
further reasoned that in light of unsuccessful family therapy sessions and nine years of unimproved relations
between Gretchen and her daughter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that ordering
family counseling was not advisable.1122 The supreme court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that boarding school would be in the daughter’s best interests.1123 Affirming the lower
court’s decision, the supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding sole legal and
primary physical custody to the father,1124 by refusing to order family therapy,1125 or by authorizing the father to
send his daughter to boarding school.1126
Danielle A. v. State, Office of Children’s Services
In Danielle A. v. State, Office of Children’s Services,1127 the supreme court held that extending custody of a
child who is covered by the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) to the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”)
requires the court to find that: (1) the child continues to be in need of aid; (2) extending custody is in her best
interests; and (3) the OCS has been complying with ICWA’s placement and active efforts requirements.1128 OCS
took emergency custody of Danielle’s daughter Roberta, and the superior court continued custody until the
reunification process between mother and child could be completed.1129 Danielle appealed the extension of custody,
claiming that under ICWA, the State was required to show that continued custody of the child by the parent would
result in serious damage to the child.1130 She also argued that Alaska law requires the superior court to determine
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whether OCS complied with ICWA’s placement and active efforts requirement, and that the superior court had
failed to make such a determination.1131 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court on
the first issue because the correct rule to apply was whether the child is in need of aid and OCS custody is in the
child’s best interests.1132 The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that Roberta was
in fact a child in need of aid and that OCS custody was in her best interests because she was not yet ready to
transition back to living with her mother.1133 The court remanded on the second issue because the superior court had
not made a proper inquiry into whether OCS had complied with ICWA’s placement and active efforts
requirements.1134 Affirming in part and remanding in part, the supreme court held that extending custody of a child
who is covered by the ICWA to the OCS requires the court to find that: (1) the child continues to be in need of aid;
(2) extending custody is in her best interests; and (3) the OCS has been complying with ICWA’s placement and
active efforts requirements.1135
Dashiell R. v. State, Office of Children’s Services
In Dashiell R. v. State, Office of Children’s Services,1136 the supreme court held that parental rights could
be terminated where a lower court finds that conditions causing harm to children remain unremedied and that
termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children based on past acts of violence by one of the
parents.1137 Dashiell, the father of two children, was serving a twelve-year prison sentence for multiple felony
convictions to end no earlier than 2013.1138 He also made phone calls to the children that severely distressed
them.1139 Prior to the convictions, the State responded to multiple reports involving harm to the children resulting
from his conduct.1140 In June 2008, the OCS filed a petition to terminate Dashiell’s parental rights.1141 The court
granted the motion, finding that the children were in need of aid due to the father’s incarceration and that continued
custody by Dashiell would constitute harm to the children.1142 On appeal, the supreme court found the trial court was
not in error in finding that the condition of Dashiell’s incarceration constituted harm to the children,1143 and that
Dashiell had failed to remedy the conditions causing harm to the children.1144 In upholding the decision of the trial
court, the supreme court held that parental rights could be terminated when the superior court finds that conditions
causing harm to children remain unremedied and that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the
children.1145
Dragseth v. Dragseth
In Dragseth v. Dragseth,1146 the supreme court held that in divorce and custody proceedings: (1) a trial
court must come to specific findings regarding the best interests of the child; (2) a spouse’s premarital separate
property can become marital property; and (3) attorneys’ fees may be paid in property rather than cash if there are
findings to justify the substitution.1147 Gina Dragseth divorced her husband, Josesph, and in the child custody
proceedings, the trial court awarded joint physical custody of their children.1148 Additionally, the trial court ruled
that promissory notes from Joseph’s business were his separate property.1149 Lastly, the trial court gave Joseph the
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option of paying Gina’s attorneys’ fees with property rather than cash.1150 Gina appealed all three decisions.1151 The
supreme court vacated the trial court’s custody award,1152 stating that nowhere in the trial court’s opinion were the
children’s best interests mentioned.1153 The supreme court held that the trial court did not address the relevant
statutory factors in determining the custody of the children and did not give any clear indication of the factors that it
used.1154 On the issue of the promissory notes, the supreme court held that they could be marital property because
they were obtained during the marriage and because a spouse’s premarital separate property, by the process of
transmutation, can become marital property.1155 With respect to attorneys’ fees, the supreme court held that there is
no problem in awarding property instead of cash payments, but the trial court must give reasons for doing so when
one of the parties claims that he is unable to convert the property into cash.1156 Reversing and remanding the
decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that in divorce and custody proceedings: (1) a trial court must
come to specific findings regarding the best interests of the child; (2) a spouse’s premarital separate property can
become marital property; and (3) attorneys’ fees may be paid in property rather than cash if there are findings to
justify the substitution.1157
Hartley v. Hartley
In Hartley v. Hartley,1158 the supreme court held that when a property settlement agreement does not
expressly resolve disputes regarding the division of benefits accrued in a Federal Employee Retirement System
(“FERS”) defined benefit plan, a superior court may use its discretion in resolving those disputes and need not hold
an evidentiary hearing when no genuine issue of material fact exists.1159 Tina Hartley filed for divorce from John
Hatley and the couple entered into and filed a property settlement agreement.1160 The agreement divided John’s
FERS plan by awarding Tina fifty-seven percent of the plan’s monthly benefits accrued during the marriage and the
time following the divorce.1161 Tina filed qualified domestic relations orders (“QDRO”), proposing that her fiftyseven percent of the FERS benefits should be calculated from John’s highest three years of salary, even if those
years occurred after the divorce,1162 and the superior court adopted her FERS QDRO.1163 On appeal the supreme
court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the benefits based on John’s highest three
salary years rather than the three highest salary years during the marriage.1164 The court held further that the superior
court permissibly declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing because there was no genuine issue of material fact,
only a legal dispute over the proper interpretation of the agreement.1165 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s
decision and thus held that when a property settlement agreement does not expressly resolve disputes regarding the
division of benefits accrued in a FERS defined benefit plan, a superior court may use its discretion in resolving those
disputes and need not hold an evidentiary hearing when no genuine issue of material fact exists.1166
Heitz v. State
In Heitz v. State,1167 the supreme court held that a foster parent’s interest in foster care reimbursement
payments is protected by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and such payments cannot be recouped by
the State without the parent receiving adequate notice of an intention to recoup and a chance to contest the state
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action.1168 Heitz was a foster parent who received reimbursement payments for foster care from the State for taking
care of Timothy, as well as other children.1169 In 2006, the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) audited Timothy’s
file, found that Heitz had been overcompensated for caring for him, and informed Heitz that it intended to deduct the
amount of overcompensation from future payments.1170 On appeal, the supreme court held that foster care payments
constitute an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed without cause.1171 Before the
State could take or reduce such property rights, due process required that adequate notice be given with a fair
opportunity to contest the decision.1172 To determine if the agency’s notice had been adequate, the court applied a
balancing test which considered: (1) the private interest involved; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of property
rights through procedure used; (3) probable value of additional procedures if used; and (4) the Government’s
interest, including the risk of added administrative burden in adding additional procedures.1173 Applying this test, the
court held that the notice given was inadequate, due largely to the great reliance Heitz placed on these payments and
the minimal burden the additional requirements would impose on the State.1174 Remanding the case to determine
whether OCS provided sufficient notice,1175 the supreme court held a foster parent’s interest in foster care
reimbursement payments that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and such payments
cannot be recouped by the State without the parent receiving adequate notice of an intention to recoup and a chance
to contest the state action.1176
Havel v. Havel
In Havel v. Havel,1177 the supreme court held that a court can modify a child custody agreement to include a
schedule of visitation, but such modification cannot permanently change the amount of time that each parent will
spend with the child.1178 The father appealed from a district court decision granting the mother’s request for a
specific custody schedule for their child.1179 The original agreement between the Havels had a fifty-fifty split in
custody, with no specific scheduling plan.1180 The superior court implemented a scheduling plan that, when
implemented, resulted in a sixty-forty split in custody, with more of the child’s time spent with his mother.1181 The
supreme court held that the superior court was allowed to change the original plan because the plan originally had no
schedule and communications between the parties had broken down, necessitating court intervention.1182 The court,
however, found that modifying the plan to a sixty-forty custody split was unacceptable.1183 Although theoretically
the new plan would split the custody time at fifty-six to forty-four in favor of the mother, when applied practically, it
would result in a sixty-forty split in favor of the mother.1184 The superior court based its plan for custody partially on
the father’s work schedule.1185 However, the supreme court found that the evidence did not support the father’s work
schedule as a basis for a necessary deviation from fifty-fifty custody.1186 Since there was no evidence that deviation
from the original agreement was necessary, and because the parties originally bargained for equal time with their
child, the supreme court remanded the decision to the superior court.1187 It held that while the superior court was
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allowed to create a schedule of visitation, it could not permanently change the amount of time each parent will spend
with the child.1188
Hunter v. Conwell
In Hunter v. Conwell,1189 the supreme court held that a challenge to an initial custody determination two
years after default judgment was time-barred, but an evidentiary hearing to modify custody may be granted when
significant facts exist that demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances.1190 After Hunter and Conwell ended
their relationship in early 2006, Conwell sued for sole legal and primary physical custody of their two children.1191
After Hunter failed to respond or attend the scheduled hearing, Conwell was awarded legal custody, with visitation
rights given to Hunter.1192 In 2008, Hunter filed a pro se motion seeking modification of the custody order which the
superior court denied because Hunter failed to show a substantial change of circumstances.1193 On appeal, the
supreme court held that Hunter’s arguments regarding the initial custody determination were time-barred, but
reversed the superior court’s decision on the modification issue, reasoning that Hunter’s allegations, if proven true at
an evidentiary hearing, would be sufficient to show a substantial change of circumstances.1194 These allegations
included claims that Conwell’s girlfriend had verbally abused the children; that the children were left alone for
extended periods with third parties; and that Conwell was knowingly interfering with the Hunter’s visitation.1195
Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that a challenge to an initial custody determination two years after
default judgment was time-barred, but an evidentiary hearing to modify custody may be granted when significant
facts exist that demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances.1196
In re Adoption of S.K.L.H.
In In re Adoption of S.K.L.H.,1197 the supreme court held that misunderstandings of the details of an
adoption did not invalidate consent to the adoption, absent fraud, misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence.1198
Donna, the biological mother, sued the Smiths, the adoptive parents, when they began restricting her visitation rights
with the child.1199 She alleged that her consent had initially been obtained by misrepresentation and undue
influence.1200 The superior court, though finding no misrepresentation or undue influence, set aside the adoption,
concluding that there was no meeting of the minds. 1201 The court also analyzed the agreement under the “best
interests” analysis set forth under Section 25.24.150(c) of the Alaska Statutes.1202 The Smiths appealed the
decision.1203 The supreme court first held that mere mistake or confusion about the finality of an adoption agreement
does not invalidate an adoption agreement.1204 The court agreed with the Uniform Adoption Act that post-adoption
disputes about the details of an adoption cannot be grounds to overturn the adoption.1205 Further, the supreme court
found that use of a “best interests” analysis was incorrect, as adoption statutes never suggest that an otherwise-valid
adoption contract can be set aside if it is in the best interests of the child to do so.1206 Therefore, the court reversed
the decision of the superior court, by holding that misunderstandings of the details of an adoption did not invalidate
consent to the adoption, absent fraud, misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence.1207
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Jaymot v. Skillings-Donat
In Jaymot v. Skillings-Donat,1208 the supreme court held that a custody ruling in favor of the father was
within the discretion of the superior court, but that insufficient factual findings had been presented for the superior
court to have made a property distribution finding.1209 After an informal custody agreement between Jaymot (the
mother), and Skillings-Donat (the father) failed, Jaymot filed suit in the superior court seeking sole legal custody,
primary physical custody, child support, and a share of property acquired in the course of the relationship.1210 The
court gave sole legal and primary physical custody to Skillings-Donat and denied Jaymot’s request to have the
property split.1211 Jaymot appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion in making its custody determination,
in determining the best interests of the daughter, and in failing to find that the property should be split.1212 The
supreme court affirmed on the custody question, reasoning that the court below had wide discretion on factual
issues,1213 properly considered statutory factors governing custody determination,1214 and was not clearly erroneous
in finding that joint legal custody was inappropriate because of communication problems between the parents.1215
Further, it held that the father was more emotionally suitable as a parent.1216 However, the supreme court vacated the
ruling below on the property issue, holding that the evidence was conflicting and that insufficient facts were to
determine whether the parties had intended to engage in a domestic partnership.1217 Affirming in part and reversing
in part, the supreme court held that a custody ruling in favor of the father was within the discretion of the superior
court, but that insufficient factual findings had been presented for the superior court to have made a property
distribution finding.1218
Johnson v. Johnson
In Johnson v. Johnson,1219 the supreme court held that there was no clerical error in a divorce agreement
where the former husband had ample time to review the agreement and consult an expert to review it.1220 During
divorce proceedings, Kathleen Johnson presented the superior court with a draft order proposing a division of Sam
Johnson’s military pension.1221 He did not object to provisions that allowed Kathleen to receive payments even if she
remarried or Sam stopped receiving payments.1222 The court issued an order that reflected Sam’s revisions.1223 Nine
months after the divorce was finalized, Sam filed a motion to correct the order and remove the provisions.1224 The
superior court denied Sam’s motion.1225 On appeal, Sam argued that the provisions were clerical error or were
entered by mistake, and also argued that the provisions did not appear in the draft order he was given to approve.1226
Although courts may correct judgments that contain clerical errors or are based on mistake, the supreme court
reasoned that the challenged provisions did not contain clerical errors and were not based on mistake because Sam
had had time to review the order and even consult an expert.1227 Moreover, Sam had waived any argument that the
provisions were not in the original draft order because he did not present that issue to the superior court, and thus it
was not properly before the supreme court.1228 Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the superior
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court and held that there was no clerical error in a divorce agreement where the former husband had ample time to
review the agreement and consult an expert to review it.1229
Lara S. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Lara S. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,1230 the supreme court held that a mother failed
to demonstrate good cause sufficient to entitle her to a hearing to review her relinquishment of parental rights.1231
The Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) took custody of Lara S.’s three sons because of her repeated substance
abuse problems.1232 OCS then filed to terminate Lara’s parental rights.1233 Lara agreed to relinquish her parental
rights upon the condition that the boys be placed with a family member, but when that plan failed, she sought
custody.1234 Lara claimed that she was now capable of caring for the children and submitted an affidavit citing her
full-time employment, drug treatment, and stable living situation as reasons to grant the review hearing.1235 The
superior court denied the motion because Lara failed to establish that her substance abuse had ceased or that she was
ready to care for the children.1236 On appeal, the supreme court stated that a Lara would need to make a prima facie
showing that: (1) reinstatement of her parental rights was in her children’s best interests; (2) she was rehabilitated;
and (3) she was capable of caring for the children.1237 The court noted that Lara must have contemplated the failure
of the planned child placement when she relinquished her rights.1238 While Lara demonstrated some positive steps in
her life, the court determined that these steps were not sufficient to establish that she had addressed her substance
abuse problems.1239 Finally, the supreme court determined that it was in the children’s best interest to place them in
a permanent home as soon as possible.1240 Accordingly, the supreme court held that a superior court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that that a mother had failed to make a sufficient showing of good cause to entitle her to a
hearing to review her relinquishment of her parental rights.1241
Morris v. Horn
In Morris v. Horn,1242 the supreme court court held that: (1) a child support payment must be based on
specific findings in the record; and (2) a past restraining order, where the issue of domestic violence was not
litigated, did not preclude litigation of that same issue in a child visitation proceeding.1243 Following Sandra Horn
and Dewey Morris’s divorce in 2002, the parties agreed that Morris would pay $1,545.76 in monthly child
support.1244 In 2003, Horn was granted a protective order against Morris for domestic violence.1245 In June 2006,
after Morris failed to pay his full monthly child support payments, he filed a motion to modify the child support.1246
Horn filed a cross-motion seeking past due child support and full custody of their children.1247 The superior court
reduced Morris’s child support payments to $921.83 and found that the two instances of domestic violence created
an unrebuttable presumption limiting Morris’s visitation rights.1248 On appeal, Morris argued that his modified child
support payments were erroneously based on an income of $40,000 and that the superior court erroneously limited
his visitation rights based on testimonial evidence from the 2003 protective order.1249 The supreme court held that
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the amount of $921.83 per month was invalid because it was not based on specific findings in the record.1250 On the
issue of visitation rights, the supreme court reasoned that the superior court should have allowed testimony
concerning the 2003 protective order because Morris had not been present to litigate the issue.1251 Because the trial
court erred in relying on the 2003 protective order, an unrebuttable presumption had not been raised.1252 Reversing
and remanding the case to the superior court, the supreme court held that: (1) a child support payment must be based
on specific findings in the record; and (2) a past restraining order, where the issue of domestic violence was not
litigated, did not preclude litigation of that same issue in a child visitation proceeding.1253
Parks v. Parks
In Parks v. Parks,1254 the supreme court held that a parent’s visitation rights cannot automatically shift from
supervised to unsupervised, and that joint legal custody does not conflict with a long-term protective order.1255
Robert Parks and Tracy Parks were married and had one daughter.1256 After being assaulted by Robert, Tracy was
granted a long-term domestic violence protective order barring Robert from contacting her or her parents.1257 Tracy
filed for divorce, and the divorce court granted the parties joint legal custody of their daughter, with primary custody
awarded to Tracy.1258 The court also stipulated that Robert would have the right to supervised visitation, which
would become unsupervised visitation upon Robert’s completion of domestic-violence classes.1259 The supreme
court held that Robert’s visitation could not automatically shift from supervised to unsupervised without showing
the mother and the court that he had completed a state-approved domestic-violence course.1260 The court reasoned
that the automatic change provision was not in the best interests of the child, and the district court abused its
discretion when it allowed for the automatic shift.1261 The supreme court also held that the trial court was correct in
assigning joint legal custody because of the need of the parents to jointly discuss the raising of their daughter.1262
The supreme court determined that the trial court was in the best position to make the decision, and that the parents
could cooperate enough to share legal custody despite the long-term protective order.1263 Affirming in part and
reversing in part, the supreme court held that visitation cannot automatically shift from supervised to unsupervised,
and long-term protective orders do not preempt parents from having joint legal custody.1264
Roland v. State of Alaska, Office of Children’s Services
In Roland v. State of Alaska, Office of Children’s Services,1265 the supreme court held that the Office of
Children’s Services (“OCS”) must make the statutorily required active efforts to reunify a parent with a child in a
termination of parental rights case, and that such efforts are evaluated over a period of time.1266 The superior court
terminated Roland’s parental rights and found that under the totality of the circumstances, the OCS made the “active
efforts” required by the Indian Child Welfare Act to prevent the breakup of Indian families.1267 On appeal, Roland
argued that OCS initially failed to make the required active efforts and that the efforts made in the spring of 2008
were “too little, too late” because they did not provide him with enough time to complete the case plan before
termination of his parental rights.1268 The State responded that Roland’s deficient conduct overshadowed OCS’s
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admitted failure to make the required active efforts during the first three months that Roland was in jail.1269 The
supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, concluding that the State made active efforts.1270 The
court reasoned that active efforts must be evaluated over time.1271 Thus, the State’s failure to make active efforts
during the first three months of the child’s life was not “too little, too late” because active efforts were subsequently
made.1272 The court further reasoned that Roland’s slow and insufficient progress with reunification resulted from
his failure to take on opportunities the State made available to him and his refusal to work with the social workers
assigned to his daughter’s case.1273 Affirming the decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that OCS must
make the statutorily required active efforts to reunify a parent with a child in a termination of parental rights case,
and that such efforts should be evaluated over a period of time.1274
Vanvelzor v. Vanvelzor
In Vanvelzor v. Vanvelzor,1275 the supreme court held that a superior court did not need personal
jurisdiction over both parties in a termination of marriage proceeding in order to end the marriage.1276 Mark
Vanvelzor filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage with Jessica Vanvelzor in Alaska, even though they were
married in New York, lived together in Ohio, and at the time of the proceeding she made her permanent home in
Ohio.1277 The superior court granted Jessica’s request for change of venue because it did not have personal
jurisdiction over her, since she never lived in Alaska.1278 Mark appealed, claiming that: (1) the superior court erred
in not giving him an opportunity to brief jurisdiction; (2) Alaska had jurisdiction because Jessica requested spousal
support; (3) Jessica waived her jurisdictional defense by not raising it with her motion to change venue; and (4) even
if the court did not have personal jurisdiction, it still had the power terminate his marriage.1279 On appeal, the
supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court on all issues but the last, finding that the superior court did
not need personal jurisdiction over Jessica to terminate the marriage.1280 The supreme court found that any error that
occurred because Mark was not able to argue the jurisdiction issue in front of the superior court was cured because
he had the opportunity to present his arguments in front of the supreme court.1281 The court further found that Jessica
did not waive her jurisdictional defense because she proceeded pro se and thus was held to a less stringent
standard.1282 The court also found that the superior court had jurisdiction to terminate a marriage if one of the parties
lives in Alaska and intends to remain there.1283 Affirming in part and remanding in part the decision of the lower
court, the supreme court held that a superior court did not need personal jurisdiction over both parties in a
termination of marriage proceeding in order to terminate the marriage.1284
Young v. Lowery
In Young v. Lowery,1285 the supreme court held that a trial court had limited authority to divide a military
pension upon divorce, and that the court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded two-thirds of the marital assets
to one party, as long as there was reasonable justification for the unequal distribution.1286 During divorce
proceedings, Lowery, Young’s ex-wife, received a portion of Young’s pension and a trust on Young’s assets if
Young chose to decrease Lowery’s pension payments.1287 Young appealed, claiming that the division of his military
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pension violated federal law by dividing disability payments which should not be subject to division.1288 On appeal,
the supreme court reversed the decision of the trial court to give Lowery part of Young’s military pension because
under federal law, the court was required to divide only the amount of pension remaining after a deduction for
waived retired pay and the cost of buying survivor benefits.1289 The court further found that the trial court did not err
in dividing the marital assets unequally because Lowery had a need to secure additional retirement and health
benefits.1290 Reversing in part and affirming in part the decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that a trial
court had limited authority to divide a military pension upon divorce, and that the court did not abuse its discretion
when it awarded two-thirds of the marital assets to one party, as long as there was reasonable justification for the
unequal distribution.1291

INSURANCE LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
O’Donnell v. Johnson
In O’Donnell v. Johnson,1292 the supreme court held that once an insurance company requests that the
policyholder not pursue their subrogation interest, the policyholder cannot then recover costs, fees, and interests
related to that claim in a subsequent judgment.1293 State Farm paid O’Donnell’s medical bills, and thereby acquired a
subrogation interest in any claims based on an accident with Johnson.1294 State Farm also mandated in writing that
O’Donnell’s attorney not pursue State Farm’s subrogation claim against Allstate.1295 O’Donnell then accepted an
offer of judgment that included $14,047 in subjugation interest, which the court later adjusted to $16,000 despite a
combined judgment and subrogation interest of $30,047.1296 O’Donnell appealed, and claimed it was an error to
exclude the subrogation claim from the calculation of the final judgment, relying on the plain meaning of the
agreement and the common fund doctrine.1297 The supreme court upheld the decision, holding that because State
Farm had requested that O’Donnell not pursue its subrogation claim, costs, fees, and interests from Allstate, the
subrogation claim could not be recovered by O’Donnell.1298 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior
court and held that once an insurance company requests that the policyholder not pursue their subrogation interest,
the policyholder cannot then recover costs, fees, and interests related to that claim in a subsequent judgment.1299
Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. Skin
In Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. Skin,1300 the supreme court held that an “owner’s motor vehicle”
insurance policy could not be construed through the doctrine of reasonable expectations to require coverage for the
insured’s operation of an ATV; however, the court also held that due to a vague definition of “vehicle” in the policy,
the insurer was liable for injuries to the policyholder from an ATV accident.1301 In 2002, Skin purchased an owner’s
motor vehicle insurance policy from Progressive to cover her Chevrolet automobile; the policy also insured her two
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sons.1302 Two weeks later, one son ran a stop sign while driving an ATV, which resulted in a collision that injured
the boy and occupants of the other vehicle.1303 Progressive refused to pay the medical expenses for all of those
injured because Skin’s son was not driving a covered motor vehicle at the time of the accident.1304 The court held
that the policy was not an “owner’s policy” under Alaska law absent explicit language to this effect, due to the fact
that the policy indicated that it was covering not “any auto,” but rather one specific vehicle.1305 The court then held
that because the definitional section of the policy did not cover the ATV, third party liability coverage was not to be
extended to those who had been injured in the accident.1306 Finally, the court upheld the superior court’s
determination that the practice of attaching two definitions for “vehicle” and “motor vehicle” at different places in
the policy was confusing to a policyholder, and that this ambiguity gave rise to Progressive’s liability for medical
expenses.1307 The supreme court held that an “owner’s motor vehicle” insurance policy could not be construed
through the doctrine of reasonable expectations to require coverage for the insured’s operation of an ATV; however,
the court held that due to a vague definition of “vehicle” in the policy, the insurer was liable for injuries to the
policyholder from an ATV accident.1308
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Wilson
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Wilson,1309 the supreme court held that damages should
be viewed in the aggregate when deciding whether a double recovery had occurred under Section 28.20.445(b) of
the Alaska Statutes.1310 Wilson was injured in an accident when Sauve crashed into the car he was riding in.1311 The
arbitrator found that Wilson suffered $210,000 in damages and that Suave was responsible for sixty percent of the
damages.1312 Because the driver of car that Wilson was riding in had underinsured motorist coverage, Wilson was
eligible to receive extra funding, which State Farm calculated to be $54,000.1313 The arbitrator awarded Wilson
$76,000, and State Farm appealed.1314 The supreme court held that the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage
was to offset the difference between actual damages and how much the injured received from insurance
payments.1315 The supreme court then decided that damages should be viewed in the aggregate rather than separated
in order to reach a fair result and avoid more confusion.1316 When viewed in the aggregate, Sauve was liable for
$126,000 in damages (sixty percent of $210,000).1317 Having already paid $50,000, State Farm could still be
required to pay up to $76,000 on the underinsured motorist policy without making duplicative payments.1318 Thus,
the supreme court affirmed the lower court and held that damages should be viewed in the aggregate when deciding
whether a double recovery had occurred under Section 28.20.445(b).1319
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NATIVE LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Jon S. v. State, Office of Children’s Services
In Jon S. v. State, Office of Children’s Services,1320 the supreme court held that, under the Indian Child
Welfare Act (“ICWA”): (1) a parent abandons his child by failing to pay child support; (2) the State met its “active
efforts” burden to allow a parent reasonable visitation under Section 47.10.086(a) of the Alaska Statutes even
though the State declined to move a child after a parent was incarcerated; and (3) future harm to a child may be
based on expert testimony as well as evidence of past serious emotional harm.1321 Jon S. had a daughter who
qualified as an Indian child under ICWA because of her mother Mae’s tribal affiliation.1322 The State placed the
child with Jon because Mae needed to enter treatment.1323 Through the next three years, Jon was repeatedly
incarcerated for using cocaine and violating his parole, and even after his release he failed to pay child support while
working.1324 At trial, the superior court concluded that Jon abandoned his child by failing to pay child support, the
State met its active efforts burden by attempting to place the child reasonably near Jon, and that future harm was
likely from placement with Jon.1325 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision.1326 The supreme
court held that it was not clearly erroneous to find abandonment where Jon failed to pay child support despite
working and recently being released from prison.1327 Further, the fact that the State failed, for one month, to attempt
to place Jon’s child near him after he was incarcerated was not evidence that the State did not meet its “active
efforts” statutory burden.1328 Lastly, the supreme court held that the lower court’s finding of likely future harm to the
child from Jon’s custody was not clearly erroneous because evidence of past harm, coupled with expert testimony,
may sustain such a finding.1329 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that it was not clearly
erroneous for a lower court to find that, under ICWA: (1) a parent abandons his child by failing to pay child support,
(2) the State met its “active efforts” burden to allow a parent reasonable visitation under 47.10.086(a) even though
the State declined to move a child after a parent was incarcerated, and (3) future harm to a child may be based on
expert testimony as well as evidence of past serious emotional harm. 1330
Marcia V. v. State, Office of Children’s Services
In Marcia V. v. State, Office of Children’s Services,1331 the supreme court held that an expert with the
Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) may be qualified as an expert witness in a termination of parental rights case
of a Native child without having expertise in Native culture.1332 In 2008, the trial court granted OCS’s petition for
termination of Marcia’s parental rights to her Native daughter Alice.1333 Marcia appealed, arguing that OCS’s expert
witness was unqualified.1334 The court reasoned that expertise in Native culture was unnecessary in qualifying an
expert when the basis for termination was unrelated to Native culture and a lack of such expertise would not affect
the termination decision.1335 The supreme court affirmed the termination of parental rights, holding that an expert
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with OCS may be qualified as an expert witness in a termination of parental rights case of a Native child without
having expertise in Native culture.1336
Neal M. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services
In Neal M. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,1337 the supreme court held that the superior
court did not commit clear error in terminating a mother’s parental rights because the children needed aid, and the
State made active and reasonable efforts to keep the family together as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act
(“ICWA”).1338 Since 1998, the parents had neglected their children and subjected them to the father’s continual
substance abuse.1339 Because of these issues, the superior court found that the children were in need of aid.1340 The
State then developed a safety plan requiring the mother would move out of the house and into a women’s shelter.1341
When the shelter removed the mother for misbehaving, the State then moved the children, supplied them with food
and necessities, and found a therapist for the mother.1342 However, the mother eventually left the shelter and
resumed living with the father against state orders, causing the superior court to terminate her parental rights.1343
According to the supreme court, a child is in need of aid if, by a preponderance of the evidence, the parent is found
to have subjected the child to neglect by not providing food, education, shelter, or health care.1344 Evidence of
parental substance abuse is another factor the court may consider.1345 The supreme court concluded that the State
presented sufficient evidence of neglect because of the father’s substance abuse and the mother’s inability to keep
the children away from the harmful situation.1346 Second, the court considered whether the State had proven by clear
and convincing evidence that it made active efforts to keep the Indian family together as required by ICWA.1347 It
concluded that the State had made active efforts to keep the family intact by sending the mother to counseling,
finding her a shelter, providing the family with food, and attempting to send the father to substance abuse
treatment.1348 Therefore, the supreme court held that the superior court did not commit clear error in terminating a
mother’s parental rights because the children needed aid, and the State made active and reasonable efforts to keep
the family together as required by the ICWA.1349
Sandy B. v. State, Office of Children’s Services
In Sandy B. v. State, Office of Children’s Services,1350 the supreme court held that under the Indian Child
Welfare Act, once the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) conducts an active effort to reunite parents and child
following a loss of custody, it is appropriate to admit expert testimony that continued custody of the child by parents
would result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child, even if that testimony is via telephone.1351 Sandy
B. lost custody of her three children to OCS due to allegations related to her alcohol and drug abuse.1352 OCS filed
petitions to terminate parental rights, which were granted by the superior court.1353 Sandy appealed, challenging the
superior court's finding concerning sufficiency of the expert testimony to support its finding that her children would
likely suffer serious harm if they were returned to her care; the supreme court found that OCS had made active but
unsuccessful efforts to reunite Sarah with her children.1354 The court further found that expert testimony was
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admissible, since the State’s expert was qualified under the Indian Child Welfare Act.1355 Finally, the supreme court
found that expert testimony given over the telephone was admissible, since there was no showing that the telephone
compromised in any way the reliability of the testimony.1356 In affirming the decision of the superior court, the
supreme court held that under the Indian Child Welfare Act, once an active effort to reunite parents and child had
been attempted, it was appropriate to admit expert testimony that continued custody of child by parents would result
in serious emotional or physical damage to the child, even if that testimony is via telephone.1357
Shageluk Ira Council v. State, Office of Children’s Services
In Shageluk Ira Council v. State, Office of Children’s Services,1358 the supreme court held that it was lawful
for the superior court to refuse to transfer jurisdiction of two child-in-need-of-aid cases to the Shageluk Ira Council
(hereinafter the “Tribe”) because the proceedings were already at an advanced stage when the request was made.1359
Della and Rachel were born to two members of the Shageluk tribe and were accordingly subject to the laws of the
Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”).1360 The State removed the children from their parents’ home because of the
parents’ history of alcohol abuse and violence and their failure to care for the children.1361 The State scheduled
several custody hearings and notified the Tribe as required under ICWA; the State specified that if the Tribe wanted
to intervene in these cases it would have to do so in writing.1362 The Tribe did not file a petition to transfer
jurisdiction to its tribal council until about five months after it had been first notified—at a point at which the
children had already been placed in foster homes and the State had already determined that the children should be
adopted because the father had not made substantial progress in his recovery.1363 The superior court denied the
Tribe’s petition on the ground that it was untimely because the case was so far advanced.1364 On appeal, the Tribe
argued largely that the denial was based on an assumption that the tribal council was incompetent and that the trial
court improperly considered the best interests of the children in making its decision.1365 Reviewing the record,
however, the supreme court concluded that the Tribe’s argument about incompetence motivating the decision below
was a meritless claim.1366 The court further determined that the lower court acted properly in that it considered the
advanced stage of the proceedings and the lateness of the Tribe’s petition in reaching its decision.1367 The supreme
court therefore affirmed the judgment of the lower court and held that its refusal to transfer jurisdiction to the Tribe
was proper because the proceedings were already at an advanced stage when the request was made.1368
Ted W. v. State, Office of Children’s Services
In Ted W. v. State, Office of Children’s Services,1369 the supreme court held that when a father, whose
parental rights had already been terminated, obtains an Indian custodianship solely by the mother’s temporary
placement of a child with him, that status may be revoked at any time by the mother acting in concert with the
Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”).1370 Ted’s parental rights to Danny, a Native, were terminated in April
2001.1371 OCS removed Danny from Ted’s home and filed an emergency petition for adjudication of child in need of
aid and temporary custody.1372 It was agreed by all parties that Ted would be Danny’s Indian custodian under the
Indian Child Welfare Act, but Ted contested that Danny was a child in need of aid.1373 OCS and Joanne filed a
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motion requesting that Ted’s Indian custodianship be terminated.1374 The superior court granted the motion to
terminate Ted’s status as Indian custodian, reasoning that Joanne and OCS had effectively withdrawn his status
because they were in agreement and had sole legal and physical custody of Danny.1375 The supreme court held that a
Native custodian’s status is derived from the temporary transfer of care and is not intended to usurp the parent’s
right to raise the child.1376 Thus, the supreme court held that when a father, whose parental rights had already been
terminated, obtains an Indian custodianship solely by the mother’s temporary placement of a child with him, that
status may be revoked at any time by the mother acting in concert with the Office of Children’s Services as the
child’s legal custodian.1377

PROPERTY LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Cragle v. Gray
In Cragle v. Gray,1378 the supreme court held that an oral succession contract devising a house to the
devisor’s granddaughter was unenforceable because such a contract must be in writing.1379 Cragle sued to evict
Gray, the devisee, but the superior court awarded the house to Gray.1380 Cragle appealed, arguing that the statute of
frauds barred Gray from claiming ownership of the house.1381 The supreme court held that an Alaska statute
governing devisement contracts was controlling.1382 The oral contract here was a devisement because it was intended
to go into effect upon the death of the transferor.1383 Under the statute, oral devisement contracts are
unenforceable.1384 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that the oral succession contract devising a
house to the devisor’s granddaughter was unenforceable because it was not in writing.1385
Hansen v. Davis
In Hansen v. Davis,1386 the supreme court held that an easement may be extinguished by prescription and
that the prescriptive period for adverse use of an easement begins when a servient estate owner unreasonably
interferes with the easement holder’s use of the easement.1387 The Davises bought land containing an easement
allowing access to neighboring property, owned by the Hansens.1388 The Davises planted a garden that covered the
disputed easement, and they later built a greenhouse there.1389 The Hansens then cleared the easement, built a road
on it, and began installing water and sewer lines.1390 The Davises sued, alleging trespass and property damage, and
were awarded judgment by the trial court.1391 On appeal, the Hansens argued that an easement cannot be
extinguished by prescription and, alternatively, that the prescriptive period had not run for a sufficient length of
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time.1392 The supreme court reversed, reasoning that while an easement could be extinguished by prescription, the
prescriptive period did not begin until unreasonable interference with current or prospective use of the easement had
occurred.1393 The court suggested that the interference should adequately provide notice that the easement is under
threat and should be an affirmative assertion that the adverse use is hostile to the rights of the easement holder. It
also ruled that temporary improvements to an unused easement that are easily and inexpensively removed will not
activate the prescriptive period.1394 Thus, the Davises’ garden did not constitute an improvement that sufficiently
triggered the prescriptive period, and the greenhouse, constructed in 2003, was built too recently to fulfill the tenyear adverse use requirement.1395 Reversing the decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that an easement
may be extinguished by prescription and that the prescriptive period for adverse use of an easement begins when a
servient estate owner unreasonably interferes with the easement holder’s use of the easement.1396
Hillstrand v. City of Homer
In Hillstrand v. City of Homer,1397 the supreme court held that Section 09.55.275 of the Alaska Statutes
does not require a condemnor to obtain final plat approval at a specific point in the taking process.1398 Additionally,
the court held that when a condemnor takes land in fee for a public building, land for subsidiary features may also be
taken in fee, provided the subsidiary features are reasonably necessary to accomplish the condemnor’s purpose.1399
The city of Homer sought land through eminent domain to expand an existing water treatment center.1400 Hillstrand,
the landowner, objected to the taking because it would close off an access road to her property without providing an
alternate way of access, and because the city sought a fee simple interest rather than an easement.1401 The lower
court found that the platting statute, Section 09.55.275, does not require the city to determine a final plat by a
specific time.1402 On appeal, the supreme court held that Hillstrand’s rights would be considered at the later
compensation proceedings, and the lower court did not err on refusing to order the city to obtain plat approval before
the end of the taking process.1403 It was not arbitrary for the city to take the buffer zone in fee simple.1404 Because in
takings cases the court must look to the whole of the project rather than scrutinize the parts, the city may take the
property in fee simple for the buffer zone.1405 Here, a buffer zone was reasonably necessary to fulfill the City’s
purpose.1406 Additionally, when a condemnor takes land in fee for a public building, land for subsidiary features may
also be taken in fee simple, provided the subsidiary features are reasonably necessary to accomplish the
condemnor’s purpose.1407 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that 09.55.275 does not require a
condemnor to obtain final plat approval at a specific point in the taking process.1408
Labrenz v. Burnett
In Labrenz v. Burnett,1409 the supreme court held that: (1) an easement holder must remove landscaping
from an easement on his neighbor’s property because the landscaping was not reasonably necessary to protect the
easement from erosion and vandalism, and (2) the neighbor could construct his own driveway over the easement.1410
Labrenz held an easement for a driveway over Burnett’s land.1411 Labrenz installed landscaping on Burnett’s
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property in the area around the driveway, justifying the installations by claiming that they controlled erosion and
prevented vandalism.1412 Burnett sued for Labrenz to remove the landscaping.1413 The superior court ruled that
Labrenz must remove the improvements because they were merely decorative.1414 On appeal, Labrenz argued that
the superior court improperly determined that his installations were not reasonably necessary, and that the court
should not allow Burnett to construct his own driveway through the easement.1415 The court held that Labrenz’s
installments were not reasonably necessary, given that: (1) testimony established that grass alone would control
erosion; (2) vandalism was not a problem in the area; and (3) Labrenz could simply move a fence back to his
property line.1416 Finally, the supreme court held it was reasonable for Burnett to construct a driveway to reach the
lower portion of their property because the driveway would not interfere with Labrenz’s easement.1417 Accordingly,
the supreme court affirmed the superior court in all respects and held that: (1) an easement holder must remove
landscaping from an easement on his neighbor’s property because the landscaping was not reasonably necessary to
protect the easement from erosion and vandalism, and (2) that the dominant estate holder could construct his own
driveway over the easement.1418
Lakloey, Inc. v. Ballek
In Lakloey, Inc. v. Ballek,1419 the supreme court held that an equipment lessor could not place a mechanic’s
lien on property owned by a lessee’s dirt supplier because buying and removing dirt was not construction, alteration,
or repair to the supplier’s property.1420 Yingst bought some fill dirt from White Eagle’s condominium construction
site to use in other projects.1421 He leased equipment from Lakloey in order to obtain and transport the dirt.1422
However, because Yingst never paid the rental charges, Lakloey recorded a mechanic’s lien against White Eagle’s
property.1423 The supreme court held that the sale and removal of dirt from property was not construction or
alteration because the primary purpose of the activity was for Yingst to obtain dirt, not for White Eagle to clean up
its job site.1424 The court noted that the contract between Yingst and White Eagle only specified the dirt’s price and
did not require Yingst to remove any specific quantity of dirt.1425 Removing dirt from standing piles was not
construction or alteration, so no lien could be recorded.1426 Therefore, the supreme court held that an equipment
lessor could not place a mechanic’s lien on property owned by a lessee’s dirt supplier because buying and removing
dirt was not construction, alteration, or repair to the supplier’s property.1427
Lundgrun v. City of Wasilla
In Lundgrun v. City of Wasilla,1428 the supreme court held that: (1) an action taking property could not be
dismissed once the municipality had taken possession of the property, and (2) the proper date of valuation of the
property taken is the date of the summons.1429 The city of Wasilla used eminent domain to take Lundgrun’s land.1430
Lundgrun filed a motion to dismiss the taking or to change the valuation date because the city delayed in replatting
and providing a legal description of the land.1431 The superior court denied the motion and Lundgrun appealed.1432
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Rule 72(i)(3) of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court cannot dismiss a taking after the plaintiff
has taken possession or title.1433 Therefore, the superior court correctly dismissed Lundgrun’s motion to dismiss the
taking.1434 Also, Alaska law states that the date of valuation is the date the summons is issued, so the superior court
did not err in dismissing Lundgrun’s motion to change the date of valuation.1435 Thus, the supreme court held that:
(1) an action taking property could not be dismissed once the municipality had taken possession of the property, and
(2) the proper date of valuation of the property taken is the date of the summons.1436
Luper v. City of Wasilla
In Luper v. City of Wasilla,1437 the supreme court held that: (1) a city may deny land-use permits when
there is a reasonable basis for denial, and (2) an ordinance requiring a permit in order to keep more than three dogs
over the age of six months on a district zoned as “rural residential” was not an unconstitutional infringement of
property rights.1438 Luper owned an approximately one-acre parcel of land zoned rural residential, on which she
maintained a Shetland sheepdog kennel with approximately eighteen dogs over four months old.1439 A city zoning
ordinance required a use permit for the operation of a “dog kennel,” defined as a lot in which more than three dogs
over four months are kept, in a rural residential zoning district.1440 In 2005, she applied for a use permit which was
denied by the city and affirmed by the superior court. 1441 On appeal, the supreme court held that the commission
had correctly denied Luper’s permit, given that the commission’s factual findings demonstrated that she did not
meet all the criteria required for the permit.1442 Further, the court held that her alleged reliance on a city clerk’s
offhand statement that no permit would be necessary was not a legitimate ground for estoppel.1443 Finally, the court
held that the three-dog limit was not an unconstitutionally arbitrary infringement on Luper’s property rights because
numerous dogs in a residential setting pose a potential for nuisance and a three-dog limit bears a fair and substantial
relationship to the city’s legitimate governmental purpose of controlling dog noise, odor, pollution, disease, and the
potential for loose dogs.1444 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that: (1) a city may deny
land-use permits when there is a reasonable basis for denial, and (2) an ordinance that requires a permit to keep more
than three dogs over the age of six months on a lot in a “rural residential” zoning district was not an unconstitutional
infringement of property rights.1445
Roeland v. Trucano
In Roeland v. Trucano,1446 the supreme court held that: (1) a right of first refusal was not breached when
the right holder received adequate notice of the proposed sale and waived his right to match the offer terms; and (2)
a subsequent formalistic transfer did not implicate the right of first refusal.1447 Trucano owned a parcel of real
property, and Roeland held a first right of refusal in that parcel.1448 Trucano entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (“MOU”) to sell a twenty-five percent interest in the land to a different buyer in exchange for a
twenty-five percent interest in any profits from the development of the land; he sent a copy of this MOU to
Roeland.1449 Roeland objected that the MOU was not sufficiently precise, and he indicated that he did not want to be
a partner.1450 The sale then went through without further communication between Roeland and Trancuso.1451
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Thereafter, the parcel was transferred to a new corporation, which was owned by Trancuso and the buyer according
to their proportionate interests in the land itself.1452 Roeland sued for two breaches of his right of first refusal.1453
The superior court ruled against him on all claims.1454 The supreme court held that it was not erroneous for the trial
court to conclude that the MOU outlined the core terms of the transaction well enough for Roeland to decide
whether to match the offer.1455 Moreover, it was not erroneous for the court to find that Roeland’s objections were in
fact a rejection of a potential partnership arrangement and or that Roeland never investigated the possibility of an
alternative arrangement with Trancuso.1456 Accordingly, Roeland had waived his right of first refusal.1457 The
supreme court further reasoned that the trial court did not err in concluding that Roeland was estopped from
claiming a breach of his right of first refusal because Trucano reasonably relied on that waiver.1458 Lastly, the court
held that in the transfer of the property to the corporation, Roeland’s right of first refusal was not implicated because
the property was not transferred to a stranger.1459 Affirming the trial court, the supreme court held that: (1) a right of
first refusal was not breached when the right holder received adequate notice of the proposed sale and waived his
right to match the offer terms; and (2) a subsequent formalistic transfer did not implicate the right of first refusal.1460
Smith v. Kofstad
In Smith v. Kofstad,1461 the supreme court held that a judgment creditor was not entitled to execute a
judgment upon a property held in tenancy by the entirety when the debtor’s interest had vested in his spouse upon
his death.1462 The judgment creditor, Smith, moved for execution of judgment ten years after the judgment was
entered.1463 The district court denied permission to execute, failing to find just and sufficient reasons for Smith’s
failure to execute within a reasonable time frame and the superior court affirmed the decision.1464 On appeal, Smith
argued that he had failed to execute earlier because he had believed that the debtor had insufficient assets to cover
the debts.1465 The supreme court declined to address that argument and decided the case on the alternative ground
that the judgment debtor’s interest in the property terminated upon his death since the property had been owned as a
tenancy by the entirety.1466 The court noted that the decedent’s share in a tenancy by the entirety is extinguished at
death, with the surviving spouse taking full ownership; therefore, the debtor’s interest in the property did not pass by
probate to his wife, but rather it ceased to exist.1467 The supreme court held that a judgment creditor was not entitled
to execution upon a property held in tenancy by the entirety which had transferred to the judgment debtor’s spouse
upon the judgment debtor’s death.1468
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Alaska Supreme Court
Asher v. Alkan Shelter, L.L.C.
In Asher v. Alkan Shelter, L.L.C.,1469 the supreme court held that: (1) trial courts may not amend their
judgments after a party has filed an appeal; and (2) when a trial court makes an allocation of fault, it must explain
how it determined the allocation.1470 After divorcing Martha Asher, Mitch Asher began working for Alkan Shelter,
L.L.C., where he embezzled $104,000.1471 During that time, Martha received health insurance from Alkan as
Mitch’s spouse, and Mitch purchased a house for Martha in Fairbanks.1472 After Alkan sued Mitch and Martha for
damages, Martha gave an affidavit stating that she had no knowledge of the embezzlement and that Mitch had no
interest in the house.1473 The trial court held Martha jointly and severally liable with Mitch for an amount consisting
of Mitch’s estimated gain on the house, insurance costs, and punitive damages.1474 Martha appealed, objecting to
joint and several liability, and the trial court filed an amended judgment that made Martha liable for twenty-five
percent of the embezzled funds.1475 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s finding of liability, but
reversed and remanded on the issue of damages.1476 Although the trial court correctly recognized that Alaska no
longer uses joint and several liability, Martha had already filed her appeal when it entered its amended final
judgment, and the trial court thus no longer had jurisdiction.1477 Further, even if it had retained jurisdiction, the trial
court erred by failing to describe how it reached both a twenty-five percent allocation of fault and the amount of
punitive damages awarded.1478 The trial court also erred by calculating Martha’s liability as a percentage of the full
amount that Mitch embezzled, rather than basing it upon the portion for which she was personally responsible.1479
The supreme court affirmed the trial court on liability, but reversed and remanded on damages, holding that: (1) trial
courts may not amend their judgments after a party has filed an appeal; and (2) when a trial court makes an
allocation of fault, it must explain how it came to the allocation used.1480
Ayuluk v. Red Oaks Assisted Living, Inc.
In Ayuluk v. Red Oaks Assisted Living, Inc.,1481 the supreme court held that the trial court erred: (1) in
excluding testimony of two expert witnesses;1482 (2) in excluding evidence of a defendant’s past conduct;1483 and (3)
by failing to include an aided-in-agency theory in the jury instructions.1484 Ayuluk was mentally impaired and lived
in Red Oaks Assisted Living Home, where one of her caregivers was Austin.1485 The owners of Red Oaks were
notified that Austin watched pornography at work and came to work under the influence of alcohol.1486 Austin had
sex with Ayuluk multiple times.1487 Ayuluk sued Austin for bodily injury and emotional distress, as well as the
owners of Red Oaks for negligent hire, for failure to protect, and for being vicariously liable for Austin’s acts.1488
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The supreme court held that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of two expert witnesses.1489 The first
witness, a nurse, was qualified to speak about the duty of care applicable to a certified nursing assistant, and the
second witness was familiar with investigating complaints made by residents in assisted living homes, thus making
her qualified to testify to the standard of care that such homes should meet with respect to the supervision of
caregivers.1490 The supreme court held that it was error to exclude Austin’s past conduct because the evidence could
be used in demonstrating Red Oaks’ knowledge of Austin’s acts.1491 The supreme court also held that the jury
instructions should have included an aided-in-agency theory of vicarious liability.1492 Reversing in part the decision
of the lower court, the supreme court held that the trial court erred: (1) in excluding testimony of two expert
witnesses;1493 (2) in excluding evidence of a defendant’s past conduct;1494 and (3) by failing to include an aided-inagency theory in the jury instructions.1495
Clemenson v. Providence Alaska Medical Center
In Clemenson v. Providence Alaska Medical Center,1496 the supreme court held that economic damages
caused by divorce actions were not actionable.1497 Clemenson took his wife to Providence Alaska Medical Center
(“PAMC”) for a mental evaluation, leaving her there on the facility’s promise that it would release her to no one but
him.1498 The hospital then released the woman to her daughter, and soon after, Clemenson’s wife filed for
divorce.1499 Clemenson then filed suit against PAMC, claiming that its release of his wife to someone other than him
led to the divorce proceeding, and that he had suffered emotional distress from this proceeding.1500 The supreme
court held that economic damages resulting from a divorce action were not actionable, and therefore the complaint
was barred.1501 The court held that it was ill-suited to consider the very personal reasons for a divorce action.1502 The
court also held that the action had been barred by the statute of limitations and that Clemenson lacked the authority
to contract with PAMC to prevent the facility from releasing his wife to someone other than him.1503 Affirming the
decision of the superior court, the supreme court held that economic damages resulting from a divorce action were
not actionable.1504
Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp.
In Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp.,1505 the supreme court held that a landlord did not violate the antiretaliation statute of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (“URLTA”) by evicting a tenant who
demanded personal injury compensation following an on-premises slip-and-fall.1506 Tenant Helfrich sued Valdez
Motel for damages resulting from an on-premises slip-and-fall.1507 Subsequently, Helfrich was asked to move out of
his current living situation at Valdez Motel.1508 Helfrich then sued the Motel, claiming both negligence and
violations of URLTA.1509 The superior court granted a directed verdict on the URLTA claim.1510 Helfrich appealed,
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arguing that Valdez Motel violated URLTA’s anti-retaliation provision.1511 The supreme court found that Valdez
Motel did not violate URLTA’s anti-retaliation provision because URLTA does not provide a remedy to recover
from personal injury when fitness and habitability of the premises are not in issue.1512 Because that right and remedy
would be better addressed under Alaska tort law, and not under URLTA, the court determined that URLTA does not
protect tenants from eviction when they threaten or actually file suits for personal injury compensation.1513
Affirming the decision of the superior court, the supreme court held that a landlord did not violate the anti-retaliation
statute of URLTA by evicting a tenant who demanded personal injury compensation following an on-premises slipand-fall.1514
L.D.G., Inc. v. Brown
In L.D.G., Inc. v. Brown,1515 the supreme court held that Section 09.17.010 of the Alaska Statutes did not
violate the constitution and that the total recovery in a wrongful death suit was limited by a single cap despite
multiple injured parties.1516 On July 17, 1998, Freeman was refused more alcohol at a bar owned by L.D.G.1517 After
finishing the rest of his current drink, he went home and fatally shot his girlfriend and Tracy Eason after an
argument.1518 On behalf of Eason’s two sons, Brown brought a wrongful death suit against L.D.G. for violating
04.16.030, which prohibits licensed liquor establishments from permitting visibly intoxicated people to consume
alcohol on the premises.1519 After a jury trial, the superior court granted Brown’s motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict because the jury refused to assign liability to L.D.G. even though they found all the facts
that would establish L.D.G. as the legal cause of Eason’s death.1520 A separate trial for damages ensued where the
superior court entered judgment capping non-economic damages at $421,824 under 09.17.010.1521 On review, the
supreme court affirmed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.1522 Brown argued on appeal that the sole owner of
L.D.G. should not have been released from personal liability because he and the corporation were the same
entity.1523 The supreme court agreed that and remanded on the issue of piercing the corporate veil.1524 The supreme
court also held that 09.17.010 is constitutional on its face and as applied because it represents the legislature’s
legitimate policy decision to limit liability and malpractice insurance costs.1525 The supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision and held that 09.17.010 did not violate the constitution and that the total recovery in a wrongful
death suit was limited by a single cap despite multiple injured parties.1526
Lockhart v. Draper
In Lockhart v. Draper,1527 the supreme court held that punitive damages were proper when the reward was
not based solely on unanswered requests for admissions and when the lower court had held a two-day hearing on
punitive damages.1528 The court also held that prejudgment interest could not be imposed on punitive damages.1529
The Drapers filed suit when Lockhart refused to return money the Drapers had given him as a retainer after they
discovered he was not an attorney, as they previously believed.1530 Lockhart transferred his only property of value, a
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duplex, to his brother for what the trial court found to be inadequate consideration.1531 The trial court found that
Lockhart acted in total disregard of the Drapers’ rights and that his actions were sufficiently egregious to justify an
award of punitive damages.1532 Affirming the trial court, the supreme court held that the trial court did not rely
solely on unanswered requests for admissions in finding punitive damages liability when the court held a two-day
hearing on punitive damages.1533 The supreme court further held that prejudgment interest could not be imposed on
punitive damages.1534 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that punitive damages were proper when the
reward was not based solely on unanswered requests for admissions and when the lower court had held a two-day
hearing on punitive damages.1535
North Slope Borough v. Brower
In North Slope Borough v. Brower,1536 the supreme court held that: (1) a beneficiary who recovers wrongful
death damages may recover the decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering survival damages, even if the beneficiary is
also the personal representative of the decedent’s estate;1537 and (2) the beneficiary’s expected lifespan is immaterial
to the amount he or she may collect from the decedent’s lost future earnings.1538 Alfred Brower died when he drove
his snow machine into a hole dug by the North Slope Borough Department of Public Works.1539 He was
unemployed, but he hunted and fished to help support his mother Isabel Brower.1540 After his death, Isabel opened
an estate on his behalf and filed a wrongful death suit against the North Slope Borough in superior court.1541 At trial,
the jury found in Isabel’s favor that the borough was liable for Alfred’s death under both the wrongful death statute
and the survival of claims statute.1542 On appeal, the supreme court interpreted the survival statute to allow survival
damages to be recovered by the beneficiary of wrongful death damages.1543 The court reasoned that nothing in the
language of the survival statute prevented a beneficiary from recovering survival damages as the personal
representative of the decedent or his estate.1544 Furthermore, the court held that the lower court had permissibly
allowed Isabel to recover damages from Alfred’s full lost earning potential.1545 Affirming the lower court’s denial of
a new trial and remittitur, the supreme court held that: (1) a beneficiary who recovers wrongful death damages may
recover the decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering survival damages, even if the beneficiary is also the personal
representative of the decedent’s estate;1546 and (2) the beneficiary’s expected lifespan is immaterial to the amount he
or she may collect from the decedent’s lost future earnings.1547
Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. State
In Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. State,1548 the supreme court held that the State can waive its affirmative
defense of sovereign immunity by failing to claim it in a timely manner.1549 Sea Hawk Seafoods alleged that the
State received millions of dollars in fraudulently conveyed loan payments.1550 Sea Hawk also brought a tort claim
against the State.1551 The State did not respond with its sovereign immunity defense until after Sea Hawk had

1531

Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1027.
1533
Id.
1534
Id. at 1028.
1535
Id. at 1027.
1536
215 P.3d 308 (Alaska 2009).
1537
Id. at 310, 312.
1538
Id. at 313.
1539
Id. at 310.
1540
Id.
1541
Id.
1542
Id. at 311.
1543
Id. at 312.
1544
Id.
1545
Id.
1546
Id.
1547
Id. at 313.
1548
215 P.3d 333 (Alaska 2009).
1549
Id. at 341.
1550
Id. at 335.
1551
Id.
1532

82

already settled with Valdez Fisheries.1552 The superior court then dismissed Sea Hawk’s claims against the State,
concluding that the State had not engaged in fraudulent conveyances or conspiracy.1553 On appeal, the supreme court
acknowledged that sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense.1554 The court also found that the State’s failure to
affirmatively plead the defense did not necessarily result in a waiver of the defense; rather, the test was whether the
adverse party was unduly prejudiced by the State’s delayed assertion of the defense.1555 The court further reasoned
that certain factors may be applied when determining whether a party would be prejudiced, including added expense
and delay, a longer or more burdensome trial, or if the issues being raised in the amendment are remote from the
scope of the original case.1556 Reversing the decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that the State may
waive its affirmative defense of sovereign immunity by failing to claim it in a timely fashion.1557
Sowinski v. Walker
In Sowinski v. Walker,1558 the supreme court held that: (1) the State is not obligated to maintain an entire
access road for third-parties when it has entered into an agreement with private landowners to maintain part of the
road;1559 and (2) that a liquor store that is found responsible for selling alcohol to minors is only responsible for its
percentage of contribution to any accidents that result.1560 After consuming alcohol purchased from a liquor store,
two minors were killed when they rode an ATV into a cable stretched across an access road.1561 Representatives of
the decedents’ estates sued the State of Alaska for failing to keep the access road free of hazards, and the liquor store
for providing alcohol to the two minors.1562 The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, finding it was
immune from liability.1563 The jury found the store thirty-five percent at fault for the accident, and the court ordered
it to pay for its percentage, as well as the decedents’ percentage, of the accident.1564 On appeal, the supreme court
found the State had no obligation to maintain the access road.1565 The court further held that the store was
responsible only for its own share of the damages, given Alaska’s system of comparative negligence with pure
several liability.1566 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that the State was not obligated to maintain an
entire access road for third-parties when it has entered into an agreement with private landowners to maintain part of
the road.1567 The court further held that a liquor store that is found responsible for selling alcohol to minors is only
responsible for its percentage of contribution to any accidents that result.1568
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TRUSTS & ESTATES LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
In re Estate of Fields
In In re Estate of Fields,1569 the supreme court held that: (1) probate court proceedings are sufficient
evidence of notice to deny a Rule 60 Motion to Set Aside Judgment for lack of pre-trial notice;1570 and (2) a probate
court has subject matter jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust.1571 The executor of Wayne’s estate filed for
informal probate of the will in 1991.1572 In 2004, the probate proceeding was reopened and Joseph and Wayne Jr.,
Wayne’s sons, were given notice to this effect.1573 During the proceeding, a constructive trust was established to
contain the estate’s real property.1574 Joseph and Wayne Jr. opposed the creation of the constructive trust.1575 In
2005, Joseph and Wayne Jr. moved to set aside the judgments of the probate proceeding for lack of notice and lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.1576 The superior court denied this motion, and the supreme court affirmed.1577 The
supreme court reasoned that a probate court is part of the superior court, and that its adjudicative ability extends over
a broad range of disputes.1578 Also, notice of probate proceedings are sufficient to deny a Rule 60 motion for lack of
notice.1579 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that: (1) probate court proceedings are sufficient
evidence of notice to deny a Rule 60 Motion to Set Aside Judgment for lack of pre-trial notice;1580 and (2) a probate
court has subject matter jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust.1581
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